B. Solution of the Question

12. From this distinction of vow I reply to the question, because whatever the opinions say which the gloss on Gregory IX, Decretals IV tit.6 ch.6 recites, this opinion is the common one, that a simple vow does not simply impede, as is found there in the text: “although a simple vow impede the contracting of matrimony, yet it does not destroy a matrimony already contracted,” and only this do we say it simply impedes. But a solemn vow does impede simply, as is found there, ibid., ch.7.

13. Reason assigned for the difference [Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.38 princ.7]:

One vow manifest and one not manifest, one proved and one not proved.

14. But this is nothing because, as was said [n.11], a simple vow, even if public and proved, does not destroy [an existing matrimony].

15. Another reason [Richard of Middleton, ibid.], because by a solemn vow one gives to him to whom one vows a right over oneself as to the act that follows the vow, and so he who solemnly vows continence gives to him, in whose hand he vows, right over himself as to making it to be observed; therefore he cannot give a right over himself, or his own [body], for the opposite act, because he does not now have that right.

16. This reason is probable.

17. However the objection may be made that he who vows with a private vow gives his body to God as to the act of the vow; therefore, he cannot give his body to his spouse for the contrary act; for one no less transfers from oneself what one vows to God immediately than one transfers what one gives to him through the medium or a human vicar.

18. But it will be said that God did not thus want power over the body to be given immediately to him, so that the following giving to a spouse would be simply null; but he wanted it thus to be about a giving made to himself through mediation of man.

19. But where does this come from? Scripture does not seem to contain this and that will of God.

20. Another reason [Richard of Middleton, ibid.], because he who makes a solemn vow gives himself in possession to him to whom he vows; he who vows simply does not, but as it were makes a promise.

21. But this is worth less than the second [n.15], because everything intrinsic to a vow as it regards an act of will whereby one obligates oneself by vowing, and transfers ownership of oneself to another (because it is through one’s own will that one is owner and transfers ownership) - everything, I say, is equal on this side and on that; so there is a giving here no more than there, nor a promise there more than here.

22. If a fourth reason be set down [Richard of Middleton ibid.], that transgression of a solemn vow is scandalous, and therefore one is bound to its observance, not only before God and oneself, but before the whole Church; the transgression of a private vow is not thus scandalous.

23. This proves nothing save that the sin here is graver than there, but the question is not about this; for not always does a graver sin take away the power to contract [matrimony].

24. Similarly, if the question were about the sin, it would seem illicit to contract matrimony after a private vow, because he simply sins mortally in contracting with the intention of consenting and consummating the carnal act; and therefore he cannot licitly contract, save with the intention of not consenting and consequently of entering Religion.

25. Also when he do consummate, he seems to sin mortally, because against his vow, although according to some [Richard of Middleton] he does not, after the first act, sin mortally in rendering it, because he is now obligated to it by a stronger bond. However, he does sin mortally in asking for it, because he has no right to this, since he has renounced such right in his vow.

26. This reason too about scandal is not compelling, because a public vow, though not a solemn one, induces scandal if the one who makes the vow ultimately transgresses it.

27. A reason, then, to be set down for this can be as follows, namely that the Church has delegitimized him who so vows; and this was reasonable because he placed himself in the power of the Church as to the opposite of that for which the contract of matrimony is. But the Church does not delegitimize him who vows privately, because he did not thus put himself in the Church’s power, but because he put himself in the hand of God to keep the opposite, and he has consulted with his soul before God not to transgress it, for the Church has left him with divine judgment.

28. And if you ask why the Church has not delegitimized him, since he sins mortally by contracting matrimony save with the intention of not consummating it? I reply, the Church does not punish all evils, nor does she so prohibit them that for this reason she impose ecclesiastical penalties; and perhaps a greater evil would follow from the delegitimizing of those who vow with a simple vow than from the non-delegitimizing of them, because more frequent guilt would follow there in the carnal act, if they not wish to be continent, as is too probable about many people, unless they have their own wives whom, being content with (even if not in asking yet in rendering), they may licitly use.

29. Now the foundation for this, that it would be licit for such a one to contract with the intention of not consummating, is obtained from Christ, because Christ preferred the state of virginity and of Religion to matrimony, as is plain in the case of John; and, from his example, Macarius and Alexius and many others dismissed their wives without knowing them [sc. carnally] and adhered to Christ [d.31 n.30]. The Church, therefore, indeed Christ, rendered that state more excellent and the other inferior. And the Church regards Religion and Sacred Orders to be the same as regards the state of continence, or as regard this preeminence, because, by statute of the Church, both states delegitimize people for such contract.