B. Scotus’ own Opinion

146. I reply to the question, then, by mediating between the said opinions: for I make a distinction in ‘subject’: as it is taken for the ultimate term of the dependence of another per accidens act, or as it is taken for any proximate term (though not the ultimate term) of that dependence, that is, taken for anything to which some act could be present per accidens as the form of it, not making something per se one with the subject.

147. In the first way [n.146] it is plain that nothing can be the subject of an accident save substance. In the second way I say that it is possible for some accident to be the subject of an accident, as the arguments prove that were touched on against the second opinion [nn.143-145]. And it is possible for any accident to be absolute without a subject in each way, as the arguments prove that were brought against the first opinion [nn.126-132].

148. But it is not possible that a respective accident is without a subject in the second way, because it is not possible that there be a respect between two things without the respect being of something to something, and this not by reason of ‘accident’ but by reason of ‘respect’; now there cannot be a respect of something to something unless it is in that of which it is the respect; and so, if it is the respect of an accident, it will be in that accident as an accident in a subject. And so, as to what is possible, it is plain that an accident can be without a subject, and this when subject is taken in this way and that way [sc. taken as substance or as accident].

149. But what is the case in fact?

I say that a respective accident is here in a subject, speaking of subject in the second way, because the relation of it is to a term.

150. But as to absolute accidents [nn.25-26], those who think in diverse ways about quantity will respond in diverse ways:

For those who say quantity is an absolute essence other than the essence of bodily substance and quality, as the common opinion says [Ord. II d.3 nn.71-74], would say that quantity here is without a subject but not quality, rather that quality is in quantity [nn.115-119]. And for this view there is this probability, that quality in this way is extended (it is plain to sense); and it is not extended essentially, but only per accidens, without an extension that is intrinsic to quality, according to this opinion [Giles of Rome]. But everything extended per accidens either receives in itself the extension by which it is extended per accidens, or receives it in extension or in something extended; now quality does not receive extension in itself, according to this opinion; therefore it is only extended per accidens, because it is received in something extended; and with this agrees the remark in the Categories 6.5b7-8, “Whiteness is as large as the surface is.”

151. But those who would say that the quantity of bodily substance is not other than the essence of this sort of substance, and that the quantity of color is not other than the color [Ord. II d.3 nn.132-135, 148-154], would say that the quality here is not in quantity, but rather that the quantity that appears is the quantity of quality.

152. But about this dispute there is discussion in Ord. II d.3 nn.4-6.