b. To the Reasons of the Other Doctors

145. To the first reason of another doctor [n.85] I say that the terms of one thing can be understood to be simultaneous with the terms of another either in simultaneity precise and adequate or in simultaneity neither precise nor adequate.

If simultaneity is understood in the first way I say that the major is true and the minor false.

But if it is understood in the second way, namely simultaneity that is not adequate, then the major is false, because it is not necessary that what is outside the terms of one be outside the terms of the other. For, universally, if one thing exceeds another, it is not necessary that what is simultaneous with the exceeding thing be simultaneous with the exceeded thing. An example: if the soul according to its quidditative terms (for it does not have a quantitative term) is simultaneous with the terms of a finger, not for this reason does it follow that whatever is outside the terms of the finger is outside the terms of the soul.

146. To the other point about an angel [n.85], I say that it proves the opposite, as was shown in the fourth reason against the opinion [nn.117-118]; for an angel can in its own way, that is definitively, be in several places simultaneously, namely by divine power.

147. To the next argument from another doctor [n.86] I say that the likeness about the nature of a thing does not hold, because one nature is the formal reason for being in one species, but being circumscribed by something else is the formal reason for being in one place. And dimension is not the proximate formal reason for being in a place but it is only the fundamental reason. Now dimension can be one though the respects are diverse, just as whiteness can be one though the likenesses are diverse. But only through one likeness is a like thing constituted formally in a species. And if a like species is not able to be multiplied in the same thing, neither is the likeness able to be.The sense seems to be that a white thing can be like many other things in being white, but it has whiteness only by being white or being like whiteness. So as whiteness is not multiplied though the things are that are alike in whiteness, so dimension is not multiplied though the places are that the dimension is in. ¹¹

148. To the next from another doctor [n.87] I say that if the same thing remains in the same ‘where’ in which it was before, it can acquire a new ‘where’ by a single change, and two new ‘wheres’ by two changes.

149. And if you ask whether these changes are of the same species or not - let either one or the other be granted, I care not.

150. And when you argue that two changes of the same species are not simultaneous in the same thing [n.87], I say that incompossibility in two changes is only from the incompossibility of the terms or forms toward which the changes are. It would first, then, be necessary to prove the incompossibility of the two ‘wheres’, which I deny, because there is no incompossibility of two changes of this sort to those ‘where’ terms, as was shown above [n.148].

151. To the other argument of the same doctor [n.88], when he says that the terms of a change are incompossible, I say that this is true of first terms but not of concomitant terms. And I mean that the first terms of any change are privation and form, or conversely, but concomitant terms are those that are joined to those just mentioned.

152. I therefore concede universally that privation and form are incompossible, but concomitants can be compossible.

153. For example:

In the case of changes in individuals, if an animated thing is posited as having a single form, the organic body precedes the animation, animation being the term ‘to which’. But the organic body is not the per se term ‘from which’ but lack of animation is, because the change is between animation and lack of animation. Now while lack of animation and animation are incompossible together, yet organic body and animation are not.

154. In the same way in the case of corruption: if the same form of the body remains that was previously the per se term ‘from which’, namely the form which is succeeded by privation, the term does not remain, but the term concomitant with the per se term ‘from which’ does remain.

155. In the same way as to increase, if the whole preexisting quantity is posited as remaining, the positive whole term ‘from which’ remains, which is concomitant with the privation that is the per se term ‘from which’.

And conversely as to decrease, some positive quantity that was before remains but not the same per se term ‘from which’

156. Likewise as to alteration in intensity or remission.

157. And in the same way about motion, which is not a contradiction because a motion of acquiring does not involve loss. And then with the term ‘to which’ the per se term ‘from which’, which is privation, does not remain; but the term does remain that is as it were the per accidens and concomitant term, being concomitant with the per se term.

158. To the matter at hand: in this case only a motion is posited that acquires a new ‘where’ without a motion of loss, and this sort of per se term ‘from which’ is privation of the ‘where’ that is acquired. And it does not remain with the term ‘to which’. But there is no term here concomitant with the per se term ‘from which’, because such term is only where there are two concomitant changes and the per se term of one is the per accidens term of the other.