3. A Possible Solution Consisting of Thirteen Main Conclusions

104. [First conclusion] - Therefore one can say differently, and let this conclusion be the first, that the conception that is caused by the spoken utterance is only grasped in the last moment of the uttering of the words.

105. The proof is that a conception of all the parts of the utterance cannot be had before that point; for a conception of the whole utterance is not had without the conception of the parts.

106. There is confirmation by way of likeness, because a concept formed by an expression is not had before the final moment of uttering the expression; therefore similarly about uttering a complete sentence. And the reason for the likeness is that, just as the parts of an expression do not signify the simple concept that the expression signifies, so the expression does not signify any complex concept that the whole uttered sentence signifies. But the difference is that a part of a sentence does signify some concept, but a part of an expression does not signify any simple concept. However, the only difference relevant there to the matter at issue is that, in both cases, the whole conception is not had save at the end of everything uttered [n.105].

107. If objection is made that therefore an utterance causes a concept when it does not exist because, when it has been completely uttered, nothing of it exists - I reply: it is plain that the objection is not cogent, because the same could be argued about the concept imported by an expression.

108. Therefore I say that when a concept comes to be in the intellect in the moment after the utterance of a sentence or expression, it does not come to be through the uttering, because the uttering does not exist, as was said, but it comes to be at the end of the uttering of any expression through something caused in imagination by the expression, because of which (while it was being uttered) the intellect causes in itself some concept of the expression. Or more to the matter at hand, through things left behind by the individual expressions while they were being uttered, the intellect in the final moment brings them together and causes an understanding or conception of the whole. And therefore did I speak of the concept that is caused by the utterance [n.104], because otherwise it could be from the signified concept that is not caused by the utterance (as a concept in the speaker which he intends to express by his utterance).

109. And if it is argued against this conclusion that the thing signified by the whole utterance arises from the things signified by the parts and that the parts signify when they are uttered - I reply that the signification is not the formal reason of causing the concept in the hearer but is a certain preceding disposition, upon which there follows, by the intellect’s act of combining, a causing of the whole concept out of the concepts caused by the parts [n.108].

110. [Second conclusion] - The second conclusion is that it is not necessary that, in the moment of uttering or in time, the concept is caused in the hearer by the uttered words and that the truth of this concept is understood without uniting the terms. For if I say, ‘God created the world’, the concept of this assertion is caused in the final moment [sc. of the uttering], but the truth of it, or the uniting of the terms, is understood to be for the first moment of time [sc. for God created the world ‘in the beginning’]. So it is not the same to say ‘in which moment’ and ‘for which moment’ the whole statement is conceived; for it is conceived in the last moment of the completed assertion, and it is also conceived for the moment when the terms are indicated as being united in the intellect or outside in the thing [sc. ‘God created the world’ is understood in the final moment of the uttering of the assertion, but it is understood to be for, or about, the beginning of all time].

111. [Third conclusion] - The third conclusion is that the terms are denoted as being united for that moment, and consequently that there is truth in the assertion which is co-signified by the verb that joins the terms together; for there is nothing else in the proposition that would signify the time to which the union of the terms (from the understanding of the proposition) is referred.

112. [Fourth conclusion] - The fourth conclusion is that a verb of any time can signify a time or a moment; otherwise one could not express a concept about the present, past, or future union of the terms.

113. For if one could not co-signify a past moment when the verb is in the past tense, or a present one when it is in the present tense, or a future one when it is in the future tense, no proposition in which is expressed a union of terms would be true, and this union of terms could only be in a moment (for example, ‘this soul was created’ would not be true, nor ‘this soul is being created’ nor ‘this soul will be created’).

114. Also, if the present time could not be co-signified if the verb is present, nor past time if the verb is past nor future time if the verb is future, no proposition would be true whose terms cannot be united except for a time (and then ‘the heaven was in motion’ would not be true, nor ‘the heaven is in motion’ nor ‘the heaven will be in motion’).

115. In continuation of this conclusion I say that the statement ‘a verb cosignifies a moment or time properly speaking’ (whether speaking of a present or past or future verb) belongs to the multiplicity of the third mode of equivocation, which is according to things co-signified by an expression that has the same meaning [Peter of Spain, Tractatus tr.7 nn.29-39, 28]. But the unitings of the terms for a moment or a time are not causes of the truth of such a proposition, because there is no single mode that is included indifferently in the two modes. And so they would have to have one common concept when they are causes of truth in what they co-signify or signify.

116. [Fifth conclusion] - The fifth conclusion, according to one of the modes of speaking, is that a verb, if it is present tense and signifies a moment, signifies the moment of the complete uttering of the whole assertion, because the union and concept of the terms or of the whole assertion is understood for the whole time of the uttering, and the whole concept is understood for the final moment. But if the verb is present tense and cosignifies time, it co-signifies the time of its uttering, whether the whole of it or a part; and accordingly, if in the final moment of the uttering of a verb fire were generated, this proposition would be true ‘fire is generated’. Now this is similar to ‘the heaven is in motion’ or ‘I am running’, if in the whole time of the uttering of it or in any part, at least a large part, the terms are united. And accordingly these propositions will never be true ‘I am drinking’ or ‘I am sleeping’ and the like, because they cannot be true as they cosignify the moment, because the act cannot be in a moment - not even if it co-signifies time, because the terms are not united for the whole time of the uttering of the assertion nor for a part of it.

117. Therefore the proposition will always be false.

118. [Sixth conclusion] - Accordingly a sixth conclusion would be posited, that in a proposition about the present, when the verb co-signifies the present moment, the things signified by all the parts of the assertion must be understood for the final moment.

This conclusion is proved from the preceding one, because according to the Philosopher On Interpretation 2.16a13-18 “‘is’ signifies a certain composition” which one cannot understand without the things composed. Therefore if the copula ‘is’ had joined them for the final moment, then for that moment must the things signified by all the parts be understood.

120. [Seventh conclusion] - And herefrom there is a seventh conclusion for the present purpose, that when here the verb [sc. ‘is’] signifies not time but a moment, because the first union of the terms is done by infinite virtue and consequently in a moment, it follows that all the parts of the assertion and the things they signify must be understood for the final moment.

121. [Eighth conclusion] - From this follows an eighth conclusion, that the pronoun ‘this’ will hold for the moment of the complete utterance; and then it would be said to be demonstrative of that which for that moment is under the species, so that in this way the demonstrating is partly for the senses and partly for the intellect, and to this extent it is altogether simply so, as the first opinion said [n.100]. But that which is demonstrated for the intellect and directly is not demonstrated disjunctively, but what is now contained [under the species] is demonstrated etc.

122. [Ninth conclusion] - The ninth conclusion is that in the case of singulars the order follows the order of universals. For any universal can be understood to descend to its proper singular before it is contracted through some difference to some lower level of predication, as to the species, and so we have the following order of singulars: ‘this being’ ‘this substance’ ‘this body’ and so successively to ‘Socrates’.

123. This is plain from Avicenna in his Physics, Sufficientia 1.1, because from a distance we first see a body before we see an animal, and an animal before we see a man [cf. Ord. I d.3 n.84], which is not to be understood of universals (for sight does not see universals), but of singulars of something more universal.That is, we do not see the universal ‘body’ before we see the individual Socrates, but we see this body, this animal, this man, Socrates. ²

124. [Tenth conclusion] - And then there is a tenth conclusion, that ‘this’ in a proposition points to a singular being and not per se to a singular of some class more or less universal than being.

125. The proof:

First, because one reasonably asks about many things ‘what is this?’, but the supposit and that which is asked about are not the same thing; therefore if the ‘this’ stands for ‘this wood’ or ‘this stone’, because that is what is being asked about, it follows that the same thing that supposits is being asked about; for when the response is given, namely ‘wood’ or ‘stone’, the mind of the asker is brought to rest about that singular. So what supposits here for the singular is only that it is a singular being, and the question asked is about something specific under being, and anything specific under being is appropriate as a response. And this proof rests on a single word that is put in Exodus 16.15 about manna, that is, ‘what is this?’

126. Another proof is a sort of grammatical one, that an adjective, when in a substantive of neuter gender, includes the substantive in itself according to the grammarians; but it only includes that which is something or a being; therefore etc.

127. [Eleventh conclusion] - The eleventh conclusion, that although the ‘this’ here only per se stands for a singular being, yet it is understood for a singular of some lower predication and regularly for the singular that is ‘the body of Christ’; because the singular is only there in that which is the body of Christ, and only in the last moment for which being in some singular thing is demonstrative.

128. [Twelfth conclusion] - The twelfth conclusion is that not for this reason will the sense of the proposition be ‘my body is my body’, because the understanding of the antecedent [‘this’] is one thing and the understanding of the consequent [‘my body’] another, even though the subject of the consequent is standing for the subject of the antecedent.

129. The fact is plain because the concept of the consequent can be certain and of the antecedent doubtful; and to be certain and doubtful are not the same.

130. It is also plain by converting the proposition, because the sense of ‘my body is this’, that is, ‘.. .is this being’ is different from the proposition ‘my body is my body’.

131. [Thirteenth conclusion] - The thirteenth conclusion is that, according to this understanding, the proposition [‘this is my body’] can effect or convert [sc. the bread]. For the minister who is principally bringing it about that, in the moment for which he enunciates the proposition, this assertion then signifies, would himself principally convert it, for ‘to bring principally about that this being is the body of Christ’ is really to bring about a conversion through which the body of Christ receives ‘being this’ (for the bringing about by which this being becomes the body of Christ and by which the body of Christ becomes this being, that is, becomes this being which is under these species, is the same bringing about). But the assertion which acts by way of signifying must be conversive [of the bread] for the moment for which the one converting really acts. Therefore this assertion is effective simply.