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past masters commons

Annotation Guide:

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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 14 - 42.
Book Four. Distinctions 14 - 42
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Distinctions
Question Two. Whether the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven are Conferred on Every Priest in the Reception of Orders
I. To the Second Question
A. Solution of the Question
2. About a Priest’s Second Key

2. About a Priest’s Second Key

32. About the second article [n.17] I say that what is ordained for this authority of passing sentence [n.29], or that whose use is ordered to the use of it, such that, of course, without the use of it there is no right use of the other [sc. the passing of sentence], can be called a ‘key’. For it is a sort of instrument for opening, though not a proximate one; rather it combines with the proximate instrument into, as it were, a single one; for without it the proximate instrument does not rightly open or close. But the authority of taking cognizance in the case of a sinner is of this sort, because without this cognizance one does not rightly pass the sentence that heaven is to be opened or closed. Therefore, this authority can be called a key of the kingdom of heaven.

33. Now this authority can be distinguished in three ways like the preceding one [n.22].

34. And about the key taken in the third way [n.28], proof can be given that it is fitting that it be had, and that it is had, in the Church (from the preceding article [nn.30-31]). For he who has authority to pass sentence in a case definitively has the authority of taking cognizance in that case - unless passing sentence at his pleasure in a case without taking cognizance of the case were committed to anyone (which commission does not seem should rationally be given to anyone who may err in passing sentence, of which sort is any wayfarer). God therefore, when rightly committing the first authority to the Church, which is called the ‘key of power’ [nn.21, 31], committed to it the second authority, which is called the ‘key of knowledge’.

35. And there is understood in the conferring of the first key, which is got from John 20.23 [n.31], also the conferring of the second key, as being something that precedes, in respect of use, the use of the second key.

36. Nor is this ‘key of knowledge’ any actual or habitual knowledge or any sort of discretion, as however the Master seems to say in the text [Lombard, Sent. IV d.19 ch.1 n.3], “Many indiscrete persons,” he says, “who have, neither before nor after [ordination to] priesthood, knowledge for discerning, presume to take the rank of priesthood, and therefore they do not receive this key in consecration. But although those do have discretion who, before [ordination to] priesthood, are endowed with the knowledge of discerning, yet the key is not in them because they are not able [sc. before ordination] to close or open with it. And therefore, when [such a one] is promoted to the priesthood, he is rightly said to receive the key of discretion, because the discretion he had before is increased and the key exists in him, so that now he is able to use it for closing and opening.”

37. But this knowledge, actual or habitual, is not the key, because the authority of taking cognizance, though it require knowledge or discretion to accompany the right use of it (in the way the key of power requires some justice for the right use of it), yet as the power of judging is not justice, indeed can be without justice, so the power or authority of taking cognizance in a case can be without discretion in cognizing.

38. And so the Master needs to be interpreted [n.36] - he who wants to hold to him and preserve the fact that knowledge is required for the key of knowledge, supply:58 required for someone rightly using it, but not for its being present absolutely.

39. If it be objected, why then is this key said to be the key of knowledge rather than that key said to be the key of justice, or the key that is justice, if knowledge is only required here for right use as justice is required there for its right use? - I reply: he who without justice has authority and gives some sentence does what belongs to his power, though unduly. And so he who without knowledge has authority for taking cognizance in a case does do something if he attempt it, though unduly. What however the first one does is always an act of power, and so it is always said to be ‘the key of power’; and what the latter does belongs always to knowledge, that is, to taking cognizance in a case, though not habitual knowledge.