D. To the Arguments Adduced for the Negative Opinion

128. As to the arguments [nn.81-93], some are universal and are solved in general in the way they proceed; many others are difficult as to imagination, and the way they proceed is in the examples above adduced about heat, hunger, saturation, health, sickness, life and death, and so on.

1. Three Preliminary Propositions

129. To solves these arguments I set down three propositions:

The first of them is: “Whatever things are essentially prior to the ‘where’ exist uniformly in the body even though the body has diverse ‘wheres’; but what things are posterior or simultaneous in nature with the ‘wheres’ will vary according to the variety of the ‘wheres’.” This is plain because something prior does not vary essentially because of variation in something posterior, but something posterior does indeed vary with variation in something prior. Also things that are simultaneous in nature with something, vary with that something. This is the first proposition.

130. The second proposition is: “As something passive which exists in one ‘where’ would receive a form from two agents next to it in the same place, so will it, if existing in two places or two ‘wheres’, be acted on by the same two agents next to it in the two ‘wheres’.” And I understand this about a being-acted-on that is toward absolute form. And this is plain, because in order for something passive to be acted on by an agent and to receive the form, there is only need that it be in a state of passive potency, and that the agent have an active form, and that they be duly near each other. But whether they are near each other in this ‘where’ or in that one makes no difference as far as action to absolute form is concerned. But when a passive thing is put in two ‘wheres’, it has the same passive potency for absolute form, and the active thing has the same active potency, and the passive thing can, as it is in this ‘where’ or in that one, be near the active thing in the same way. Therefore it will be acted on in the same way as to any absolute form by any active thing that is near it whether in this ‘where’ or in another one, just as if it were in one ‘where’ and the agent were near it. I have added the phrase ‘as to absolute form’ because it is not necessary that the passive thing receive the same effects when speaking of relative things that are simultaneous in nature with or posterior to the ‘where’; because these can vary as the ‘where’ does (from the first proposition [n.129]). However, this second proposition could also be conceded in their case, as will be plain in responding to the objections specifically [nn.177-179].

131. The third proposition is “Just as a body existing in one ‘where’ is disposed in idea of activity to the diverse things near it in that ‘where’, so is it, when existing in two ‘wheres’, disposed to the same things next to it in those ‘wheres’.” This is plain from the proof of the preceding relation [n.130].

2. To the Individual Reasons

132. Answer on the basis of these propositions to the reasons adduced for the negative opinion.

a. To the Reasons of Henry of Ghent

133. [To the first] - To the first [n.81] I say that the first proposition [the major] could be so understood that it would have to be denied absolutely. For God has power for all vision and for all modes of vision; but he cannot cause every vision in every eye, because not every eye is susceptive of every vision, as the eye of a bat is not capable of the vision of an eagle, because the vision of an eagle is repugnant to its receptive power. But let it be that Henry is speaking of any form to which the power of the agent is of itself equally disposed, and to which the receptive power is equally disposed, and let it be that anything through this power could be caused in the recipient - then the proposition is true, because both by reason of the active power and by reason of the passive power the possibility would be equal.

134. But the conclusion still does not follow if it is about any power individually and about all the many possible forms at once, because a surface has, on the part of God and of the active and passive recipient, an equal possibility for every color, but not for every color at once. And then Henry would need to show that a body is on its part equally receptive of all diverse ‘wheres’ and of two of them, which is denied by an adversary. However, I concede as to the thing that, on the part of God as active and on the part of body as receptive, there is an equal possibility in a body for two ‘wheres’ that are simply distinct, and to each or to any number, and then to all.

135. And when it is said that ‘by no virtue can one body have all ‘wheres’ or be everywhere’ - this is false. And my proof is that they concede that Christ’s body could be everywhere sacramentally; for God could convert any body universally, just like bread, into the body of Christ. And I say that, when making comparison with the power of God, there is no greater limitation to existing anywhere by location than to existing anywhere sacramentally.

136. Also, whatever can be done by an active second cause God can do immediately; but the sacrament, that veils the body of Christ, is only the reason for the body being here as second effective cause, because it is not the formal cause, as was proved before [d.8 nn.141-149].

137. And when it is said [n.81] that ‘being everywhere is proper to God’, I say that God is necessarily everywhere by his immensity, because there can be no ‘where’ in which God does not exist by his power, presence, and essence; and in this way is it impossible for anything other than God to be everywhere. But it is not unacceptable that something other than God be by God’s active power in any ‘where’ whatever, nor should it for this reason be said to be everywhere the way God is, for it is not immense.

138. [Second reason] - As to the argument [n.82] that includes many of those contradictories or repugnancies, the answer is plain from the three aforesaid propositions [nn.129-131]. Yet I apply them as follows: let it be that to this body in this place an agent, namely fire, comes next to it, and another agent, namely water, does so in another place - I say that either the agents are of equal power in action or one overcomes the other.

If they be of equal virtue and if they be then next to the body that has one ‘where’, either each would impede the other so that neither would act, or they would act for some intermediate effect in which the passive thing would be perfectly assimilated neither to one nor to the other. And I answer in the same way now when they are next to the same body that exists in diverse places or ‘wheres’.

But if the virtue of either one overcomes the other, it will either assimilate the passive thing to itself or will do so more than the other does.

139. And I reply in the same way if they are in diverse places, because there is no greater difficulty in this case than if fire and water were placed together (which it is not denied can be done by God), and if the same body were next to fire and water having the same ‘where’, because one should not there say, so as to prevent contraries in the passive thing, that ‘anything can more easily, or equally easily, avoid it here’.

140. About hunger and satiety [n.82] I say that hunger is appetite for the cold and dry. But this appetite is either natural or voluntary, namely the wish to eat, and whether it is one or the other it states something absolute. Therefore it does not vary with variation in ‘where’ (from the first proposition [n.129]), and consequently if it be here sated and its appetite cease in one ‘where’, it would cease elsewhere too, though not from food taken there, as will be immediately said about death [n.143].

141. But if you say satiety is ‘bodily fullness of stomach’ then, since it would not receive food as it does here, a doubt is possible whether it would for this reason be thus full here. And I say no (just as neither was the body of Christ wounded as it is in the pyx), because this fullness only states the presence of food contained by the container, namely the belly; and just as it is possible that the containing capacity of this body is different in this place and in that, so it is possible that the active containing capacity of this body here is different from the containing capacity of the same body in another ‘where’, for this containing capacity does not state something absolute but an extrinsic respect.

142. About the third [n.82], namely about health and illness, and temperateness and intemperateness, I say that intemperateness of the air expels temperateness as to the body of an animal on which the temperate or intemperate air acts. And then, in brief, the body would be such as the overcoming agent would be of a nature to cause it to be, although it would perhaps act less intensely because of the reaction of some contrary thing impeding or resisting it. But if they are equal in acting, the passive thing will then alter to the middle state, in the same way in short as you would say healthy and unhealthy things would be if they were together (which you concede God can do), and the same body would be next to this one and to that one together.

143. The fourth, which is about death and life [n.82], is easily solved, because each is something absolute (privative or positive), and consequently does not vary because of variation in ‘where’ (according to the first proposition [n.129]). If then it dies here, it dies there as well, but yet this inference does not follow ‘it is wounded here, therefore it is wounded there’, because wounding states a division of what is continuous as it is here by something dividing it here. But yet it is true that if it has a wound here it has it elsewhere as well, because such is what the discontinuity of the parts is like, and if it is in this body there it is also in the same body elsewhere.

144. [To the third] - To the next argument [n.83], the third main one by this doctor, I say that it is not necessary that something located in place be commensurate with the dimensions of place according as [the place] is one and many, so that according to the multitude of the dimensions of place there follows a multitude of the dimensions of the placed thing; just as neither does a multitude in what is prior follow on a multitude in what is posterior, especially as to an extrinsic respect and foundation, as was touched on in argument earlier [nn.123-126].

b. To the Reasons of the Other Doctors

145. To the first reason of another doctor [n.85] I say that the terms of one thing can be understood to be simultaneous with the terms of another either in simultaneity precise and adequate or in simultaneity neither precise nor adequate.

If simultaneity is understood in the first way I say that the major is true and the minor false.

But if it is understood in the second way, namely simultaneity that is not adequate, then the major is false, because it is not necessary that what is outside the terms of one be outside the terms of the other. For, universally, if one thing exceeds another, it is not necessary that what is simultaneous with the exceeding thing be simultaneous with the exceeded thing. An example: if the soul according to its quidditative terms (for it does not have a quantitative term) is simultaneous with the terms of a finger, not for this reason does it follow that whatever is outside the terms of the finger is outside the terms of the soul.

146. To the other point about an angel [n.85], I say that it proves the opposite, as was shown in the fourth reason against the opinion [nn.117-118]; for an angel can in its own way, that is definitively, be in several places simultaneously, namely by divine power.

147. To the next argument from another doctor [n.86] I say that the likeness about the nature of a thing does not hold, because one nature is the formal reason for being in one species, but being circumscribed by something else is the formal reason for being in one place. And dimension is not the proximate formal reason for being in a place but it is only the fundamental reason. Now dimension can be one though the respects are diverse, just as whiteness can be one though the likenesses are diverse. But only through one likeness is a like thing constituted formally in a species. And if a like species is not able to be multiplied in the same thing, neither is the likeness able to be.The sense seems to be that a white thing can be like many other things in being white, but it has whiteness only by being white or being like whiteness. So as whiteness is not multiplied though the things are that are alike in whiteness, so dimension is not multiplied though the places are that the dimension is in. ¹¹

148. To the next from another doctor [n.87] I say that if the same thing remains in the same ‘where’ in which it was before, it can acquire a new ‘where’ by a single change, and two new ‘wheres’ by two changes.

149. And if you ask whether these changes are of the same species or not - let either one or the other be granted, I care not.

150. And when you argue that two changes of the same species are not simultaneous in the same thing [n.87], I say that incompossibility in two changes is only from the incompossibility of the terms or forms toward which the changes are. It would first, then, be necessary to prove the incompossibility of the two ‘wheres’, which I deny, because there is no incompossibility of two changes of this sort to those ‘where’ terms, as was shown above [n.148].

151. To the other argument of the same doctor [n.88], when he says that the terms of a change are incompossible, I say that this is true of first terms but not of concomitant terms. And I mean that the first terms of any change are privation and form, or conversely, but concomitant terms are those that are joined to those just mentioned.

152. I therefore concede universally that privation and form are incompossible, but concomitants can be compossible.

153. For example:

In the case of changes in individuals, if an animated thing is posited as having a single form, the organic body precedes the animation, animation being the term ‘to which’. But the organic body is not the per se term ‘from which’ but lack of animation is, because the change is between animation and lack of animation. Now while lack of animation and animation are incompossible together, yet organic body and animation are not.

154. In the same way in the case of corruption: if the same form of the body remains that was previously the per se term ‘from which’, namely the form which is succeeded by privation, the term does not remain, but the term concomitant with the per se term ‘from which’ does remain.

155. In the same way as to increase, if the whole preexisting quantity is posited as remaining, the positive whole term ‘from which’ remains, which is concomitant with the privation that is the per se term ‘from which’.

And conversely as to decrease, some positive quantity that was before remains but not the same per se term ‘from which’

156. Likewise as to alteration in intensity or remission.

157. And in the same way about motion, which is not a contradiction because a motion of acquiring does not involve loss. And then with the term ‘to which’ the per se term ‘from which’, which is privation, does not remain; but the term does remain that is as it were the per accidens and concomitant term, being concomitant with the per se term.

158. To the matter at hand: in this case only a motion is posited that acquires a new ‘where’ without a motion of loss, and this sort of per se term ‘from which’ is privation of the ‘where’ that is acquired. And it does not remain with the term ‘to which’. But there is no term here concomitant with the per se term ‘from which’, because such term is only where there are two concomitant changes and the per se term of one is the per accidens term of the other.

c. To the Other Reasons that were Adduced

159. To the arguments added on.

To the first argument [n.89] I say that one can prove through it that two bodies could not be together, because a natural agent does not intend to expel one body unless it introduces another body. If, then, there were no repugnance in two bodies being in this place here, a natural agent in moving this body to that ‘where’ would not expel the other body and so nature could make two bodies to be together. So, because the conclusion is manifestly unacceptable, I say that there are some repugnancies in respect of created and limited power that created virtue cannot deal with simultaneously, and yet they are not simply incompossible. An example: it is as impossible for nature to make a virgin conceive as to make two bodies to be in the same place and one body to be in diverse places; for created virtue has no power with respect to these at the same time, although their absolute simultaneity does not involve a contradiction simply, as was seen [nn.96-97], and therefore they are possible for God.

160. To the second [n.90] I say that one could concede that the matter of a body in two places might be changed by two agents into two forms, nor would a new miracle there be needed, but the matter would through the old miracle be fitted to receive the action of those agents.

161. However I say otherwise, that if the same thing is put in two places, it does not follow that the same matter would be informed by two forms at the same time, whether of the same or different species, and that one could argue in the same way about this one and about that, whether the agents were posited as of the same or different species.

162. As to the example about food [n.90] I say that the same thing would happen with food taken by diverse things in diverse ‘wheres’ as would happen if two stomachs were to come to be in the same place and the food was in each of them. For then either one power would totally overcome the other and all the food would be converted into its body; or the powers would be equal, and then they would convert the food equally, one into its body and the other into its; or the powers would be unequal yet not such that one would entirely overcome the other, and then the stronger would convert more of the food into its body and the weaker would convert less food into its. So as you would have to speak there about the stomachs of animals existing together and about the food received into each, so I speak in the same way here, following the second proposition set down above [n.130].

163. The same point serves for the other argument [n.90], about fires next to wood in diverse places; I say the same as you would have to say if two fires by the power of God were next to the wood.

164. And if you ask, “What should be said then? Surely the wood would be converted into fire, and into which fire and by which fire? For not more by one fire than the other because they are equal; nor into one fire only, because the agents are two and total agents, and there cannot be two total causes of the same effect.” - I say that either they would generate a more perfect fire, and so the effect would be divisible according to perfection if the substantial form could have part and part, just as one would say about heat. But if they were to generate an altogether indivisible effect, yet they would generate it in the same manner of efficient causality where neither of them could be the cause of the total effect, because the effect would happen after so brief an alteration that it would not suffice for ignition by either agent precisely. And then this proposition is true, that “two total causes totally causing cannot be causes of the same effect.”

165. To another argument [n.92] I say that an animal that exists in some ‘where’ without nutriment, would be nourished in that place if it took in appropriate food in another ‘where’. For although the local motion of the food to the stomach would not be the same here as there (and no wonder, because from the fact that the ‘where’ is different, so can the local mP3otion to the thing in that ‘where’ be different), yet the conversion of food into the substance of the thing to be fed is the same here as there, because the conversion is the generation of a part of the substance of the thing nourished, and the whole substance of the thing nourished and any part of it is prior to the ‘where’, and so will not vary with variation in the ‘where’.

166. And when the addition is made “if it had sufficient food in both places it would be nourished twice” [n.93], I say that either it would take in the food in both places and consequently it would receive food superfluously, because half of it would suffice for its nourishment; or it would take in one part in one place and the other in the other, and in each place (from what has been said [nn.140-141]) it would be sufficiently nourished.

167. To the argument about the small fire [n.91] I answer using the second proposition [n.130]. For let a fire be put in one place and much combustible material next to it as it is in that ‘where’ alone - what you would say then about the fire with respect to that material I say now, for either the fire would act precisely on some part of the material, or if it acted on any part, then, if we suppose that the whole matter is together, it would act on it yet with little intensity. I speak in the same way as to the matter at hand, that the action will not be intense on any part of the matter in comparison with the action it would have on one part if it acted on no other part. And no wonder, because natural virtue works less on more things than on fewer, and on many than on one.

168. To the argument about figure [n.84, Christ’s body on the cross and in the pyx], I say that although figure seems to be quality yet it follows the ‘where’.

169. To the other point about whole and part [n.84, about being curly because curly as to the hair], I say that a part outside the whole has nothing outside the whole that it does not have in the whole; for the actuality that is attributed to a part not in the whole outside the whole is only by way of making a precision.

170. But on the contrary: because continuity is an absolute form and consequently is prior to the ‘where’, then the same body cannot be continuous in one place and not continuous in another; and consequently neither is there a part here and a non-part there in the way that being continuous with another is called a part.

171. Look for the response.a

a.a [Interpolation ] - One can say that figure is double. One is an absolute form and it belongs to the category of the quality ‘form or an abiding form in something’, and so it does not follow ‘where’. Another is figure that is the siting of parts in place and in the container of them, and this is relative form that follows the ‘where’; and the argument proceeds in this latter way. But on this matter see d. 12 q.4 n.387, in the response to the question there ‘But about different shapes...’