3. To the Argument for the Possible Opinion

120. As to what was said about the will [n.116], I say that the major seems probable, namely that ‘a principle of acting that is finite, or non-infinite, is not repugnant to a creature’, and so neither is the action repugnant for which such a principle is per se sufficient. And the consequence of this concession is that the will, as it is the principle of creatures, is formally infinite. So I deny the minor, namely that it is not infinite; and the reason for this denial was touched on in Ord. 1 d.10 n.9.

121. Briefly, then, it is plain that God is simply blessed in the operations of his intellect and will; for he is not simply blessed in his essence as it is infinite if he does not comprehend the essence; and just as the intellect comprehends the essence by seeing it, so the will in its own way, if God is to be perfectly blessed, must comprehend the essence by loving it. And so both powers and both acts of both powers about the divine essence will be infinite if God is to be perfectly blessed.

122. To the proof then of the minor [n.116] I say that in divine reality a quasi extensive infinity can be understood, as it is if it be understood to be a quasi infinite multitude of perfections; in another way there is an intensive infinity of any perfection simply, such that the perfection, in its idea, is without limit and end. And in this second way something can have an infinity that is not only formal but also fundamental, and something can have a formal intensive infinity though not a fundamental one.

123. I say therefore that nothing of one formal idea is infinite in the first way; indeed even in God there is perhaps no such infinity absolutely; for perhaps, just as the persons are finite, speaking of this sort of infinity, so too the perfections are finite in number or in multitude, and the notions and relations too, and the former and latter when conjoined; but intensive formal and fundamental infinity are present together there in the divine essence as it is essence, and to this extent it is called by Damascene ‘a sea’ [n.116]. But formal infinity only, not fundamental, is in any perfection simply; for any perfection has its formal perfection from the infinity of the essence as from its root and foundation. But an infinity neither formal nor fundamental is in the relations in divine reality, as was shown in Ord. 1 d.13 nn.71-72, because it is better for the Father not to have filiation than to have filiation; ‘perfection simply is that which it is better for anything to have than not to have’ [Anselm, Monologion ch.15].

124. The response is now plain, that although the will is formally infinite yet it does not include in itself formally all the intrinsic perfections, because neither the essence nor anything else includes them in this way; but neither does the will include all perfections fundamentally, but only the essence, which is the ‘sea’, does so in this way; but it does include by identity both any perfection simply and any relation.

125. The confirmation about relations [n.116] is of little value, because however much relations are not included the idea of infinity can still be preserved, understanding the relations in the way that they add nothing because of which there is infinity; for then, when they are set aside, infinity is not had in anything, and when they are added they are not formally infinite, and a finite or non-finite added to something finite does not make it infinite; therefore the intended conclusion follows. I reply therefore that although the will does not include the relations formally, it can nevertheless be formally infinite.

126. And if you object ‘the will does not include divine perfection totally’, I say that although it does not include it extensively it does include it intensively as to one perfection formally; but as to all the other perfections and relations it includes them by identity and not formally. And these matters were discussed in Ord. 1 d.8 nn.191-209, 213-217.

127. To the second argument [n.117] one can give reply from the preceding distinction 12 [nn.224-229, 386-417, 432-439, 490-502], from the four last questions -from the first of these it is plain how acting belongs to the species, and from the other three how undergoing and being corrupted belong to them.

128. Briefly then one must deny that they can be changed by a created agent into any totally new substance, either in the case of mixture or nutrition or any corruption of the species, as is plain there. But sometimes a new substance succeeds to them when they are corrupted, if not by the action of a created agent but of God immediately producing it.