1. First Doubt

230. But against these conclusions there are some doubts.

231. First, against the third conclusion [n.224] there is this doubt: for it does not appear that a quality’s action on the senses and on a contrary is different:

a. First, because a quality does not act through choice - therefore, as to how much is from itself, it acts uniformly; therefore, as to how much is from itself, its input into any passive object is the same, and consequently it puts a similar form into the senses and into a passive object, and consequently the action, as to how much is from the side of the agent, is not different.

b. Second, because where the active principle is the same, the action is the same (the proof of this is from the Commentator, On the Heaven 3 com.72: “if the nature is one, the action too is one”); but the formal principle and the proximate formal principle of acting both on the senses and on the intellect are the same; therefore, the action is the same.