D. Fourth Opinion, which is that of Richard of Middleton

1. Exposition of the Opinion

485. The fourth opinion [Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.12 princ.2 ad1] is that in transubstantiation there is converted along with the accidents, and this by creation, a possibility for change not only into form but also into the lowest degree of actuality, which is matter; therefore, the accidents are afterwards resolved into matter from the aforesaid possibility annexed to them, having been converted into a naturally made actuality of the lowest degree.

486. And thus does this opinion agree with the second [n.465], namely that matter returns, but not immediately from God; rather by the action of a natural agent.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

487. Against this opinion is that this ‘pure possible’ is, according to him, the term of creation; therefore it is something outside its cause, or it has outside the first cause a positive entity inferior to matter. But this is false, because Augustine says in Confessions 12.7 n.7, “Lord, you have made two things: one near you (namely angelic nature) and another almost nothing (namely prime matter);” therefore, in fact there is nothing inferior to matter, though perhaps it is possible for some inferior positive thing to be created by God. But whatever may be the case with this, disputation about it has no place here.

488. To the proposal I argue as follows:

Matter is not produced by generation, since it is the foundation that is presupposed to generation; therefore, a natural agent cannot convert that pure potential, annexed to the species, into prime matter or the composite, such that it produce, by that action, prime matter or matter proper to this composite.

489. Again, let it be that such a pure potential were posited in the species of the Eucharist, and that it were possible for matter or the composite to be produced from the action of a natural agent; it would still be vainly posited, because a natural agent can only act on a quantum in act, which would not be the case here.