a. About the Word ‘Penitence’ Equivocally Taken

57. About the second conclusion of this article [n.32], namely about the word ‘penitence’, I say that, just as in the case of the voluntary punishment [nn.49-55], it turns out there are many things to consider: First indeed, the will to punish, which is a commanding or efficacious will joining together the proximate causes of undergoing the punishment; second, the not willing to have sinned or to give displeasure, which is a proximate partial cause of the penalty, although the not willing not intend the penalty; and third, willing, that is, accepting, the undergoing of the punishment now inflicted; fourth, bearing the punishment patiently. And let these four be thus briefly expressed: to avenge what has been done; to detest what has been done; to accept the penalty inflicted; to bear patiently the penalty inflicted.

58. To these four correspond another four on the part of the term of the volition, wherein the material element is the same, namely ‘to punish’. And there are four superadded formal elements, namely what is willed by the will causing, what by the will detesting, what by the will accepting, what by the will patiently bearing.

59. Now it is plain that none of the aforesaid volitions is per se the same as the punishment undergone. And thus the name [sc. ‘penitence’], which per se signifies volition and connotes punishment, will not signify punishment univocally in connoting volition, and consequently, if any expression per se signify the punishment willed and the willing of the penalty, this will be done equivocally. Again, if it signify this fourfold volition, this will be done equivocally.

60. The same name, then, could be equivocally imposed on these eight elements.