5. Scotus’ own Conclusion

141. For this reason I say that this whole disputation (in thirteen conclusions and their proofs and disproofs) about saving the truth of this proposition [‘this is my body’] is subtle and matter for logic. But for a theologian it suffices that the assertion, as it is a sensible sign, is an instrument of God, instituted by God, for the consecration that follows in the final instant, such that God assists in it as it is a certain preceding effective disposition, so that, when it is complete, he may cause the relevant invisible effect. But the assertion’s truth, as it is such a disposition, does not precede the action of God, because, being a perceptible sign in a state of becoming and consequently in time, it is not understood to have its own truth. Also, when it does have truth, its truth follows, in the order of nature, the divine action.

142. Briefly, then, the theologian should say that, however a logician might save the truth of the proposition, yet the proposition is not a sacramental pronouncement as it is true, but as it is the sort of perceptible sign it is, preceding its truth perhaps in time -and at least naturally - , just as a disposition continuous in time precedes the final moment and the condition in the final moment of whatever it precedes; a cause too precedes the condition of the caused.

143. And if you ask ‘what sort of proposition, either as true or false, is this proposition that converts [the bread]?’, I say that it is neither one way nor the other but only as it is a neutral proposition and prior naturally (and perhaps in time) to its truth.

144. And this priority is proved as follows, that any foundation is prior to the accident that is a relation; a proposition or concept is a foundation in respect of truth, which is an accident that is a relation, because truth can be in or not in a proposition, just as a proposition can conform or not conform with the thing. For when Socrates is sitting the assertion that says ‘Socrates is sitting’ is true, as is said in Categories 5.4a10-b18. Therefore the concept of an assertion as it is in itself is naturally prior to its truth - and the assertion itself too, as it is variable and in a state of becoming, is still prior in duration to its concept (just as time is prior to its ending final moment).

145. And this fact too about the natural priority of the concept to the truth is manifestly plain in a learner; for first a student conceives the undemonstrated conclusion, and indeed as then neither true nor false, and yet he perceives and conceives the whole per se concept of it; second, when a demonstration is applied to it, he conceives it as true. And it is plainly evident that God could institute some un-meaning sentence upon whose utterance by a minister he would assist at the end of the uttering in causing an effect.

146. So, therefore, however it may be with the logical disputation about how the proposition [‘this is my body’] is true [n.141], this point is to be held as certain, that the proposition, as a vocal sign and in external coming to be, is an efficacious sign in respect of consecration, because it is a preceding disposition that God, by compact, assists with at the end in effective causing of an effect [cf. IV d.1 nn.308, 315, 325, d.4 n.103] -regardless of whether the proposition signifies this sort of effect (which is true and fitting in the matter at hand), and that merely so, namely as neither true nor false but insofar as it is a disposition; or whether it signifies the effect as a true proposition does, and that for the time when it is a disposition or for the moment for which what it is a disposition for will be caused, and then as naturally prior or as naturally posterior to the moment in which the effect will be caused.

147. But one could in a different way make a subtle distinction here, that in the final moment of utterance there is first, according to the order of nature, a concept of the proposition as neither [sc. true or false]; that second a divine operation follows on it, causing what the assertion designates; that third the truth of this conception follows. And so not only is the assertion prior to truth as it is vocally and continuously uttered, but also as it has its proper effect, though not as something true.

148. However this subtlety implies things that belong to the logical disputation about the truth of the proposition or of the conception of the proposition, namely that it is true for the final moment [n.140]; and the subtlety does nothing for the assertion as it is something sacramental. For the conception that is posited as being got through the assertion in the final moment [n.116] is in no way an instrument of God for the action of God that is posited as following in the second moment of nature [n.147], because God does not use for his operation anything sacramental save the perceptible sign [IV d.1 n.315].

149. So in brief, therefore, it suffices for the minister, without his engaging then in dispute about what the assertion is understood for, to intend to pronounce the words in the way that Christ instituted that they be pronounced. And in this way the due intention and the due instrument are got, namely the spoken assertion itself, which instrument, applied by such agent [sc. the minister], God assists so as to cause such effect in the final moment.

150. From these points the understanding of the form of consecration over the wine is plain, because the logical disputation and theological certitude [sc. about the wine] could be altogether like [sc. the disputation and certitude about the bread].

151. But that the words ‘this chalice’ are here set down is because the blood is consecrated under the idea of drink; and a liquid does not have the idea of drink save in a vessel. But nothing of the sort is set down in the idea and consecration of the body, because the body is confected as food, and a solid has the idea of food even though it is not in a vessel.