II. To the Initial Arguments

152. To the principal arguments.

I concede the first two [nn.6-7], for they prove that in this divine conversion there is no action of the category of action, unless the opinion stated above be held [d.11 nn.333-339], that no body succeeds to the bread save the body of Christ as it is here. And if this opinion is held the arguments must be replied to:

153. As to the first [n.6] the reply is that when it is said ‘action is founded on motion’ the term ‘motion’ is taken there indifferently for motion properly speaking and for change, and indifferently for motion subjectively or foundationally or concomitantly. And I concede here that this action is founded on a change of Christ’s body as it succeeds to its not being here.

154. As to the second [n.7] I concede that there is passive undergoing here when holding the above opinion [d.11 nn.333-339]; but this passive undergoing is in the body in that it becomes present here from not being present here.

155. As to the third [n.8], it is plain from d.11 n.164 in what way ‘generation’ is conversion of whole to whole; but the conversion [sc. of the Eucharist] is not a total one in the way generation is.

156. As to the fourth [n.9], the inference ‘nature can be the principle of being in one way that is fitting, therefore it can be a principle of being in a way that is not fitting’ does not hold; on the contrary the way is repugnant to it as far as concerns itself.

157. And when you argue [n.10] that because the being is the same therefore it follows that the same thing can be the principle of this being - I concede it; but from this does not follow that therefore ‘what is the principle of this being in that way can be the principle of it in this way’.

158. And when the point is pressed [n.11] that the mode of the being is not there repugnant to the being, I say that it is repugnant to it in comparison to the sort of cause in question, namely such that the cause cannot cause this being in this mode although it can cause it absolutely or in another mode.

159. And when it is added finally [n.12] that the mode does not exceed in perfection that of which it is the mode, I say that something imperfect with the imperfection left to it can fail to be subject to the causality of that to which something more perfect in another fitting mode is subject.

160. To the final argument [n.13] I say that the action of an instrumental agent, taking ‘instrumental agent’ to mean disposing agent, does indeed require a proper intention in that agent - whether it be a natural agent (as in the case of heat when it causes alteration, where there is indeed a proper intention, although it is an instrumental agent, that is, a disposing agent, with respect to generating fire); or whether it be an agent acting through intellect, because then the instrument requires a determinate human action that is ordered to the action of the principal agent; and such universally is the action of a minister in the dispensing of the sacraments.