b. What Should be Said of Anselm’s Solution

22. But if this opinion is taking its understanding about God’s absolute power, because God could not accept any act of a penitent as a just satisfaction for sin save insofar as this act is conjoined with the merit of Christ’s passion - here is disproof of it [cf. also Scotus, Lectura III d.20 nn.12-39].

23. First, because it is not impossible for the Son of God not to have been incarnate and, consequently, not to have suffered; and it would have been possible, along with this, for God to have brought the predestined to beatitude, and to have done so justly (without however excluding mercy). Therefore, it would have been possible for the penitent to have made satisfaction for himself - for God cannot beatify the sinner justly without satisfaction.

24. This is confirmed by Augustine, On the Trinity XIII ch.10 n.13, “There was also, indeed, another way possible for our redemption, namely other than by the incarnation and passion; but none was more agreeable to the healing of our misery.” Therefore, our fall could be healed in a way other than through the incarnation and passion of Christ.

25. Again the passion of Christ only destroys our fault as a meritorious cause, and consequently as a second cause, which is not of the essence of the thing; indeed, it is reduced to the genus of efficient cause. But whatever God can do through a second efficient cause he can do immediately; therefore he could, without it, justly and in ordered manner remit guilt.

26. But if it be said to these two arguments [nn.23, 25] that God could, without the mediation of Christ, have destroyed the fault of the wayfarer, and so have led him to beatitude (according to the first argument [n.23]), and have immediately justified him

(according to the second argument [n.25]); yet not by way of satisfaction (because there would not have been anything equivalent then to give back), but now there is a whole equivalent through the passion of Christ (but with this passion being such as to be a satisfaction for it) - On the contrary: satisfaction is a returning of equivalent for equivalent; but the sin turning away from God was as evil as the turning back to God out of charity was good; also, my sin took away as much good (and not more), and as much good can be in my act, as was of a nature to be in my act; so through that amount of good, therefore, can something altogether equivalent be given back.

27. If it be said that my act is not the equivalent in good of the evil in displeasure [sc. caused to God] unless the act be elicited by grace, but the first grace would only be given to a sinner by the passion of Christ - on the contrary, because the first grace can very well, by the absolute power of God, be given without the merit of the passion of Christ.

28. The proof is:

Because the supreme grace given to a creature is given to the soul of Christ, and without any merit; for in no way was his passion either displayed or foreseen in respect of the grace to be conferred on him; rather, it was foreseen that he was going to have grace first before his passion was to be accepted.

Again, the passion of Christ was a finite good, even when taken according to the whole idea of merit in it; because it was not an uncreated good, nor consequently was it accepted by God infinitely on the part of the object, because God was not blessed by willing or loving that passion as he is by loving his essence. If infinity in sin, therefore, would prohibit possible satisfaction, it will also prohibit it after the passion of Christ is in place.