1. Three Preliminary Propositions

129. To solves these arguments I set down three propositions:

The first of them is: “Whatever things are essentially prior to the ‘where’ exist uniformly in the body even though the body has diverse ‘wheres’; but what things are posterior or simultaneous in nature with the ‘wheres’ will vary according to the variety of the ‘wheres’.” This is plain because something prior does not vary essentially because of variation in something posterior, but something posterior does indeed vary with variation in something prior. Also things that are simultaneous in nature with something, vary with that something. This is the first proposition.

130. The second proposition is: “As something passive which exists in one ‘where’ would receive a form from two agents next to it in the same place, so will it, if existing in two places or two ‘wheres’, be acted on by the same two agents next to it in the two ‘wheres’.” And I understand this about a being-acted-on that is toward absolute form. And this is plain, because in order for something passive to be acted on by an agent and to receive the form, there is only need that it be in a state of passive potency, and that the agent have an active form, and that they be duly near each other. But whether they are near each other in this ‘where’ or in that one makes no difference as far as action to absolute form is concerned. But when a passive thing is put in two ‘wheres’, it has the same passive potency for absolute form, and the active thing has the same active potency, and the passive thing can, as it is in this ‘where’ or in that one, be near the active thing in the same way. Therefore it will be acted on in the same way as to any absolute form by any active thing that is near it whether in this ‘where’ or in another one, just as if it were in one ‘where’ and the agent were near it. I have added the phrase ‘as to absolute form’ because it is not necessary that the passive thing receive the same effects when speaking of relative things that are simultaneous in nature with or posterior to the ‘where’; because these can vary as the ‘where’ does (from the first proposition [n.129]). However, this second proposition could also be conceded in their case, as will be plain in responding to the objections specifically [nn.177-179].

131. The third proposition is “Just as a body existing in one ‘where’ is disposed in idea of activity to the diverse things near it in that ‘where’, so is it, when existing in two ‘wheres’, disposed to the same things next to it in those ‘wheres’.” This is plain from the proof of the preceding relation [n.130].