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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 8 - 13.
Book Four. Distinctions 8 - 13
Thirteenth Distinction. On the Efficient Cause of the Consecration of the Eucharist
Question One. Whether the Body of Christ is Confected only by Divine Act
I. To the Question
A. Whether the Eucharist can be Confected by Divine Action
4. To Statements made about God’s Extrinsic and Intrinsic Action

4. To Statements made about God’s Extrinsic and Intrinsic Action

109. I argue against statements made about God’s intrinsic action and his whole extrinsic action: First: “Action belongs to what power belongs to,” On Sleep and Dreams1.454a8; but in God there is truly active power; therefore acting truly belongs to him.

110. Again, as long as creatures exist, they are always referred to God as his creatures; but they are not always referred to God by creation as undergone, because creation as undergone exists only in the first instant when things are created, just as creation as God’s action only exists then; therefore creatures are referred to God by some relation other than passive creation. Therefore, although this something other, by which creatures are thus referred to God, is not of the category of passion, yet creation as undergone can belong to the category of passion, because it is not present in creatures after the first instant.

111. Again, creation seems to be God’s real production of creatures; but there is no real relation of God to creatures; therefore creation is not a relation.

112. To the first [n.109] I say that just as the term ‘action’ is equivocal (as was said above, nn.56-60), so the term ‘active power’ is equivocal, for it is said not only of transforming power but also of productive power. And indeed God does have active power in both ways, and so action can belong to him in both ways; but then one action will not be the other.

113. To the second [n.110]: this argument seems capable of being reduced to the opposite, for if creation as undergone does not always remain, nevertheless the disposition that creatures have to God as to efficient cause always remains while the creature remains; therefore this disposition is not an undergoing of creation in the category of passion.

But I say that the disposition of creatures to God as to efficient cause is only a single relation and a relation coeval with the foundation, nay it is the same as the foundation, as is plain from Ord. 2 d.1 nn.260-271, and it can be called passive creation; or if the term ‘creation’ imports a newness or order to preceding non-being, then one should use a term that does not import newness, because the newness is not coeval with the relation to God nor with the foundation; and this point is discussed there [ibid. nn.281-285, 295].

114. To the third [n.111] the response is in Ord. 1 d.30 nn.44-55, 73, about how God is really ‘Lord’ but not by a real relation of lordship.