II. To the Initial Arguments

36. As to the first argument [n.3], it is plain that these are not three goods of the sacrament of matrimony (for that is a certain sign accompanying the contract), but they are three goods of matrimony properly taken (namely the indissoluble bond that remains after the contract), and it is not unacceptable that it is good with other goods. But it is good with one of these goods as with intrinsic goodness, with the others as with ends that are nearer or more remote or more principal.

37. To the second [n.4] the answer is plain from the solution to the question; for the good of faith is always in the obligation though not always in the execution [n.24].

38. To the third [n.5] the answer is plain through the same thing, that the obligation is not absolutely for the good of offspring, but under the condition, if it happen, for receiving offspring gladly and for educating them religiously, and for not studying to procure the opposite, so that offspring not happen. However, in truth, where there is a certain impossibility for the good of offspring, the conjugal act does not seem much excused by this, unless you say that perhaps God would miraculously give fecundity to the sterile. But if that not be probable, nor intended by those using such act, the other two goods excuse it, and the matrimony is there only as a remedy, but not as an office, which was spoken about above, in distinction 26 in the solution to the question [nn.77-81].

39. As to the final one [n.6], it is plain how ‘sacrament’ is equivocal; for as it is taken as one good of matrimony, and in the way it is taken in this question principally [nn.14, 23], it is only the indissolubility formally of the bond or obligation. But as the sacrament of matrimony is taken properly, it is a sensible sign of the grace conferred on those worthily contracting matrimony, for the graced union of minds.