A. Opinion of Others

1. Exposition of the Opinion

11. One way of speaking here [Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.29 princ.1 q.1] is that no one can be so coerced to consent that his will consents, because the will is not compelled nor can be compelled. But only in a certain respect is anyone coerced by a fear of penalties he wants to avoid. Herefrom the argument is: anyone does sufficiently avoid the penalties he fears by consenting with words exteriorly; and therefore if, over and above the consent that appears in the speaking of the words, he consent interiorly in his mind, he consents with that consent, not from fear. And consequently, the interior consent is free, not coerced, and so it obligates and the matrimony is ratified in the judgment both of God and the Church. But he who consents in his mind but with the words only, since the consent in his mind is not free, such as he does not contract matrimony either in the forum of conscience or in the forum of the Church, because the Church presumes that such as he did not consent.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

12. But, first, this seems unreasonable, because, according to everyone, the fear cannot be simply fear within or without, or simply coercion, because he who speaks is voluntarily moving his tongue. For however much his mouth were with fingers violently opened or his tongue moved, he could not speak or express words unless he were moved voluntarily by himself; therefore, coercion is only the inducement to do something to avoid a threatening evil.

Likewise, fear that leads to mortal sin cannot happen to a man of constancy, because then a man could be coerced into mortally sinning.

13. From these points I argue as follows: whoever is coerced to something, which cannot, in the absence of something else, be without mortal sin, is coerced to that something else, and this when taking ‘coercion’ in the same way on this side and that. But this person, for you, is coerced by fear into speaking external words expressing consent, and these words cannot, in the absence of interior consent, be without mortal sin, because he who speaks them without interior consent is perniciously lying. So, just as he can, for you, be coerced to speak the words, so can he be coerced to interior consent.

14. Proof of the major in multiple ways:

First, because the fear that excuses is only that which can happen to a man of constancy according to law; but a man of constancy seems to be one whom a fear of greater disadvantage than fear of mortal sin cannot happen to.

15. A proof also of this is that no fear can, according to right reason, happen to anyone save to undergo a lesser evil in order not to do, or in order to avoid, a greater evil; but suffering some pain is a lesser evil than sinning mortally; but it is a mortal sin to express outwardly that one consents and yet not to consent interiorly.

16. This could also be proved about what is licit and illicit, because fear cannot bring anyone to anything save to what is licit; for it is more necessary to avoid what is illicit than to flee pain, since indeed anyone is directed by a higher cause to flee what is illicit than to avoid pain, because God draws a man back from what is illicit through affection for justice, but love of advantage inclines toward avoidance of pain.

17. This reason [n.13] is confirmed by a double example:

First because if it were not licit for someone to consent interiorly, no fear ought to bring him to speak the words exteriorly - just as would be the case with a Religious, who ought in no way to be brought to speak these words, for either he is consenting and sins mortally against his vow, or he is not consenting and sins mortally with a pernicious lie. Therefore, fear is not sufficient to bring anyone else to speak those words save as he is distinguished from a Religious, for whom it is not licit to consent interiorly.

Another example is if someone, while inflicting violence on this person to accept this woman through the violence, were also to exact from him this sort of oath, ‘I swear on the holy Gospels of God that without fear I consent to her’ - in no way should he be brought by any fear to this oath, because, by swearing deceitfully, it is mortal sin. Therefore, similarly, by no fear can this man be brought to accept this woman by words exteriorly, save as it is licit so to accept her; but it is not licit save as conjoined with interior consent.

18. If you say that it is proved by these reasons that he should not speak words for any fear whatever unless he consent with his mind, yet, if he does consent, he is bound, because fear is not sufficient to bring him to that consent - on the contrary: neither is he coerced so to the exterior words simply that another be the mover of his tongue, but because something more to be avoided threatens him, namely death; for this reason is he said to be coerced by fear into so speaking; therefore, by similarity, when an evil threatens him greater than giving consent to this woman (as death or mortal sin), he is coerced by fear into giving consent to her.

19. This is confirmed, because the opposite would give many people the occasion to lie perniciously. It is also confirmed by an example, because if someone in great peril cast merchandise into the sea lest he drown, he casts it from fear; and if there were some other act in the absence of which there could be no casting into the sea, either absolutely or not without mortal sin, he would be coerced in like manner into that.

20. Second, the opinion is at fault in its saying that the Church presumes there is no interior consent there, because the Church presumes he only consented exteriorly out of fear, not interiorly in his mind. For this is false, because the Church always makes assumption for the better side, as is contained in Gregory IX, Decretals V tit.41 ch.2, ‘Be merciful’, and I tit.12 ch.1, ‘About scrutiny in conferring Orders’, “Him whom one does not know to be unworthy, one should reckon to be worthy.” It is manifestly plain that the Church assumes that carnal union, following espousals, comes from marital affection, because the Church assumes that spouse and spouse are not sinning mortally in the act; therefore here similarly.