C. Third Opinion, which is that of Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent

1. Exposition of the Opinion

473. The third opinion [Giles of Rome, Theorems on Christ’s Body prop.45, Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 8 q.36] is that, as the Commentator says (Physics 1 com.64 and Substance of the Sphere 1), one must understand the dimensions in the matter of generable and corruptible things to be indeterminate before the advent of substantial form, otherwise the division of matter for the sake of diverse substantial forms being in diverse parts of matter could not be understood. But these sorts of dimensions receive, after the arrival of substantial forms, determinate and complete being; but whatever is understood to be in matter before substantial form remains numerically the same in the generated and corrupted thing, because a prior thing should remain after removal of a posterior one. Just as, therefore, the matter of the bread would, by means of these incomplete dimensions, receive the form of that which might be generated from the bread, and this when the bread has not been converted, so since now [sc. in the converted bread in the Eucharist] subsistence is granted to the dimensions and since being conform to the being of the prior substances is granted to them, so there is granted to them that they are able to be under a substantial natural form; for they do not have from their nature the ability to be only under an accidental form, but they do have this ability from a substantial form. And then matter will either come as a consequence, because of the natural concomitance of form with matter, or the nature of matter will be given by divine virtue to the dimension itself, because of dimension’s nearness to matter, so that, in this way, what is generated is a composite of matter and form.

474. Added to this opinion is that if from such dimensions a worm were generated of matter first, then substance were generated from the nutrient parts, the matter of the nutriment will eventually be the matter of that substance.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

475. Against this opinion:

A form determinate to some receptive subject can in no way perfect something different, as whiteness cannot perfect an angel nor wisdom a stone; but a substantial form is determinate to substantial matter, as to what is properly susceptive of it; therefore in no way can it perfect a dimension in the genus of quantity, which is not substantial matter.

476. Again, a form of a prior genus cannot perfect what is receptive of a posterior genus; therefore neither can substantial form perfect the dimension of bread. The proof of the antecedent is that act presupposes potency, and this when speaking of the order of origin; but the act of a prior genus does not presuppose, in either origin or perfection, anything of a posterior genus.

477. Again third, and it seems more manifest, is that substantial form is the sort of act that is of a nature to constitute something per se one with what is perfectible by it; but it cannot constitute something per se one in the genus of quantity.

478. Again, that which is essentially the idea of being the term of another thing’s dependence, cannot depend on that other thing; substantial form is of this sort with respect to quantity; therefore etc.

479. Again, how can a substantial form be drawn out from the potency of dimension, since a substantial form, by the nature of the thing, is not in dimension as in what is properly potential for it?

480. Thus does the first part of the opinion [n.473] seem refuted in general, namely because dimension cannot take the place of matter with respect to substantial form.

481. But as to generation from that dimension [sc. the quantity in the Eucharist], there is refutation in particular.

First as follows: fire generated from that dimension and fire from the substantial form of fire would not be something univocal, and [the former] would not be univocally fire with another fire generated from the substantial form and matter of fire; and then fire would not act univocally in burning the [sacramental] host and in burning wood.

482. Again, not only does an absurdity follow in this one case, that mathematical fire will come from quantity and substantial form, but there will be a process in generable and corruptible things of this sort up to the end of the world; for from the mathematical fire, having dimension for the matter, water will be generated, having the same thing for the matter that the corrupted thing had for matter; and from that water will be generated air, and so on to the end of the world, or to infinity according to the philosophers.

483. What the other doctor adds, about the matter of arriving nutriment [n.474], does not save the proposed opinion.

Posit that what is generated is, like fire, not nourishable: the argument is worth nothing.

484. Again, let it be that a priest were nourished from the species, and posit, as would be possible that, for the long time during which the many parts of matter would have been in flux, new parts would always have been generated - the result is that those parts will not truly be parts of flesh, constituted of the essential parts of flesh, as the other parts would be that were not generated from the species; and thus it would be possible to posit the case of a child who, nourished on species until the end of his life, would rise again only as a human being composed of dimension and of one or several substantial forms, according to them.