A. Opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines

1. Exposition of the Opinion Expressed in Two Conclusions

328. There is here an opinion [Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet XI q.3], which says that not only is it possible for the quantity here not to remain the same, but that there is altogether a different quantity in rarefaction and in densification of the species, such that, namely, nothing at all of what is prior remains in what is posterior and no part of the posterior was before in the prior.

329. He goes from this conclusion to another conclusion, namely that here there is motion without a subject and by a created agent, for it is sufficiently plain to sense that fire can rarefy the species as if they were in a subject.

330. He makes, however, an addition to this second conclusion, namely that “that according to which change happens first and per se is not altogether without a subject, because this sort of change happens according to the rare and dense; and this change happens according to hot and cold; and on this sort of change follows contraction and expansion; and so change according to quantity happens per accidens and as a consequence. And accordingly, because that according to which this change, as this change, happens first and per se is not without a subject, one can say that this motion is not wholly without a movable thing.”

331. And as if this response not suffice he adds, “However, because what is here posited for the subject (of that which change per se happens in accord with) is also changed, and no subject can be assigned for its change, therefore, by reason of this, motion in the matter at hand is said to be without a movable.

2. Two Reasons for the First Conclusion

332. For the first conclusion [n.328] argument is given as follows: the terms of motion must be incompossible (plain from Physics 5.3.7-10); therefore nothing of one term is anything that remains in the other, just as the incompossible is not in its incompossible.

333. If the position were held too that some quantity remained the same here, but the terms of change were the greater and lesser in the quantity remaining - this he himself rejects because “the subject and terms of motion must really differ;” but the quantity, and the greater and lesser in the quantity, do not really differ, “for it cannot be said that variation happens according to greater and lesser without variation happening as to the essence of quantity, since greater and lesser are only the quantum itself essentially.” In this way does he himself argue that the same whiteness cannot both remain in the change and vary from greater to lesser.

334. And the strength of this reasoning [n.332] rests on this, that the subject is really distinguished from each term, and in this especially that the subject remains under each term; but neither term remains under the other, since they are opposites.

335. Again, each part of what is rarer is rarer; therefore each part of what is rarer is greater in quantity; therefore each part is a quantum with a new quantity.

336. If you say that something altogether new does not follow but only something new as to a part - on the contrary: I take what the subject is of the part of quantity that is new; that subject is rarer than it was before (from the first proposition [n.335]); therefore it is greater than before; therefore too it is a quantum with a greater quantity; and consequently the new quantity, of which the subject is posited as subject, will be greater than the old quantity and yet not altogether other than it. Therefore, in the same way the quantity of the whole rare thing will be greater than the whole quantity of the dense thing, and yet not altogether new.

337. Here argument [sc. against this, n.336] is made in brief as follows. If the quantity that was before remains, I ask what subject it is in; only in the same as it was in before, because the accident does not migrate; therefore, the subject that was a quantum with this quantity before will now be a quantum with the same quantity. Therefore, it cannot, either in the whole of itself or in a part, be a quantum with another new quantity unless the same thing be at the same time a quantum with two quantities (which is impossible), or unless there is in the rarefaction an aggregation of new parts of the substance under the new quantity; and the aggregation of quantum parts with preexisting quantum parts is rarefaction. But this is nothing, because then no part of the rarer would be rarer formally; for an old part would not be rarer formally by the fact that another new part was made continuous with it.

3. Three Reasons for the Second Conclusion

338. For the second conclusion [n.329] he argues himself as follows (as it can be elicited from this words):

“Just as an accident has, by divine virtue, being without a subject in its ‘having been made’ and its ‘being at rest’, so too can it have being without a subject in its ‘coming to be’ and its motion” [Godfrey, Quodlibet XI q.3].

339. Another reason: “Because just as it has, by divine virtue, being without a subject, so too does it have everything by the same virtue, so that everything that can belong to it in a subject belongs to it without a subject. Therefore, just as extension could vary in a substance as to greater and lesser, and just as the substance would accordingly be said by participation to be greater and lesser, so too will this sort of change be able, when the extension remains without a subject, to come to be in another quantity without a subject” [ibid.].

340. Third: “Although motion does not exist in its complete idea (according to the course of nature that fits it) unless there is some one thing that, as to some form, is disposed differently now than it was before, yet to the essence of motion principally belongs the flow itself of the form, or the form itself in its ‘being in a state of becoming’.” Now this form [in a state of becoming] can well be found [here] even though no subject is differently disposed according to it; therefore too can the essence of motion be found [here].

4. Reasons Against the Second Conclusion and their Solution

341. Against the second conclusion [n.329] he intimates three reasons:

The first is of this sort: the greater quantity has not been drawn out from the potency of matter, for the quantity does not have a subject; but such an entity [sc. the greater quantity] is said to be created; and so, in such a change, a greater quantity cannot come to be save by creation.

342. Second, because the body of Christ remains under the species of bread as long as the accidents remain that affected the substance of the bread; but for you the quantity is altogether new, or different from before [n.328]; therefore, the body of Christ does not remain there, which however is not the position held.

343. Third as follows: “The being of successive things consists in the succession of parts as to prior and posterior; but there cannot be prior and posterior in motion unless there is something that varies as to prior and posterior; therefore etc.”

344. And he responds to these arguments:

To the first [n.341] as follows, that because in this change there is not thus one thing and another thing that at some point has interrupted being - neither because, namely, it is corrupted in itself or something else like it is regenerated, nor because one thing is contrary to the other; rather is it of one idea in form and species, and in existing continuously and without interruption - therefore nothing prevents the idea of motion from being capable of being posited here.

345. And this reason could be applied to the first [n.341], namely because there is on this account no creation, “because there is no production of some new being of a thing corrupted in itself, but only the production of some being as to form and species according to a certain successive ‘coming to be’ of a thing conserved” [Godfrey, ibid.]

346. He does, however, say to the first [n.341] that “just as it was in the potency of the subject that a greater quantity could, without creation, be introduced after a lesser quantity by a created agent, so does this force remain in a separated quantity, so that a greater after a lesser is brought to be by a natural agent and without creation,- such that the term ‘from which’ is the quantity lesser in degree from which the motion begins, while the term ‘to which’ is the quantity greater in some other degree at which the change stops; but motion is the flow of quantity indeterminate between these two definite terms, and possessed of existence in quasi infinite degrees between them. But if some quantity were to come to be such that it would not have a relation to the pre-existing quantity, that quantity would properly be created” [Godfrey, ibid.] - In this final word does his response seem to stand, namely that there is no creation here, because the new quantity that is introduced has such a relation to the pre-existing quantity, because it succeeds to it by an uninterrupted flow, according to quasi infinite degrees in the form of the quantity.

347. To the second [n.342] he replies that “the body of Christ does not cease to be there because of just any variation in the species, but only because of such a variation as could not exist unless, along with the change of species, the substance of the bread and wine would, were it there, also change; and therefore, as long as the species remain in uninterrupted being under such rareness or extension, and so on about other features (but provided the bread could be affected by them), so long does the body of Christ remain there.”

348. To the third [n.343] he says that in motion that is toward quantity, whether it is per se, namely in increase, or is in rarefaction (as in the issue at hand [n.337]), it is not possible to take there a per se and primary order of any parts save in quantity; and thus will the separated species be understood to have an order in coming to be and in succession, because part will be able to succeed continuously to part when not in a subject just as when in a subject.