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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 8 - 13.
Book Four. Distinctions 8 - 13
Twelfth Distinction. First Part: About the Being of the Accidents in the Eucharist
Question One. Whether there is in the Eucharist Any Accident without a Subject
II. To the Initial Arguments
A. To the First Initial Argument

A. To the First Initial Argument

83. To the first initial argument [n.8] I say that by taking ‘being per se’ and ‘being in another’ uniformly, namely as ‘being per se’ denies aptitude for inhering and ‘being in another’ affirms that aptitude, the two are thus in proportional agreement, the first with substance and the second with accident; and then nothing more follows save that an accident cannot be a being per se to which inhering is repugnant, just as neither can substance be that to which the aptitude of inhering belongs.

84. And if you wish to take each actually, namely ‘actually being per se’ and ‘actually being in another’, I say that, as such, they do not divide [being] nor are substance and accident proper to these dividing terms. And no wonder, because on the part of the ‘per se’ the first understanding entails the second; for repugnance to being in [another] entails not being in [another]. But on the other part [sc. ‘being in another’] it is not so, but there is a fallacy of the consequent: ‘it is naturally apt to be in [another], therefore it is in [another]’.

85. And suppose that, as to the aptitude or lack of aptitude for inhering, you ask what it is and how it is disposed to whiteness, namely whether it is in it, and whether in it by another inherence, and so on ad infinitum;

86. Suppose too you ask about the quantity or also about the per se existing whiteness, whether it has a mode of inhering opposite to the one it has when it is in another (it seems that it does, because ‘to be per se’ and ‘to be in another’, however they are taken, are opposites to each other; but it seems the opposite is the case, because it is the same ‘to be’ (as was said before [n.83]), and consequently the same mode of ‘to be’);

87. Suppose, third, the question is asked whether the accident could, by its own aptitude, actually be present, if a substance actually came to be that was of a nature to be informed by the accident;

88. As to the first [n.85]: an aptitude is nothing other than the nature of that of which it is the aptitude. That it is not anything absolute is plain. That it is not anything else, such as an actual real respect, [is plain], for it only states that such a ‘what’ would be fitting to such a nature; and that is why it belong to this nature, or is not repugnant to it, because this nature is this nature.

89. As to the second [n.86], I say that modes of being can be understood to be because either they vary the ‘to be’ itself or because they posit some diversity posterior to the ‘to be’. In the first way, since the ‘to be’ of the accident is the same in the bread and without the bread, so there is the same mode. In the second way there is variation, because the ‘to be’ in the bread was the subject of a certain real respect to the bread, but when the ‘to be’ is per se, it is deprived of that respect; and hereby it is plain that ‘to be in the bread’ and ‘to be per se’ state a diverse mode in the ‘to be’, by positing and taking away the respect to another.

90. As to the third [n.87], the answer is plain from the fourth doubt solved before [n.78], because an accident cannot effectively unite itself to the subject. Hence if God were to be bring back the substance of the bread and do nothing else, the accident would remain without a subject, as it does now [sc. after the consecration], nor would it be united to the substance of the bread as a form by virtue of the accident (I mean by virtue of it effectively).

91. And if you argue that it is a miracle that the accident is not in a subject, therefore, when the impediment of non-inherence, namely of the non-existence of the subject, ceases, the miracle will cease, and the accident will be totally in the subject - I reply: something miraculously posited in being remains in that being until it is changed by some agent.