3. To the Arguments for the Opinion of others

a. To the first Argument

83. To the first argument against this article, when it is said that ‘by relation nothing is produced, by production something is produced’ [nn.19-21]; this reasoning should not move anyone with intelligence; for divine production, by which something external is produced, is not anything absolute in God (as all agree), because God does not relate to creatures according to anything absolute in himself; therefore everyone must say that the production whereby God is said to produce is a respect. But how is it more unacceptable to say that he produces by relation than that he produces by respect? For whatever seems contrary to ‘he produces by relation’ would have to be taken from a middle term common to every respect - just as an absolute form in a category can be related to production in the way that no respect can be.

84. Second, it is manifest that a product is more formally produced by the passive production of it than by the active production of the agent; but the passive production of a product is not a passion in the category of passion, because it is not anything extrinsic coming to it but rather something intrinsic, because it arises from its foundation; so it is a relation properly speaking. Therefore a creature is produced by a production that is formally a relation properly speaking.

85. I respond therefore to the argument that both premises are amphibolies; for the ablative can be taken by reason of formal proximate or remote principle; and this multiplicity universally happens when something abstract is construed in the ablative along with some concrete denominating respect. For this proposition is true, ‘the like is like by likeness’, namely when understanding the ablative to be taken in idea of proximately denominating form; and this proposition is true, ‘the like is like by quality’, when understanding the ablative to be taken in idea of remote formal principle; likewise this proposition is true, ‘the hot heats by heat’, and this proposition, ‘the hot heats by heating’, but each in a different sense.

86. As concerns the issue at hand, if the ablative is taken in both premises by reason of proximately denominating form, the minor premise is true [sc. ‘by production something is produced’] and the major false [‘by relation nothing is produced’], because the production, whereby it is formally produced, is relation. And so the syllogism is formed from opposites, like this one: ‘no man is running, Socrates runs, therefore Socrates is not a man’; and no wonder that an impossible conclusion is inferred, nay an incompossible conclusion according to Prior Analytics 2.2.55a10-19.

87. But when taking the major negative premise [sc. ‘by relation nothing is produced’] as the ablative is taken in idea of remote formal principle, and the affirmative minor [sc. ‘by production something is produced’] is taken as the ablative is taken in idea of proximately denominating form, then both are true; but then to infer that production is not relation is the fallacy of figure of speech, by change of idea of proximate formal principle into idea of remote formal principle, or conversely; or, to speak logically, by change of absolute to relational, for the remote principle of anything denominated by relation is absolute, but the proximate principle is a respect.

88. And perhaps ‘the figure of speech’ could here be posited according to the first mode, by likeness of termination; nor is this ever as evident elsewhere than in such paralogisms; for this is because of the causal termination, which shows a like construction of cases. And here the argument is deceptive by amphiboly as to the premises, and it is plain that the inference could be made as if similar terminations in the same case signified the same sentence in the premises.

b. To the Second Argument

89. As to the second argument [n.58], to concede that God’s creation is a relation of reason is not acceptable, since one must say that the creation of creatures is not a passion in the category of passion but a relation properly speaking.

90. And when you infer, ‘therefore God’s willing creatures to be is for God to be related’, the conclusion does not follow; for ‘to create’ principally signifies the relation of passion, and it connotes an essential divine intrinsic act, not only absolutely, but as it passes over to an external object; now the sentence ‘God wills creatures to be’ principally states a divine act, though it connotes its passing over to the object. But the following inference does not hold, ‘what principally states relation is relation, therefore what fundamentally connotes relation is relation’. So in the form of the argument the ‘as to another’ is changed into ‘as to itself’; just as the inference would not be valid if one were to argue, ‘to be like is to be related; but to be white is to be like; therefore to be white is to be related’.

c. To the Third Argument

91. As to the third argument [n.23], if the proposition ‘generation is relation’ is true (as was shown in Ord. 1 d.27), and if the inference from abstracts to concretes universally holds of necessity, though sometimes not conversely, there will be nothing unacceptable, rather it will be necessary, that ‘to generate’ is ‘to be related’. But if the force of the words is stressed and it is held to be unacceptable that ‘to generate’ or ‘to speak’ be precisely ‘to be referred’, I say that a subordinate term is not precisely the superordinate one, for the subordinate is the superordinate with some difference added -as ‘man’ is not just ‘animal’ but ‘rational animal’.

92. So I say that ‘to generate’ states a relation, but a relation of a certain sort, namely a relation productive by way of nature, and ‘to speak’ is a relation productive by way of intellect; and therefore ‘to generate’ is not just ‘to be referred’ but ‘to be referred by a relation of origin founded on fertile nature’, and ‘to speak’ is ‘to be referred by a relation of origin founded on fertile intellect’.

d. To the Fourth Argument

93. As to the fourth argument, when it is said that ‘the relative is not cause of its correlative’ [n.24], this is against the common opinion, unless perhaps one posits the persons to be absolutes; for if all Catholics concede origin in divine reality, they also concede that there person is principle to person. Or one must say that the relative is principle of its correlative. Or one must say that the person that is a principle is an absolute by relation to a second person.

94. The response then is, as I said in Ord. 1 d.28 n.24, that although relatives are simultaneous in nature, to the extent that ‘simultaneity’ states ‘not being able to be without each other’, yet priority or origin stands along with this, and priority of origin states nothing other than ‘from which’ another is.

95. On the contrary:

Things can have an order in the intellect that yet can have no order outside the intellect; therefore things that can have no order in the intellect can have no order at all. But relatives are simultaneous in nature; therefore etc.

96. Again, what is simultaneous is, as simultaneous, not prior; but what is prior in origin, as it is prior in origin, is simultaneous with the posterior as it is posterior, because thus they are per se correlatives; therefore ‘prior in origin’ is not prior (and the same argument could be made about prior and posterior in nature).

97. To the first [n.95] I say that ‘being simultaneous in the intellect’ can be understood in two ways: either that the simultaneity determines the act of understanding as it considers the objects, or that it determines the objects themselves that are understood; or in another way (and it amounts to the same) simultaneity can state the mode of the objects as they are understood or compared to the act of understanding, or it can state the mode of the objects in themselves. In the first way the major is false, namely ‘things that are simultaneous in the intellect can have no order [sc. outside the intellect]’, because however much they have to be understood together, yet not for this reason is anything taken from them that belongs to them in themselves - and only in this way is the minor true.

98. On the contrary: relatives, in the way they are understood in their proper ideas, have complete simultaneity in the intellect; therefore they have no order.

99. I reply: their ideas do properly have a certain order, and yet they have simultaneity too as they have order, namely simultaneity in reference to the act of understanding.

100. To the second [n.96]: the major proposition, ‘things that are simultaneous do not, as simultaneous, have an order,’ is true if the ‘as’ states simultaneity and states it in the mode of simultaneity and, together with this, states it in the mode of order and in the mode of inherence of simultaneity and order. I understand it thus, that just as the mode of simultaneity is taken according to nature and according to order, so, proportionally, is the same mode of priority and posteriority taken; along with this too, that as simultaneity is predicated of them so order is denied of them, namely, that if ‘simultaneity’ is there taken as inhering in them denominatively, and if thereby order is not denied to be in them per se, in the first mode of per se, but is denied to be present in them denominatively, then the minor premise is only true of the mode ‘simultaneous in nature’ and of the mode of accidental or denominative inherence. And I conclude uniformly that they are not ordered by such order, and that as denominated by such order. But it does not follow from this that they are not ordered per se in the first mode. So this proposition is true, ‘the prior, as prior, is prior to the posterior’, understanding it of predication per se in the first mode; and this proposition is true, ‘the prior as prior is simultaneous with the posterior’, understanding this of predication per se in the second mode.

101. Nor is it unacceptable that in such general intentions one opposite is predicated essentially of the other, and that the other opposite is predicated of the same denominatively, understanding by ‘opposite’ what is opposite in idea of concept; but not every idea of opposition, as it is a mode of predication in different form, is preserved. -An example: power is power per se in the first mode, and power is in act by the actuality corresponding to it, because power, when outside its cause, is not in potency to its being. The thing is more apparent in intentions, because this proposition is true, ‘a singular is singular per se in the first mode’, and this one is true, ‘a singular is universal by denominative predication’; and in grammatical intentions the proposition, ‘masculine is masculine’, is true per se in the first mode - but this proposition ‘masculine is neuter’ [sc. the word ‘masculine’ is neuter in grammatical gender] is true denominatively or by denominative predication.

e. To the Fifth Argument

102. To the fifth main argument [n.25] from Metaphysics 5, one can, in one way, say that no relation of the second mode is founded on action and passion but only on active and passive power, as was said in Rep. IA d.27 nn.51-52, because the relations that seem founded on action and passion are not present when action and passion are present, and are present when action and passion are not present.

103. The point is plain: for when someone among creatures is generating he is not a father; but afterwards, when the offspring has already been formed, he who has generated begins to be father just as the offspring begins to be son; yet there is no action then, for the father could then not exist, or not then be acting with any new action at all besides the first one. But a relation cannot exist save when its foundation does; and if its foundation is complete, and that on both sides, the relation will also be there at the same time. So actions can be a condition for relations only as being dispositions previous to such relations.

104. So the statement of the Philosopher there [n.25] is saved, that relations of the second mode are said ‘according to active and passive power’ as according to foundations, and are said ‘according to actions of powers’ as according to dispositions previous to those relations.

105. It can in another way be said that the Philosopher is speaking of action according to the signification of the name, as it imports relation of producer to produced [n.57]; and action in this signification states per se something in the category of relation, as was said above [n.62]; and then the remark ‘according to active and passive power’ must be expounded as before [n.104], namely as according to foundation. But the following remark, ‘according to actions of powers’ [n.104] must be understood of actions formally, the way that the like is said according to likeness; and there is something in the text that clearly corresponds to this, for the Philosopher says, “a father is father of a son, for the former made and the latter is what was made”: ‘made’, that is, produced, ‘what was made’, that is, what was produced.

106. And if you object that the Philosopher gives an example of heater to heatable and again of heating to what becomes hot and of cutting to what is cut, as if he is talking of acting things [Metaphysics 5.15.1021a14-19, 21-23] - I reply that he is expounding how he understands the words, saying immediately afterwards, “The terms are said to be ‘to another’ according to time, as what did make to what is made, and what will make to what must be made.” Now here the thing producing is ‘always acting’, and the thing done is the thing produced; and so one should understand ‘heat-making’ as taken for what is productive of the whole hot thing, the way he says in Metaphysics 7.8.1033b8-18 [d.12 n.324], that the whole composite is generated, namely in the case of generations per accidens, as in the generation of substance. And he takes ‘heatable’ for the whole that is able to be produced and not for the passive thing as it is able to undergo change; and so he takes ‘heater’ for the producer of the whole hot thing, and ‘what becomes hot’ for the whole composite that terminates the production, and not for the subject transformed to heat; and so too of the relation of what is cut to what cuts.

107. It can be said in a third way that the Philosopher is not only setting down the kinds of relation there but also the modes in which each of them is said to be ‘to another’, just as also in the chapter on quality [Metaphysics 5.14.1020a33] he sets down not only the kinds of quality but the modes; hence he says, “‘What sort of’ or ‘quality’ is in one way said to be the difference of a substance,” although substantial difference does not belong to the category of quality. So here relatives in the second mode of relatives are possibly being set down according to what is said to be ‘to another’, and not as according to relation formally but as according to some extrinsic respect coming to a thing and having a likeness to the mode.

108. And then the text may be expounded as follows: “active and passive things according to active and passive power” [n.104] are said to be ‘to something’ as the foundations of relations properly speaking. What follows, “according to actions of powers” may be expounded of actions in the category of action, because it is according to actions that things are formally called actives to passives and conversely; they are not so called according to relations properly in the category of relation, but according to certain respects pertaining to the second mode of relatives and not pertaining to the category of relation, though they do have a mode similar to certain species of relation - and in this way they belong to one mode of relatives but not to any kind of relation.