4. Doubts against the Third Conclusion

46. A first argument against this conclusion [n.30] is as follows: if whiteness inheres in a subject, as you concede [n.40], either this inherence is of the essence of whiteness, and I have the proposed conclusion (that it is a contradiction, and a primary contradiction [cf. Ord. II d.2 n.409], for the subject to be without its predicate [n.44, sc. ‘a color is without a body’]); or it is not, and this seems unacceptable, both by authority [nn.47-48] and by reason [n.49].

47. By the authority of the Philosopher, Metaphysics 7.1.1028a18-20: “accidents,” he says, “or things other than substance are called ‘beings’ by the fact they are, in such manner, ‘of being’;” therefore the formal idea of entity in the case of an accident is to inhere, in such manner, in being, that is, in substance; and a little later he says, “none of them is naturally fit to be by itself, nor able to be separated from substance.” Many things to the same effect are also there.

48. There is a confirmation: in Metaphysics 4.2.1003a33-b10 the Philosopher says that being is said of substance and accidents as ‘healthy’ is said of health in an animal and health in urine; but ‘healthy’ says formally of urine nothing save the relation of sign to the health said of animal. Therefore, ‘being’ said of an accident does not state anything other than relation to substance. Similarly, in Metaphysics 7.4.1030a32-b7 Aristotle seems to say that in the way something ‘non-knowable’ is equivocally ‘knowable’ so too work and vessel are equivocally ‘curative’, because these things, ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’, are in this way said to be beings.

49. Now the reason [n.46] for proving that this is unacceptable is as follows: for if inherence is not of the essence of whiteness, something else will be and it will inhere in whiteness, because whiteness is said to be formally inherent by this inherence. I ask then about the inherence: by what inherence does it inhere in whiteness? Either by the very same whiteness or by the very inherence; and by parity of reasoning one must make a stand at the first, or the inherence is other than its foundation and one will progress to infinity.

50. Again, there is another doubt against this conclusion [n.30], because at least the relation of accident to subject seems to be the same as the accident. The proof is that in Ord. II d.1 q.5 nn.252, 260-271 [cf. I d.3 n.287] it was said that the relation of each creature to God under the idea of a threefold cause [sc. God as exemplary cause, efficient cause, final cause] is the same as the foundation [sc. of the relation]; but the respect of accident to subject seems to be no less the same as the accident itself than this relation does [sc. relation of creature to God]. The proof is that created substance is not defined by adding the divine essence to its definition, for then nothing could have a definition in its own genus, since God is outside genus; and yet an accident, because of its necessary respect to a subject, is defined by respect to a subject (Metaphysics 7.4.1030a27-b13); therefore the respect of an accident to a subject is no less the same as the accident than is the respect of created substance to God.

51. Again a third doubt: if the respect of whiteness to the subject be other than whiteness, at least it does not seem to be posterior to whiteness; for whiteness only requires a subject because of the respect that it has to it. But if this respect be posterior to whiteness, the whiteness is able to remain when the respect has been removed; therefore, the whiteness is able not to depend on a subject. And this reason can be more evidently deduced about an accident as it is understood than about an accident as it is in existence, in the following way: if whiteness is prior to the respect, then it can be conceived completely without that respect, and consequently defined completely, as a prior can be without a posterior; but whiteness only requires a subject because of the respect it has to the subject; therefore, it can be defined completely without a subject, which is against the Philosopher (as before [nn.47-48]).

52. Again, a fourth doubt: if inherence is other than whiteness and posterior to it, at least it seems to be a proper attribute of whiteness, because nothing seems to inhere more immediately in whiteness than relation to a subject; but ‘a subject being per se without its proper attribute’ includes a contradiction, otherwise no conclusion would be simply knowable, for any such conclusion predicates an attribute of a subject and, for you [nn.39-42], no such conclusion would be simply necessary nor, consequently, simply knowable.