II. To the Initial Arguments

25. To the first argument [n.3] I say that presumption goes along with what happens for the most part, and it is more apparent to right reason that for the most part it seems difficult or impossible for such a person to repent well because the reasons stated before [nn.14-22]. However, the conclusion of this presumption is not necessary, because the opposite can occur, though for the least part and with difficulty. And therefore does Augustine say [n.3, ibid.], “I do not say that he will be saved, but neither do I say that he will be damned,” because about neither of them can a man be certain.

26. As to the second [n.4]: I concede that he who knowingly exposes himself to risk of his salvation sins mortally; and so this man, if in any elicited act he determine himself never to repent save in extremities, he exposes himself by that act to such risk and sins mortally. But even of that act, if he has so sinned, he can repent in extremities.

27. To the third [n.5] I say that as long as anyone has the use of free choice he can sin with interior (though not exterior) sin, at least by taking pleasure in sins already committed before, and so he can then dismiss the sin by being displeased with it - though it is necessary he not sin with exterior sin; but this too to the extent it can then be voluntary for him to have then the will. But if he could sin with exterior sin he should altogether flee from it, and then he would have about what he committed before not only displeasure but also an additional exterior penitence, at least in desire, should he survive.

28. To the fourth [n.6] I say that a legislator should not pass over things that are in themselves fitting in ordained law though someone take from them occasion to transgress, otherwise God should never have instituted penitence in any law, because someone could take from it opportunity to transgress, which he would not take if he could not afterwards be penitent. Now as to a law ordained simply for this state of fallen nature, it is required that penitence be capable of being fruitful, and a reason it should be so in any instant of health is an equal reason it should be so in extremities; indeed it is more necessary for the imperfect many that it then be of avail to them. I say therefore that this is not an occasion given by the law but only an occasion taken by the imperfect; but in itself it is an occasion for keeping the law out of love for the legislator, who is of so great mercy toward the wretched that he never closes to them the bosom of his mercy.

29. And this response can be confirmed, because when a greater good comes directly from something than a bad comes indirectly from it as from an occasion taken, then it is to be done and in no way left undone because of such occasion. But that some, bad until the end, be saved by penitence is a greater good than the sin is bad that is done by occasion of it, because many through this penitence finally reach the term of divine predestination; but by the occasion of it none fall from that end, and if they sometimes sin, yet not with the sin by which they be finally damned.

30. As to the fifth [n.7]: I concede that this person should be punished by some penalty for his sin. But it should not be imposed on him here, because he cannot fulfill it here; nor should it be imposed on him that he be for so much time in purgatory, because the priest does not have authority to inflict that penalty. But a penalty corresponding to his sins should be proposed to him in this sort of way: ‘if you were healthy, such a penitence would have to be imposed on you, which, if you recover, you are to study to fulfill; but now you are in the hand of God; have confidence in his mercy, because though he punish you, yet he will mercifully punish you’. Or, in a case where it is impossible to protract much talking, there is no need to inform him of any penalty but only to instruct him about the merciful justice of God.

31. As to what is objected against the response [n.8], I say that the case is not alike: for someone dying in mortal sin has nothing holding him back from deserved penalty; but this man dying in charity, yet a debtor for sins committed for which he has not done penitence, does have something holding him back from glory, because no one, while he is debtor to any penalty, can be glorified; for just as glory allows no penalty along with itself so no debt to penalty either, because the penalty is neither to be paid at the same time nor later.