2. Rejection of the Opinion

188. Against this I ask what is meant by the ‘in virtue of substance’ that is said? Because whether he means an absolute or a relative [accident], I ask, what is it in? If he means the absolute that is substance or that is something in substance, then since the substance of bread simply does not exist [sc. after transubstantiation], it follows that an accident will generate by nothing or by non-being, or by virtue of nothing. If he means the absolute that is accident or something in accident, then nothing nobler than accident is there, and consequently, in virtue of such a something, an accident has no more power for anything more perfect than it has by its own virtue. But if he means the relation of accident to substance as to a prior cause, then since there is no relation to nothing, and the bread is not a being, it follows that nothing positive is being set down by what the ‘in virtue of’ is, and so the same as before [sc. an accident will generate in virtue of nothing].

189. From these words [nn.186-187], it seems that he is positing the virtue to be in the accident instrumentally, for he says that the virtue in accidents is caused, or that “they receive instrumental virtue from the fact that they are caused by essential principles of substance.” And then, since nothing in an accident is nobler than that accident, it manifestly follows that an accident has, through what is first said (‘in virtue’ or ‘through this virtue’), no power for anything more perfect than it has power for from itself or through itself.

190. But the true understanding of these words, ‘in virtue of such a cause’, seems, where the said words have place, to be this, namely that he is asserting the relation of inferior cause to superior cause, or more perfect cause, that concurs in the causing, just as was said above, that the influence which an inferior agent receives from a superior is not any form then caused, but is only a determinate order of causes in acting together or causing together [cf. Ord. IV d.1 n.170].

191. Again, what does not exist possesses no idea of cause with respect to a generated thing when it is generated, because the cause in act and the effect in act are and are not together (Physics 2.3.195b17-21 and Metaphysics 5.2.1014a20-25). And the fact is plain by reason, because non-being, when it is not, is not cause of anything, in any order of cause; now the substance that the accident affected and was accident of does not exist; therefore the substance has no idea of cause, proximate or remote, with respect to the effect caused by the accident, and consequently the accident does not cause anything in virtue of the substance, as in virtue of a superior cause.

192. Again, nothing is an instrumental cause with respect to that for producing which its sole active virtue is sufficient - the point is plain if ‘instrument’ be taken strictly, as a saw or axe are said to be moved mover instruments [Ord. IV d.1 nn.120, 317-318; d.6 nn.124-126]; for such an instrument does not have of itself a form sufficient for producing the effect, but only by the motion of the principal agent is that produced which is produced. If too ‘instrument’ be taken according to other modes posited above [ibid. d.6 nn.117-119], namely insofar as an inferior cause is said to be an instrument, or a form that this sort of cause receives from the motion of a higher agent (by which form it acts), still none of these instruments has, through its form, power for the effect in respect of which it is the instrument; but it is necessary that, for the effect, the co-cause it is instrument of concur with it at the same time. But as it is [sc. after transubstantiation], the accident, without any action of the substance, acts precisely by its form on whatever it acts on; therefore, in no way does it act for any effect in virtue of substance or as its instrument.

193. Again, the point can be argued through the principles of the above statements [nn.186-187] about an instrument that is a moved mover, because an accident in the issue at hand is not moved by substance, since the substance does not exist; therefore, the accident is not its instrument.These objections against may seem to be missing the point. For one could gloss Thomas’ position as that accidents act in virtue of substance (as the red of an apple acts on the eye) because they are really there, and they are really there because the substance they are accidents of is really there. But if accidents do nothing unless really there in an actual substance, so a substance does nothing through accidents it lacks (a green apple, for instance, causes no perception of red). So, it would seem that accidents act in virtue of substance, not because they receive some form from substance, but because they exist in virtue of substance. However, if they were to exist without substance (as they do by divine power in the Eucharist), then they would act through their own form in virtue of existing, but their existing would not be in virtue of substance. Thus the ‘in virtue of substance’ Thomas is talking about seems to refer, not to the form of the accident (redness, for instance), but to the existence of the accident. If so, Scotus’ objections would seem misdirected. However, Scotus returns to this issue later, nn.204-211, and argues that, on Thomas’ own principles, substance must be cause also of the form of accidents and not just of their existence. But be that as it may, for nothing prevents Scotus having his own different view on the matter regardless. ⁴³