Thirty First Distinction

Single Question. Whether the Goods of Matrimony are the Three that the Master Sets Down in the Text, namely Faith, Offspring, and Sacrament

1. “After these things, about the goods of matrimony” [Lombard, Sent. IV d.31 ch.1].

2. About this thirty first distinction I ask whether the goods of matrimony are the three that the Master sets down in the text, namely faith, offspring, and sacrament.

3. It seems that they are not:

Because a sacrament is formally good in itself; therefore it is not good by other goods, that is, good through other goods.

4. Again, faith does not seem to be a good of matrimony, because between adulterer and adulteress or another woman there can be a true matrimony, where however there is not faith or the good of faith.

5. Again, there can be matrimony with someone who is sterile, where there is not the good of offspring.

6. Again, since matrimony is a sacrament, the sacrament cannot be a partial good of matrimony, because the same thing is not a part of itself.

7. To the opposite is the Master in the text [n.1].

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Others

1. Exposition of the Opinion

8. Here it is said [Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.31 princ. 1 q.1] that he who contracts matrimony obligates himself to carnal union, at least under the condition if it be asked for; and certitude about not asking for it is found in very few. But in that act a man is deprived of the greatest good, namely the use of reason, according to the Philosopher Ethics 7.7 15-18, “such an act robs the wisest man of intellect.” Hence Augustine, City of God 14.16 [Lombard, Sent. IV d.31 ch.5 n.1]: “Pleasure, than which there is none greater among bodily pleasures - in the moment of time when its extreme is reached, almost all the keenness and as it were vigilance of thinking is overthrown” But no one, according to right reason, should obligate himself to anything by which he suffer so great an evil unless there be there some compensating good; therefore no one ought to contract matrimony unless there are goods compensating this throwing away of the use of reason; and those are said by the saints to be goods excusing the carnal act [Lombard, ibid., ch.5 n.7]. Now these goods are the good of faith, of offspring, and the sacrament [Lombard, ibid., ch.5 n.1].

2. Rejection of the Opinion

9. Against this: that in the state of innocence there would have been a matrimony having these goods, and yet they would not then have been goods excusing the carnal act or the contract of matrimony, because neither the act nor the contract would then have needed excuse.

10. Again, in the matrimony of Mary and Joseph there was no need to set down these excusing goods, nor universally in the case of spiritual matrimony with an equal vow by the spouses of chastity.

11. Again, much more is a man deprived of use of reason by sleep than by that act, and this both according to intensity (hence Ethics 1.13.1102b6-7, “The happy man only differs from the miserable man as to half his life, namely when awake”) as according to extension, because sleep deprives [use of reason] for a long time, but this act deprives it as it were momentarily. Therefore no one, according to right reason, should expose himself to sleep, unless there were goods excusing it and goods better at that time than the use of reason, which however is not admitted.

12. It is said here [Richard of Middleton, ibid.] that there are recompensing and excusing goods in sleep, namely necessity of nature, invigoration of bodily members, strengthening of the organs - because without sleep there would be too much weakness and dullness of sense powers, and consequently impediment of intellect, because the intellect is impeded when imagination is impeded. In another way is it said that one does not in sleep suffer loss, the way one does in that act; because after sleep the intellect is strengthened; after this act it is dulled, so that not only is one deprived of this good through that act, but one is rendered less apt for this good after that act; it is the opposite in the case of sleep.

B. Scotus’ own Response

13. To the question, therefore, I say, according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 5.16.1021b12-30, chapter ‘On Good’, that good and perfect are the same thing. But there is a double perfection: intrinsic form, extrinsic end, or first the form, second the end. Now there can be a double end of something: remoter end and nearer end. The remoter is regularly the more principal end, because the nearer end is ordered to it.

14. These three exist proportionally in matrimony, and they are called the three goods of matrimony [n.2].

For, taking matrimony for the bond left behind from the contract of matrimony, this is the indissoluble form, as was touched on in the first question [d.26 n.29], and the indissolubility is called the sacrament by reason of the fact that it signifies the indissolubility of Christ and the Church; therefore ‘sacrament’ as it is here taken is the intrinsic good of matrimony, because it is its first and formal perfection.

15. But this obligation is, by way of end, for this, that such persons procreate offspring to be religiously educated. Offspring to be religious educated, therefore, is the extrinsic good of matrimony, as the principal end.

16. But this end only follows from a certain other principle, namely from carnal union. Therefore, the bond or obligation, which is the first and formal perfection of matrimony, is immediately ordered to mutual rendering of the carnal act, if it be asked for, and this rendering is just because of the mutual preceding obligation. And this near and immediate end of matrimony is called the good of faith, and is fidelity or justice in rendering to the other spouse what is that spouse’s own, and in not giving it to another; and this fidelity, or justice, to the act to which it obligates is an extrinsic good as proximate end, as was said.

17. There is, then, a single form of matrimony, and two subordinated ends, which are also called the three goods of matrimony.

18. In this way is it plain, therefore, how the sacrament, as it is here taken, is the first and intrinsic good of marriage and the form of it. Faith, that is, fidelity, in justly rendering the act due is the good as proximate and less principal end. And the good of offspring is the extrinsic good and the more principal end.

19. And only the first good is essential to matrimony, because the second good, namely to render the debt or the good of faith, is not simply and absolutely necessary for true matrimony, but only under a condition, if it be asked for. Nor either is the third good [simply and absolutely necessary], namely offspring, because that good does not follow save with preceding carnal union. And consequently it is not simply necessary for matrimony, but only under condition, as is also the good that, according to the common law, is necessarily presupposed to it.

20. But whence arises the first good, namely indissolubility?

I say that it formally arises from the mutual giving but effectively its perpetuity comes from God as Legislator, who also does not permit that anyone could give his body to another for that act unless he have power and concession from his superior lord, namely from the Legislator, which indeed God did not regularly concede, but sometimes did well dispense from, as in the Old Law, when he permitted a bill of divorcement to be given [Deuteronomy 24.1-3, Matthew 19.7-8, Mark 10.3-9].

21. The obligation, therefore, and its indissolubility or perpetuity, formally arises from mutual consent and effectively from the Legislator.

22. But, on account of some arguments, it is necessary to see how these three goods exist in every matrimony. For it does not seem that the good of the sacrament exists in a ratified non-consummated matrimony, because this is dissoluble through entry into Religion, as is plain in Gregory IX, Decretals III tit.31 ch.16 [or better tit.32 ch.2]. Nor does the good of offspring exist where there is an impossibility to get offspring. Nor the good of faith where faith is not kept, as in adulteries.

23. I reply: as was said [n.14], the sacrament, according as it is set down as a good of matrimony, is not taken for a sacrament of the New Law, because that is only a sensible sign. But this indissolubility is something spiritual in the minds of the contracting parties. The sacrament of matrimony also passes by at once, because it consists in coming to be; but this indissolubility remains and exists in being at rest not in coming to be. A sacrament also is a disposition for grace in those who worthily receive it; not so this indissolubility. It is however an intrinsic good of every matrimony of the New Law, such that it is impossible for there to be a matrimony formally without it, because it is the form of matrimony, that is, of the bond.

24. But the other two goods are not intrinsic goods of matrimony, nor necessary there formally; but they are necessarily there in obligation and virtually. The good indeed of keeping faith in actually rendering to the spouse what is the spouse’s, and not giving to another what is foreign to that other, is necessarily there in the obligation. As concerns the negative obligation at least, the obligation is there always and at all times (as for the affirmative, it will be spoken of in the next question [d.32 nn.10-28]). And therefore, one who does not keep faith sins mortally. The other good, namely of offspring, is there in the obligation under a condition, if it come about, in order for offspring to be taken up gratefully and religiously educated. And therefore always and at all times is not being studious to impede that good under obligation there.

25. From these points to objections:

It is in one way said as to the first good [Richard of Middleton] that this indissolubility remains until death. But if, as the Apostle says I Corinthians 8.39, the man is dead, the woman is loosed from the law of her husband. But they say that this holds not only of carnal death but also of civil death, because this act [of matrimony] only belongs to someone living in civil life; but when he professes Religious life he dies to civilian life.

26. Against this: if the matrimony were consummated, it would be altogether indissoluble until natural death, such that, if the spouses were to be continent with parity of vow, the bond between them would not be dissolved, even by entry into Religion. So, according to the above way [n.25], indissolubility between them would belong to matrimony, not by the matrimonial contract simply, which is the mutual giving, but by the superadded carnal act; this does not seem probable, because the act is not any part of a new contract, nor consequently does it introduce any new indissolubility of obligation.

27. It is said in another way [Henry of Ghent] that by profession of Religion the conjugal bond is not dissolved. And if it be argued that the bride, remaining in the world, can marry another and be his wife and thus be at the same time wife of two men, they reply that this is not unacceptable - so, however, that she be wife of one spiritually and by spiritual bond only, of the other spiritually and carnally; but it would be unacceptable that she were wife of two men carnally.

28. And according to this, they would consequently have to concede that one woman could by this spiritual bond be at the same time wife of a hundred men, and then matrimony, whence it is matrimony, would not determine that one woman be wife of one man, nor would the commutative justice that is there required do so; nor does it seem that the following carnal union bestow any new justice.

29. It can in a third way be said that in a ratified matrimony, even if the one contracting intend not to consent but at once to fly off to Religion before consummation, there is not only a joint borrowing or bartering of power over bodies for a time but in their perpetuity; otherwise it would not be a true matrimony of the New Law. And from this giving there arises an indissoluble bond, unless it be dissolved by the natural death of one of the spouses, or by the revocation or relaxation of him who constituted it thus to be indissoluble. But Christ, who brought back this indissolubility, Matthew 19.4-12, rejecting for his Law the Mosaic repudiation, himself relaxes this indissolubility when one of the spouses is converted to Religion.

30. Hence, the Church would never have attempted to give license for Religion to one spouse, after unconsummated ratified matrimonies, while the other remains in the world, unless Christ had instituted this. But it is obtained from the fact of Christ calling the Apostle and Evangelist John from marriage to the apostolate, John 2.11 [Rupert of Troyes, Commentary on John II]; and John’s example was imitated by the holy fathers Alexius, Theonas, and others [Jacob de Voragine Golden Legends ch.90, John Cassian Collations of the Fathers ch.8-9, Gratian, Decretum p.2 cause 27 q.2 ch.26, Lombard, Sent. IV d.27 ch.6 n.2]. Nor, according to this, would she, by then marrying another, be wife at the same time of two men, but only of the second; because her bond to the first has been dissolved by the revocation or relaxation of Christ, not dissolved precisely by such or such death of hers; for the dissolution that is through death is by the failing of one of the two extremes, and it does not require a special relaxation by the legislator.

31. Now this relaxation of Christ’s was reasonable, because it is reasonable that an obligation to a lesser good be exchanged for an obligation to a greater good by him who has the authority to make the exchange; profession in Religion, which is an obligation to a spiritual good, is an obligation to a greater good. Hence also Christ preferred the state of virginity (understand: not only by lack of the act but with resolve for perpetual continence) to the conjugal state, Matthew 19.12, “There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven etc.” Hence this chastity, as it is distinct from conjugal chastity, is said to have fruit a hundredfold and that one thirtyfold (Jerome, Against Jovinian I ch.3).

32. If you ask whether this indissolubility belong to Gospel matrimony because of the idea of the sacrament, I say no; rather it would have been indissoluble also in the law of nature, and yet it would not then have been a sacrament properly speaking annexed to the Gospel contract. And Christ could have prescribed this indissolubility in the matrimony of his own Law, even if he had adjoined no sacrament to the contract. He could also have adjoined a sacrament to the contract from which contract he would not want an indissoluble bond to arise, as if he had wanted to approve the Mosaic repudiation. This indissolubility then is precisely from the superior Lord determining that the contract had to be done for always and the obligation to follow for always, unless he himself would anywhere dispense it. With this is natural reason in agreement.

33. From this solution follows a notable corollary, that those who contract under some condition repugnant to any of these three goods, accomplish nothing - as against the first, ‘I accept you for my wife until another more pleasing come along’; against the second, ‘I accept you for my wife, so that I not be bound to keep faith with you, either affirmatively by rendering it to you save when I want to, or negatively but that I be able to marry another at my pleasure’; against the third, ‘I accept you for my wife provided however you will to procure poison for sterility or consent with me in procuring such poisons’.

34. And the reason why these contracts are not matrimonial contracts is that they only hold under that condition, since they are conditional contracts. But it is impossible for them to be matrimonial under that condition, because the condition is repugnant to the matrimonial contract; indeed, they are contracts of no one, because he cannot give himself to her against the prohibition of his Superior, and the prohibition of the Superior concerns contracting under these conditions; for he has prescribed a transfer that must be done under the opposite conditions.

35. Hence, all those who have attempted so to make the contract are not only sinning mortally, but they are, by such contract, in no way obligated mutually to each other for withdrawing mutually, by virtue of such contract, from any use [sc. of each other].

II. To the Initial Arguments

36. As to the first argument [n.3], it is plain that these are not three goods of the sacrament of matrimony (for that is a certain sign accompanying the contract), but they are three goods of matrimony properly taken (namely the indissoluble bond that remains after the contract), and it is not unacceptable that it is good with other goods. But it is good with one of these goods as with intrinsic goodness, with the others as with ends that are nearer or more remote or more principal.

37. To the second [n.4] the answer is plain from the solution to the question; for the good of faith is always in the obligation though not always in the execution [n.24].

38. To the third [n.5] the answer is plain through the same thing, that the obligation is not absolutely for the good of offspring, but under the condition, if it happen, for receiving offspring gladly and for educating them religiously, and for not studying to procure the opposite, so that offspring not happen. However, in truth, where there is a certain impossibility for the good of offspring, the conjugal act does not seem much excused by this, unless you say that perhaps God would miraculously give fecundity to the sterile. But if that not be probable, nor intended by those using such act, the other two goods excuse it, and the matrimony is there only as a remedy, but not as an office, which was spoken about above, in distinction 26 in the solution to the question [nn.77-81].

39. As to the final one [n.6], it is plain how ‘sacrament’ is equivocal; for as it is taken as one good of matrimony, and in the way it is taken in this question principally [nn.14, 23], it is only the indissolubility formally of the bond or obligation. But as the sacrament of matrimony is taken properly, it is a sensible sign of the grace conferred on those worthily contracting matrimony, for the graced union of minds.