Twelfth Distinction. First Part: About the Being of the Accidents in the Eucharist

7. Concerning the first part [n.3] two questions are asked: first whether there is in the Eucharist any accident without a subject; second whether every accident remaining in the Eucharist is without a subject.

Question One. Whether there is in the Eucharist Any Accident without a Subject

8. As to the first part [n.7], argument is made that there is not:

Because just as existing per se belongs to substance, so existing in another belongs to accident. This is plain because ‘being is divided into being per se and being in another’ [cf. Metaphysics 5.7.1017a7-8], and the first member belongs to substance and the second to accident; but it is impossible for substance to be and not to be per se or to be in another, because “what truly is, is not an accident of anything,” Physics 1.3.186b4-5; therefore it is impossible for an accident to be and to be per se or not to be in another.

9. Again, the essentially posterior cannot be without the essentially prior, Metaphysics 5.11.1019a1-4; but accident is essentially posterior to substance, from Metaphysics 7.1.1028a31-33, because substance is first of all beings in knowledge, time, and definition; therefore, it is impossible for an accident to be without the substance of which it is the accident.

10. Again, it is impossible for a defined thing to be without a definition, and consequently without whatever defines it; but substance defines accident, from Metaphysics 7.3.1028b33-37; therefore etc.

11. If you say that the major is true of a definition that belongs to the quiddity of the defined thing but not of that which defines as something added, and that substance defines accident in this way [cf. Metaphysics 7.5.1030b14-16] - on the contrary: it is impossible and incompossible for a relative to be without its correlative (for then the relative would not be relative); but a correlative defines the relative not as something of its quiddity but as added; therefore the major is true of what defines as something added.

12. There is also confirmation of this, because if God were to belong to the definition of any creature, he would only belong as something added, and it would be impossible for the defined thing to be without that addition; but as it is, according to the philosophers, substance is a simply necessary cause of accident as God is of creature, and because of this necessity of causing substance falls in the definition of accident as such a simply necessary added thing; therefore etc.

13. Again, in the Categories 8.9a28-35, ‘white’ and ‘whiteness’ signify the same, because ‘white’ signifies the quality alone; therefore ‘quantum’ and ‘quantity’ signify in the same way; but it is impossible for a quantum to be unless there is some subject to which the quantity belongs; therefore it is impossible for a quantity to be without a subject. And there is a confirmation: when two things are altogether the same, one of them cannot be without the other; of this sort are ‘quantity’ and ‘quantum’.

14. The opposite is asserted in the text [of Lombard], and from the authorities of the saints that were adduced in the preceding distinction [d.11 nn.94-96].

15. Again by reason: the accidents of the bread remain, as is plain to sense, and they do not affect the body of Christ, because that body is not a quantum with this quantity [sc. of the bread]; but much more is that body not shaped by this shape but by the shape of a human body; nor is it colored with this color but by the color that belongs to a human body. Nor do the accidents affect the [surrounding] air, because the air is not capable of these accidents, since they are accidents of a mixed body and repugnant to an element; nor do they affect the substance of bread, because the substance does not remain (from what was said before, d.11 nn.13-29). Therefore, they exist without a subject.

I. To the Question

A. First Opinion and its Rejection

16. It is said here [Godfrey of Fontaines, Giles of Rome] that since of one composite thing there is only one being, that being is consequently and per accidens the being of any accident of the whole, and so, if an accident be separated from a subject, God gives it a new being, because it cannot now have the being of the whole which it was an accident of before.

17. Against this:

Just as each thing that is outside its cause and outside the intellect has its own entity, so also does it have its own being; if therefore an accident have outside its subject and the intellect its own essential entity, it also has its own being, and so does not exist formally through the being of the subject. The first proposition is taken here as plain; the other is made clear in the case of ‘being’ and ‘essence’ [nn.28-30].

18. Again, that a form exists in matter necessarily argues that it is a composite, such that the first cannot be posited without the second; but a form is in matter by some natural change (as by alteration or increase); therefore by that change, and by the same agent, a composite of subject and accident has the formal being of the accident. But it does not formally have the being of the subject, because that being existed before the change; therefore etc.

19. Again, if an accident, when separated, has a new being, one must posit there a change from lack of the being to this being; but this is impossible. The proof is that it is impossible to set down what this change is; for it is not generation because an accident is not a subject of generation; nor is it increase or alteration, for quantity is not acquired by that change nor is quality, because then quality would be the subject of either increase or alteration, and quantity or quality would be whose being is acquired. And so could one go on arguing about it ad infinitum.The being of a separate quantity or quality would not be acquired by change of increase or alteration because quantity or quality would already be presupposed as the subject of the change and so would not acquire being through it; and as for the being that is supposedly acquired, it would be the being of quantity or quality and so would again not be acquired through the change but presupposed to it. And if one asks how such presupposed being is acquired, the same questions would arise again, and so on ad infinitum. ³⁷

20. Again, that new being, because it is not formally divine being, is either the being properly of substance or of accident or it is neither. If it is in the genus of substance it will be independent and so will not be formally the being of any accident, because no accident can formally be independent or exist per se; if it is in the genus of accident (by reduction in some way or other), it will be as dependent as the form it is the being of, and consequently it will not by that being be formally that whose entity is independent.

B. Second Opinion and its Rejection

21. It is said in another way [Henry of Ghent] that when accident is separated from subject God gives it a certain supernatural virtue, by which virtue it is able to exist per se, though it could not do so without it.

22. Argument is made against this second view just as against the preceding one [n.16], at least as regards the two last arguments [nn.19-20]. For this virtue that comes from outside is the term of some change; I ask, of what change? It will also belong to some genus [of change]; I ask, to which genus? And the argument would proceed as before [nn.19-20].

23. Again, even though some supernatural virtue be given to something, yet after the virtue is present in it, it is natural to what has it or can have that for which it is the virtue (as a blind man, even though he be supernaturally given sight, yet when he has sight he sees naturally); therefore, although there be in the first instant a miracle in the conserving of these accidents without a subject, yet because the virtue is then conferred on the accident, it will afterwards by that virtue exist naturally without a subject.

24. Again, it is impossible for a substance to receive any virtue by which it should depend on something else as inhering in that something; therefore it is impossible for an accident to receive a virtue by which it should be a per se being, released from all inherence in another. The proof of the consequence is that ‘to exist per se’ and ‘to inhere’ are equally proper to them, namely to substance and accident, the latter to the latter and the former to the former.

C. Scotus’ own Opinion

1. Preliminaries

25. To the question I say that the word ‘accident’ can be taken for what is per se signified by it or for what is denominated by what is per se signified (and this distinction is universal to all concrete terms). Further, when taking it for what is denominated by what is signified by the name, accident can be taken for what is absolute or for an accidental respect or relation.

26. Accordingly there are three divisions: namely about accident as concerns the per se idea that accident introduces; also about what is denominatively called accident and is absolute; the third division is about what is denominatively called accident and is relational.

27. Further, the predicate ‘to be in a subject’ or ‘not to be in a subject’ can be taken as to aptitude or as to actuality.

2. Three Conclusions

28. Let the first conclusion, then, be that, when speaking of what is per se signified by accident, it is a contradiction to understand it not to be in a subject; and this when understanding it in a uniform way in subject and in predicate, namely if actually actually, if aptitudinally aptitudinally.

29. Let the second conclusion be that, when speaking of what is denominated by what is per se signified by accident and is a per se respect, it is a contradiction for an accident to be without a subject, and this actually, namely such that it not actually inhere in a subject (extending subject to the foundation that can be the proximate subject of a respect).

30. The third conclusion is that what is denominated by what is per se signified by accident and is something absolute is capable of being and not being in a subject actually - but it is necessarily in a subject aptitudinally.

3. Proof of the Conclusions

a. Proof of the First Conclusion

31. The proof of the first conclusion [n.28] is that what is per se signified by the word ‘accident’ is a certain respect as to that of which it is an accident, and perhaps it is the same respect that is introduced by the term ‘inhering’ as to what it inheres in. And the thing signified by accident and by accident-ness (so to speak) and by what inheres and inherence is the same. Therefore, just as it is impossible for there to be an accident-ness that is not an inherence (if actually, actually; if aptitudinally, apititudinally), so the fact that something is an accident (speaking of what is per se and first signified by the this word) cannot not be inherent proportionally - that is, if actually actually, if aptitudinally aptitudinally.

32. And if you ask what genus that belongs to which per se signifies what is meant by ‘accident’ and ‘inhering’, I reply that it belongs to a genus of extrinsically arising respect. For it is plain that it states a respect, because its idea cannot be understood by itself. And it does not state a respect that comes from within, because it does not state what necessarily follows the positing of the extreme terms; for, as will be plain in the final conclusion [nn.39-42], its foundation and term can persist without the respect.

33. If you ask what genus it should be reduced to, perhaps to the genus of ‘passion’ [Categories 9.11b1-14], so that in this way passion states not only the respect of the passive thing to the agent, but to the form, or possibly perhaps to the genus of ‘action’ [ibid.], so that in this way action states not only the respect of the agent to the patient, but of the informing form to that which is informed. But in either way it will be a respect coming from outside.

34. And if you object that what belongs to a determinate genus cannot belong to several genera, but the term ‘accident’ or ‘inhering’, as far as concerns the per se idea of the word, belongs to all nine genera [n.35], therefore etc. - I reply that it is very possible that what belongs to a determinate genus denominates several genera; for perhaps ‘created thing’ states something that per se belongs to the genus of relation, and yet perhaps it denominates anything other than God, and only what is other than God is properly in a genus. So, therefore, this respect can belong per se to one genus, and yet it is denominatively said of the relations or respects of the nine genera.

35. But if it be objected against this, from Simplicius On the Categories [section on substance], that ‘is in’ does not constitute any special genus, because there is one ‘is in’ for all nine genera - I reply that either ‘is in’ is taken denominatively, and thus it encompasses all the genera of accidents, just as does that which is ‘inheres in’ or ‘is accident to’; or it is taken for the relation that is per se signified by ‘is in’, and in this way not just any accident is taken by ‘is in’, because it is a determinate species in one genus. But if Simplicius means that ‘is in’, as far as concerns the per se idea that it introduces, does not belong to any determinate genus but per se to several genera, he is to be rejected, for he is not of so great authority that the opposite of what reason concludes is, on his say-so, to be conceded. Now reason convincingly shows that the concept that ‘in’ introduces can be contained quidditatively in some genus, even though it be denominatively said of forms that are in many genera. For it is not said quidditatively of whiteness and line, because then whiteness and line would not be said for themselves, for that which essentially includes a relation is not for itself, according to Augustine On the Trinity 7.2 n.3.

b. Proof of the Second Conclusion

36. The proof of the second conclusion [n.29] is that a respect is essentially a relation between two extremes, therefore, just as to take away the term that the respect is to is to take away or destroy the idea of respect, so to take away that which the respect is of is to take away the respect itself and to destroy the idea of respect. Not therefore because a relational accident is an accident does it for this reason require a subject or foundation; but because a respect is a respect for this reason does it require that of which and to which it is a respect (even in the case of divine reality).

37. If it be argued against this [second] conclusion [n.29] that it seems to contradict the preceding one [n.28], because, according to the preceding conclusion, the idea that ‘to be accident to’ or to ‘inhere’ signifies is a respect coming from outside [n.32], therefore it cannot belong to any respect denominatively, because a respect is not a subject or a foundation of a respect (for then there would be a regress to infinity); therefore ‘paternity’ or ‘likeness’ cannot inhere in or be accident to, because ‘to inhere in’ or ‘to be denominated by inhering in’ requires that the thing denominated be the subject or foundation of the inhering in. I reply that one respect can well be founded on another, as posterior on prior (just as was touched on above in a question about character, and was proved about proportion and proportionality [Ord. IV d.6 nn.300-305]). And so I say that just as whiteness can be denominated from inhering in, or from what can be accidental to, so can paternity be denominated; and ‘like’ is a denomination in this regard.

38. But if you argue that therefore a respect is denominated by itself - the solution to this will be given in the third article [nn.39-45, cf. nn.67-68].

c. Proof of the Third Conclusion

39. The proof of the third conclusion [n.30] is that an absolute does not, from its being an absolute, require a term or terms, because then it would not be an absolute; therefore, if it requires a subject, this must be because of some other dependence essential to it; but there is no simply necessary dependence of any absolute on anything that is not of the absolute’s essence, save for dependence on the simply first extrinsic cause, namely on God.

40. Now a subject is not of the essence of an accident, because then ‘man is white’ would not be a being per accidens, which is against the Philosopher, Metaphysics 5.7.1017a7-22, 6.1015b16-26; 7.5.1030b14-27; for by adding to a thing what is of its essence one does not get a being per accidens, especially if that thing is in itself a being per se.

41. Now an accident in itself is a being per se, according to the Philosopher ibid. 5.7.1017a22-30; hence it is also per se in a genus. And a subject is not the simply first extrinsic cause of an accident, because God is not the subject of an accident. Therefore, the dependence of an absolute accident on a subject is not simply necessary (and I mean by simply necessary that whose opposite includes a contradiction). The proof of the major is that the first cause can perfectly supply the causality of any extrinsic cause with respect to any caused thing, because the first cause has in itself all such causality more eminently than a second does cause.

42. If you say ‘a subject is a material cause with respect to an accident, and God cannot supply the place of a material cause just as not of a formal cause either’ - on the contrary: according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 8.4-5.1044b7-26, accidents do not have matter ‘from which’ but matter ‘in which’, or if they have matter ‘from which’ it is not a subject, because a subject along with an accident makes a being per accidens, as was said [n.40]. But what is per se intrinsic to the essence of an accident, whether matter or form, does not constitute a being per accidens, because an accident, as being a certain whole, arises from all the things that pertain to its essence.

43. From this reasoning it is clear why philosophers said that an accident cannot be without a subject; not indeed because they posited the subject to be of the essence of an accident (on the contrary, from these a being per accidens is constituted), nor because they posited inherence, or some or other respect to the subject, to be of the essence of an absolute accident (for it is a contradiction that some respect be included in the per se idea of an absolute, since then it would be absolute and non-absolute); but only because they posited an order of causes that was simply necessary, such that the first cause cannot cause what is caused by a second cause without that second cause. Now a subject does have some causality with respect to an accident, speaking of the natural order of causes. And so they denied that an accident, in the order of its causality they set down, exists without this cause. And to this extent is it said in Physics 1.4.188a9-10 that an intellect looking for the separation of accidents from subjects will be looking for things impossible. But the impossible is not that it include something repugnant to the first idea or quiddity of an absolute accident; for once such an impossible is posited, no rule for disputation can be preserved, especially as regard those consequents that are included along with their opposites in the antecedent. For it is plain that then, with such impossible thing posited, contradictories must at once be admitted. And thus, in the issue at hand, the greatest unacceptable result to which a respondent can be reduced is included, namely that of refutation.

44. But, as it is, the Philosopher in Physics 4.7.214a9-10 asks this question: if there were a space in which there was only color or sound, would it be a vacuum? And he replies definitively for one side, that if the space were receptive of a body it would be a vacuum. But if, from the primary understanding of what it is to be a color, a color’s being in a subject were included, then, since its subject could only be a body, from the first understanding of what was posed [sc. “if there were a space in which there was only color or sound, would it be a vacuum?”] one would get ‘a body is there’ and ‘a body is not there’; and so, once the hypothesis was posed, the response would at once have to be that the space would be a vacuum and not a vacuum.

45. The above discussion has been adduced for this purpose, so it may be seen that the Philosopher did not intend the contradiction to follow from the first quidditative idea of accident, just as neither did he posit ‘being in a subject’ to belong to the first quidditative idea of whiteness; but the impossibility he has is only because of the necessity he posits in the order of causes.

4. Doubts against the Third Conclusion

46. A first argument against this conclusion [n.30] is as follows: if whiteness inheres in a subject, as you concede [n.40], either this inherence is of the essence of whiteness, and I have the proposed conclusion (that it is a contradiction, and a primary contradiction [cf. Ord. II d.2 n.409], for the subject to be without its predicate [n.44, sc. ‘a color is without a body’]); or it is not, and this seems unacceptable, both by authority [nn.47-48] and by reason [n.49].

47. By the authority of the Philosopher, Metaphysics 7.1.1028a18-20: “accidents,” he says, “or things other than substance are called ‘beings’ by the fact they are, in such manner, ‘of being’;” therefore the formal idea of entity in the case of an accident is to inhere, in such manner, in being, that is, in substance; and a little later he says, “none of them is naturally fit to be by itself, nor able to be separated from substance.” Many things to the same effect are also there.

48. There is a confirmation: in Metaphysics 4.2.1003a33-b10 the Philosopher says that being is said of substance and accidents as ‘healthy’ is said of health in an animal and health in urine; but ‘healthy’ says formally of urine nothing save the relation of sign to the health said of animal. Therefore, ‘being’ said of an accident does not state anything other than relation to substance. Similarly, in Metaphysics 7.4.1030a32-b7 Aristotle seems to say that in the way something ‘non-knowable’ is equivocally ‘knowable’ so too work and vessel are equivocally ‘curative’, because these things, ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’, are in this way said to be beings.

49. Now the reason [n.46] for proving that this is unacceptable is as follows: for if inherence is not of the essence of whiteness, something else will be and it will inhere in whiteness, because whiteness is said to be formally inherent by this inherence. I ask then about the inherence: by what inherence does it inhere in whiteness? Either by the very same whiteness or by the very inherence; and by parity of reasoning one must make a stand at the first, or the inherence is other than its foundation and one will progress to infinity.

50. Again, there is another doubt against this conclusion [n.30], because at least the relation of accident to subject seems to be the same as the accident. The proof is that in Ord. II d.1 q.5 nn.252, 260-271 [cf. I d.3 n.287] it was said that the relation of each creature to God under the idea of a threefold cause [sc. God as exemplary cause, efficient cause, final cause] is the same as the foundation [sc. of the relation]; but the respect of accident to subject seems to be no less the same as the accident itself than this relation does [sc. relation of creature to God]. The proof is that created substance is not defined by adding the divine essence to its definition, for then nothing could have a definition in its own genus, since God is outside genus; and yet an accident, because of its necessary respect to a subject, is defined by respect to a subject (Metaphysics 7.4.1030a27-b13); therefore the respect of an accident to a subject is no less the same as the accident than is the respect of created substance to God.

51. Again a third doubt: if the respect of whiteness to the subject be other than whiteness, at least it does not seem to be posterior to whiteness; for whiteness only requires a subject because of the respect that it has to it. But if this respect be posterior to whiteness, the whiteness is able to remain when the respect has been removed; therefore, the whiteness is able not to depend on a subject. And this reason can be more evidently deduced about an accident as it is understood than about an accident as it is in existence, in the following way: if whiteness is prior to the respect, then it can be conceived completely without that respect, and consequently defined completely, as a prior can be without a posterior; but whiteness only requires a subject because of the respect it has to the subject; therefore, it can be defined completely without a subject, which is against the Philosopher (as before [nn.47-48]).

52. Again, a fourth doubt: if inherence is other than whiteness and posterior to it, at least it seems to be a proper attribute of whiteness, because nothing seems to inhere more immediately in whiteness than relation to a subject; but ‘a subject being per se without its proper attribute’ includes a contradiction, otherwise no conclusion would be simply knowable, for any such conclusion predicates an attribute of a subject and, for you [nn.39-42], no such conclusion would be simply necessary nor, consequently, simply knowable.

5. Solution of the Doubts

a. Solution of the First Doubt

53. Response to these doubts:

To the first [nn.46-49]: in no way must it be conceded that inherence is of the essence of whiteness; and the question moved by others about this seems fictitious and deceptive and without understanding. For even if asking whether the relation [sc. of inherence] is the same as whiteness would have some evidence to it, yet not on this ground is there reason to ask whether it is of the essence of whiteness, because nothing is of the essence of something save what intrinsically belongs to its quiddity; but a respect, though it be the same as the foundation, as was said of the respect of the creature to God [n.50], is yet not of its quiddity, because then no essence of a creature would be absolute. I assert the negative, therefore, that the inherence whereby whiteness inheres in its subject, is not of the essence of whiteness.

54. When argument is then drawn from Aristotle [nn.47-48], I say that he never thought this, that a form which is per se in an absolute genus includes any respect essentially; but the idea of inherence cannot be understood without the idea of respect, unless you do not understand what is meant by the name.

55. The first authority, then [from Aristotle, n.47], is brought from equivocation over the phrase ‘by the fact that’. For ‘by the fact that’ is not always a mark of the formal cause of what precedes it; for when Metaphysics 5.18.1022a14-20 says that ‘to the extent that’ or ‘by the fact that’ is said as often as ‘cause’ is said, the phrase can be a mark of any cause of what precedes it; and so, since substance is a cause of accident but is not of the essence of it, an accident is a being ‘by the fact that it is, in such manner, of being’, designating the causality in the substance. But not for this reason will the formal ‘to be’ in the entity of whiteness be the ‘to be’ of another entity.

56. Thus universally, a thing caused by any cause, in any genus of cause, is what it is because it is, in such manner, of being, that is, belongs to such cause in such genius and order of causing; nor yet is this relation to any cause something formal or essential in the thing caused, because then no caused thing would formally be absolute.

57. However some pervert this text, saying that Aristotle’s text is that “accidents are not beings [sc. as opposed to “are not called beings,” n.47]The authentic text does seem to be the reading Scotus rejects. ³⁸ save because they are, in such manner, of being” - this proposition the Philosopher neither asserts nor is it there [sc. in the text] nor does it follow from the Philosopher’s proposition; for just as the phrase ‘by the fact that’ can denote in the antecedent any cause of what precedes, so it can denote such a cause but not do so precisely, and consequently it does not denote such precision. But let it be that in the antecedent the precise cause were denoted just as it is in the consequent, yet neither proposition makes for the intended conclusion, that the relation imported by the term ‘of being’ is formal in the essence of whiteness. Now the phrase ‘in such manner, of being’ is taken for the substance that the preceding discussion was about - or for ‘totally of being’, according to another text, such that ‘totally’ does not thus state the totality of universality, because then an accident would be ‘of being’ taken in the most universal way, and thus it would not be a being, but it would be totally being, with the totality of perfection; and thus is substance totally being.

58. As to the other authority [n.47, “neither naturally fit nor able [to be separated from substance]” and the other things said there, it is plain how the Philosopher understands it, that it is because of the necessary order of caused thing to proximate cause; but there is not got from this that the relation to proximate cause is of the essence of the caused thing.

59. The authority from Metaphysics 4 and the like one from Metaphysics 7 about ‘knowable’ and ‘non-knowable’ [n.48] could, according to the appearance of the words, be adduced for the fact that an accident would have no formal entity, just as ‘health’ in the case of urine has nothing of the formal idea of health; and if it is adduced for this purpose, it is only ignorance of words. For it is plain that accidents are principles of acting and principles of knowing substance and per se objects of the senses (from On the Soul 1.1.402b16-3a2). But it is trifling to say that something is a principle of acting, either by real action on matter or by intentional action on the senses or intellect, and does not have any formal entity; for thus I could say that a chimaera acts or senses. It is also trifling that something is the per se property of being if it not have per se some entity, or that it is the term of some motion or change if it not have some entity. In the case of all substances, if they have properties, the properties are accidents. Also if there is any movement of growth, alteration, and ‘where’, it is to an accident as term.

60. The understanding of the philosopher therefore in the examples is not that they run all fours, for according to Damascene ch.70 “What is alike in everything will be altogether the same thing, not an example.” And so he says as preface, “it is not necessary for examples to be assigned that are complete and without defects; for it is necessary to consider in examples what is like and what is unlike.”

61. Thus I say that the examples of the Philosopher are to this effect, that just as the essential order is of medicine to animal in what it is ‘to be called healthy’, so the essential order is between substance and accident in having entitative being. But the examples are not to the effect that essential order to a subject is of the essence of the whiteness that has that order the way the idea of sign is essentially ‘healthy’ as said of urine. And the reason for the unlikeness is in this, that there is not in urine any absolute form by which it might be said to be healthy, although there is something absolute there on which the idea of sign is founded, namely the sort of color and digestion and other things that appear in it, but the very order to health is that by which urine is formally said to be healthy. And therefore is this altogether equivocal as far as concerns the name imposed on it from the concept by which an animal is said to be healthy; for although the health is the same that is in an animal formally and that is indicated by urine, yet ‘healthy’ is imposed to denote what has health formally, and what has health as a sign is purely equivocal. But on the other side ‘being’ is not purely equivocal, as was said elsewhere [Ord. I d.3 nn.26-41], and in each extreme there is an absolute thing because of which a thing is said to be a being, although on one of the absolutes an order to the other is founded.

62. To the argument [n.49] I say that inherence inheres in whiteness, otherwise whiteness would not be formally inherent by that inherence.

63. And when you ask about the inherence [n.49] by what inherence it inheres in whiteness, I say that it is the same as the inherence of whiteness, and so a stand is made there. The reason for this is plain in Ord. II d.1 q.5 n.205, because the relation is the same as the foundation, without which ‘being a foundation’ includes a contradiction. Of this sort is the inherence of the inherence, because it is a contradiction for the inherence of whiteness at a surface to be actual and not actually to inhere or not to have that inherence. It is similarly impossible and a contradiction for inherence to exist aptitudinally without inhering aptitudinally, and without being a foundation of the inherence, namely the whiteness itself; and it too is present in this foundation, for a respect cannot exist without being in a foundation because of the special repugnance a respect has to not being in a foundation. But, for the opposite reason, no inherence of an absolute form is the same as itself, for there is simply no repugnance in that form being and not being simply.

b. Solution of the Second Doubt

64. And from this [n.63] the answer is plain to the second doubt [n.50]; for I say that the inherence of whiteness too is not the same as whiteness.

65. And when proof is given through the relation of the creature to God [n.50], I say the case is not alike, because of the major previously set down for this third conclusion [n.39]; for no relation to an extrinsic cause is identical with the thing caused save the relation that is to the first cause, because of the fact that the first cause can create any creature at all without any other extrinsic cause at all.

66. And when the argument about the definition is given [n.50], it would prove rather that an accident should not be defined by the subject, because stone or horse are not defined by God, therefore neither is accident by subject. Nevertheless, although God is the sort of cause without which it is impossible and a contradiction for a stone or a horse to exist, yet it is not so in the case of a subject with respect to an accident.

67. But I reply: the identity, or non-identity, of a respect with the foundation is not a reason that the term of respect should fall into the definition of the foundation as something added.

68. What else then?

I reply that neither is dependence an essential and necessary cause that the term of the dependence be added in the definition of the depending foundation; for then God would more be posited in the definition of any caused thing than substance in the definition of accident. But the cause is that no form can have a satisfyingly complete concept unless that of which it is the form be understood along with it; but a definition expresses the perfect concept of the defined thing; and therefore, however much the essential features of a form be expressed without that of which it is the form, and although the quiddity of it be indicated, yet there would not be a perfect concept satisfying the intellect, and so not a definitive concept either. But if a caused thing that is in itself some subsistent composite is conceived in itself, the intellect rests there, not seeking anything else to understand along with it.

69. And if you object that there is therefore equal necessity for a substantial form to be defined by something added as for an accident as well, I reply that there is a necessity on both sides. The point is plain from the Philosopher in defining the soul, On the Soul 2.1.412a19-21, where he at once posits the body (which is what is perfectible by the soul), or the whole composite (of which the soul is part). Nor does he posit anything pertaining to the essence of the soul save only that it is act, which signifies the respect of the soul to that of which it is the form. But there is not a like addition here and there, because in the definition of a substantial form is added something that, with it, makes it per se one, or of which it is a per se part (I give the disjunction because of the diverse way of saying that a form is defined, through matter or through the whole); but in the definition of an accidental form is added something with which it does not make a per se one, nor of which it is per se part.

c. Solution of the Third Doubt

70. As to the third doubt [n.51] I say that this respect of inherence is posterior to the whiteness, just as universally a respect founded on something is posterior to the foundation.

71. And when you say [n.51] that therefore whiteness does not necessarily require a term for the respect, I deny the consequence; for something can well depend on the term of a respect and yet not depend on the respect if the respect is posterior to it (for thus does the substance of a stone not depend on the respect of the stone to God, but rather conversely, provided they were diverse things, and yet the stone would depend essentially on God, who is the term of the respect).

72. As to the proposition [n.51] “whiteness only requires a subject because of the respect,” I reply: ‘because of’ in the sense of necessarily following the nature of the foundation, but not ‘because of’ in the sense of being required for the nature of the foundation as something prior to it. And because it is a ‘because of’ in the former way, it is not necessary that it be required in the same order in which the term of the respect is required.

73. Hereby as to the following point in the same place [“it can be defined completely without a subject,” n.51], which is still touching on the definition of accident, I concede that whiteness can be understood as to anything included in the idea of whiteness in the first mode per se,The first mode of per se is when the predicate belongs to the essence of the subject (as in ‘man is rational’), while the second mode is when the subject belongs to the essence of the predicate (as in ‘man is capable of laughter’). ³⁹ without understanding anything of the respect.

74. And when it is said that therefore it could be defined by its essential parts [n.51], the concession has been made that some idea of it could be assigned that indicates, through the essential parts, the whole essence of it; yet it would not be a definition because it would not be expressive of the perfect concept, for the understanding, when it has this concept, would always depend on something else that is the term of the dependence of the concept [n.42].

75. And when you argue that if the respect is not necessarily concomitant, then the term too of the respect is not required for the understanding of a white thing [n.51], I deny the consequence (speaking of complete concept and one satisfying in intelligibility), since for this is required that the term be understood, but it is not required that the respect to the term be understood as well.

76. And this last fact [sc. respect to the term] makes clear the whole of this conclusion [sc. the third, n. 30] and the response to the three preceding arguments [sc. the doubts, nn.46-51]; for inherence is a certain respect

d. Solution of the Fourth Doubt

77. To the fourth doubt [n.52] I say that this inherence is not a per se property of whiteness but is a per accidens accident of whiteness; for inherence is a certain extrinsically arising respect, and that at least for any absolute accident, because it states the actual union of the absolute to another absolute. Now every union of an absolute to an absolute is an externally arising respect, but every externally arising respect is (for that in which it is) a per accidens accident (as was shown above in a question about character [Ord. IV d.6 nn.295-296]); for it is not a necessary consequent, even when the term is posited (for then it would be an intrinsically arising respect). For a respect cannot arise more intrinsically than what necessarily follows the foundation once the term is posited; for if it followed the posited foundation without the term it would not be a respect.

78. But the proof of the proposition, namely that every union of absolutes is an extrinsically arising respect [n.77], is that neither of the absolutes nor both are, by their idea, a necessary cause of such union; for God can without contradiction separate each and conserve it separately without the other, because of the fact that each of them in respect of the other can only be an extrinsic cause, and not a first cause, such that the point about extrinsic respect makes clear how whiteness could be without inherence, namely as a foundation without the extrinsically arising respect, either because the term is not the respect, as in the proposition just stated, or because, if it is, it is separate.

79. But this point about extrinsic respect is at length reduced to the idea above introduced, the proof of the third conclusion [nn.39-42], namely the proposition that God can make any absolute without what is not of the essence of the absolute, because the absolute would only depend on that as on an extrinsic and not a first cause - and all such dependence is contingent.

80. To the proof, then, about an attribute that is immediately present [n.52], one could say that if whiteness has a proper attribute it would more immediately inhere in whiteness than the inherence does. For the inherence is not necessarily present in whiteness, and that whether the subject is conjoined or is separate. Now inherence is only contingently present, and not by the nature of whiteness but by an extrinsic cause; for whiteness does not make itself inhere, but the agent does. For universally the form is not effective in generating but the composite is, and as in a composite per se one so in a composite per accidens. But what makes whiteness inhere in a subject makes a composite per accidens, namely the white subject.

81. And if you argue that by parity of reasoning neither does the remaining part, namely the potential, neither does it make the whole, and so the subject will not be the effective principle of uniting any accident to itself - this is not to the purpose. There is a solution to it, however, because the subject can well include the form virtually, and so include the whole composed of itself and the form. But not so the accident, because the accident does not virtually include itself nor the subject, nor consequently the whole composed of them; also, it naturally follows the agent, since it is the formal term, but the subject is not so.

82. One could say in another way that although inherence is present most immediately in whiteness and in other absolutes, yet the consequence that it is more a per se attribute does not follow unless the foundation, adopted by some people [Giles of Rome], be proved that a variable accident cannot be present in anything save by the mediation of an invariable accident - on which they base a great harangue about the powers of the soul. But how they prove it let them find out. They adduce some examples, but it would be necessary to see some reason for the conjunction of the extreme terms. If something of the same idea could be an inseparable accident in one thing and a separable accident in another (and this is not denied of heat in fire and in wood), the foundation will be weak.

II. To the Initial Arguments

A. To the First Initial Argument

83. To the first initial argument [n.8] I say that by taking ‘being per se’ and ‘being in another’ uniformly, namely as ‘being per se’ denies aptitude for inhering and ‘being in another’ affirms that aptitude, the two are thus in proportional agreement, the first with substance and the second with accident; and then nothing more follows save that an accident cannot be a being per se to which inhering is repugnant, just as neither can substance be that to which the aptitude of inhering belongs.

84. And if you wish to take each actually, namely ‘actually being per se’ and ‘actually being in another’, I say that, as such, they do not divide [being] nor are substance and accident proper to these dividing terms. And no wonder, because on the part of the ‘per se’ the first understanding entails the second; for repugnance to being in [another] entails not being in [another]. But on the other part [sc. ‘being in another’] it is not so, but there is a fallacy of the consequent: ‘it is naturally apt to be in [another], therefore it is in [another]’.

85. And suppose that, as to the aptitude or lack of aptitude for inhering, you ask what it is and how it is disposed to whiteness, namely whether it is in it, and whether in it by another inherence, and so on ad infinitum;

86. Suppose too you ask about the quantity or also about the per se existing whiteness, whether it has a mode of inhering opposite to the one it has when it is in another (it seems that it does, because ‘to be per se’ and ‘to be in another’, however they are taken, are opposites to each other; but it seems the opposite is the case, because it is the same ‘to be’ (as was said before [n.83]), and consequently the same mode of ‘to be’);

87. Suppose, third, the question is asked whether the accident could, by its own aptitude, actually be present, if a substance actually came to be that was of a nature to be informed by the accident;

88. As to the first [n.85]: an aptitude is nothing other than the nature of that of which it is the aptitude. That it is not anything absolute is plain. That it is not anything else, such as an actual real respect, [is plain], for it only states that such a ‘what’ would be fitting to such a nature; and that is why it belong to this nature, or is not repugnant to it, because this nature is this nature.

89. As to the second [n.86], I say that modes of being can be understood to be because either they vary the ‘to be’ itself or because they posit some diversity posterior to the ‘to be’. In the first way, since the ‘to be’ of the accident is the same in the bread and without the bread, so there is the same mode. In the second way there is variation, because the ‘to be’ in the bread was the subject of a certain real respect to the bread, but when the ‘to be’ is per se, it is deprived of that respect; and hereby it is plain that ‘to be in the bread’ and ‘to be per se’ state a diverse mode in the ‘to be’, by positing and taking away the respect to another.

90. As to the third [n.87], the answer is plain from the fourth doubt solved before [n.78], because an accident cannot effectively unite itself to the subject. Hence if God were to be bring back the substance of the bread and do nothing else, the accident would remain without a subject, as it does now [sc. after the consecration], nor would it be united to the substance of the bread as a form by virtue of the accident (I mean by virtue of it effectively).

91. And if you argue that it is a miracle that the accident is not in a subject, therefore, when the impediment of non-inherence, namely of the non-existence of the subject, ceases, the miracle will cease, and the accident will be totally in the subject - I reply: something miraculously posited in being remains in that being until it is changed by some agent.

B. To the Second Initial Argument

92. To the second [n.9] I say that prior and posterior can be understood either actually or in aptitude. If you take them uniformly I concede that the posterior cannot naturally be without the prior. But if you take it that ‘posterior in aptitude’ cannot be without ‘prior actually’ it is not true; for if what is prior in aptitude does not exist, it is not prior actually, and also if it does exist, and the dependence of the posterior on it is taken away by something else that is prior to both, neither thus is it actually prior. And this is the way it is in the issue at hand. Hence I say that the accident is not actually posterior to the substance of the bread but only apt naturally to be posterior to it as to what is aptitudinally prior.

93. And if you argue that it has no special respect of posterior to God that it did not have before; therefore the priority of the bread is not more supplied now by divine action than before (and this could be an objection against the third main conclusion [n.30] and against its proof [nn.39-41], namely how the first extrinsic cause could supply the causality of any other extrinsic cause, since it could not have in itself the priority of the second cause, nor consequently does it seem to be the term of the posteriority in the caused thing that properly corresponds to that priority [sc. of the second cause]) - I reply: an unlimited unique priority can be the term of the posterior simply.

94. On the contrary: it is not the term now in a way different than before; but it was not the term totally before.

95. I reply: some respects were prior in the posterior (which is the foundation) that are not prior now; and this is possible because they came to the foundation extrinsically; those respects therefore had a term previously and do not have a term now (I concede), because they do not exist now. But the unique respect which before had a term in the simply First thing has a term in it now, and the termination of it by that one thing is sufficient for the being of the foundation of this sort of respect.

96. On the contrary: therefore the foundation did not before essentially depend on those other dependencies, because without the terms of those dependencies the foundation’s first respect to the simply First was totally sufficient for the being of the foundation; for what has whatever is required for its being in a prior stage does not depend for anything in a second stage.

97. I reply: this deduction seems well to touch on the order of second causes, and on the necessity of that order, because of which order the Philosopher is said to deny posteriority in the issue at hand [n.9]. Or if this order is not necessary, it is difficult to see how a second cause is cause of the effect, since that is not a cause without which the caused thing has the totality of its being from something else naturally prior (see on this point Ord. II d.1 n.143; also I d.8 n. 306).

C. To the Third and Fourth Initial Arguments

98. To the third argument, about definition [n.10], response has been made by the response to the doubts moved against the third conclusion [nn.68-69].

99. One word remains there, however, because of the proof that that which falls there in a definition is necessarily required for its being, as a correlative is for the being of a correlative [n.11].

100. I say that this is for the reason that it is a relative; nor is there any other reason why it necessarily requires another term. For it is not because it is an accident; rather, if it were a relation and not an accident (as is relation in divine reality) a term would still be required. But the defined thing of which we are speaking is an absolute; therefore it does not require something added as a term of the respect, but as an extrinsic cause - and any such extrinsic cause is not necessarily required save the first cause.

101. To the fourth argument [n.13] I say that ‘white’ can be understood in two ways:

In one way as it imports such a form under such a mode of signifying, and this it signifies per se. Hence, according to the Philosopher in the Categories [n.13], ‘white’ signifies the quality alone - which is true, but under a different mode of signifying than ‘whiteness’.

In another way as we commonly conceive (through ‘white’ and these sort of concrete terms) the whole composed of subject and form.

102. If in the first way the argument has more evidence, for about the second way it is plain that if there is whiteness, there is no necessity that there is a white [thing]. But about the first way I say that, by virtue of the word, there is then no necessity to concede that if there is whiteness, there is white, because although the form is naturally apt to inhere in a subject, there is no necessity that it be under such a mode of being, namely under actual inherence in a subject; but ‘white’ signifies the form under such idea of actually inhering.

103. Or if you object that a noun, both adjectival and substantive, abstracts from time, therefore ‘white’ does not signify actual inherence of a form in a subject, because then it would co-signify present time - I reply: then the concession would be that as there is whiteness, so also is there white; and it would not follow that therefore something as a subject is white, because this is not posited in the antecedent either (not by the thing signified nor by the mode of signifying). This concession would be more easily made about quantity; for just as concession is here made that there is quantity, so too that there is a quantum, yet no concession is here made that some matter or substance is perfected by quantity.

Question Two. Whether in the Eucharist any Accident Whatever Remaining is without a Subject

104. To the second question [n.13], it is argued that in the Eucharist any accident whatever remaining is without a subject:

For any accident whatever is there without a substance; therefore without a subject. The antecedent is plain from the preceding question [n.7].

105. Proof of the consequence:

First as follows: Metaphysics 7.1.1028a32, 35-36, “substance is first of all in idea,” which the Philosopher proves because, “it is necessary that in the idea of anything the idea of substance be present;” but substance does not fall into the idea of anything save as something added, otherwise the other thing in whose idea substance falls would not be a being per se, which is against the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.8.1017b10-14. But it only falls as something added [in the idea etc.] as subject.

106. A confirmation of this is that when accidents are in a substance, the substance is the term of the dependence of each accident; but it is only the term as subject; therefore etc.

107. Again, no accident is the subject of any accident in the Eucharist; therefore, all whatever are there without a subject. The consequence is plain, because there is no substance there.

108. Proof of the antecedent:

First from the Philosopher Metaphysics 4.4.1007b2-4, 12-13: “An accident,” he says, “is not an accident of an accident save because both are accidents of the same subject; for this accident is no more an accident of that one than that one is of this.”

109. Second by reason: First, because as it belongs to substance to be per se, so it belongs to an accident to inhere [in another]; therefore, as it is repugnant for substance to inhere so it is repugnant for an accident to be per se or to ‘sub-stand’. Second, because what is the term of any dependence does not depend with a dependence of the same idea; but every accident depends with dependence on a subject; therefore, no accident is the term of this dependence.

110. Again, some accident is there without a subject; therefore any accident can be [there] without a subject. The antecedent is plain because an accident, which is primarily of a nature to be in a substance, does not have a subject there, because no substance is there.

111. Proof of the consequence: first because any accident at all depends equally essentially on a subject; second because in essentially dependent things, dependence on a first thing is the more necessary - as is plain in the case of causes, because dependence on a first cause is simply necessary; therefore dependence on a substance is more necessary than dependence on any accident; if therefore something can be an accident without dependence on a substance, then an accident will able to be without dependence on any subject.

112. Again, it seems more repugnant for a relative accident or a respect to be without a subject than for any other accident; but a relative accident or respect can be without a subject; therefore so can any other accident.

113. Proof of the minor: because if it is repugnant, then either on the ground that a relative accident is an accident or on the ground that it is a relation. Not on the ground it is an accident, because then it would be repugnant to any accident; nor on the ground it is a relation, because then it would be repugnant to divine relation - which is false, because divine relation is not in a subject; and the proof is that it is infinite and the infinite is a being per se (the proof of the first proposition is that the relation is the divine essence, and so is infinite; the proof of the second is that simply perfect conditions of being come together in the same thing, so that one implies the other, as that necessity implies actuality and infinity implies necessity and so on about the others; therefore what has infinity has per se being as well, which is a noble condition in being).

114. [To the contrary]

The opposite seems per se evident, because then [sc. if any accident at all in the Eucharist is without a subject] it would be necessary to say that in the Eucharist any possible motion at all would be there without a movable thing.

Something else would also follow, that a respect would be there without a foundation; for there is equality there of this quantity to another quantity as large, and there is likeness there of this quality to another quality of the same species, and there is a being circumscribed by place there without location of this dimension by the containing body. And equality, for you [e.g. Godfrey of Fontaines, nn.141-142], is not in quantity, and likeness not in whiteness, and circumscription not in quantity, and consequently these relations would exist and yet not in any foundation. If the consequent does not appear unacceptable at once, it is proved to be so by the fact that nothing is said to be formally such and such without some form inhering formally in it: this quantity is said to be formally equal, and this quality to be like, and this dimension to be located in place; therefore what the subject is denominated by is in the subject as form.

I. To the Question

A. Two Extreme Opinions

1. First Opinion

a. Exposition of the Opinion

115. There are here two extreme opinions.

One that posits only quantity to be, and to be able to be, in the Eucharist without a subject [Giles of Rome, Thomas Aquinas].

116. For this opinion there are four reasons.

The first is as follows: only quantity is individuated per se, and all other accidents are individuated through quantity; therefore, if there were some accident and it were not in quantity, it would be a ‘this’ and would not be a ‘this’.

117. Again [nn.117-119 are from Giles or Rome], if whiteness were separated from quantity, it would be perceptible and imperceptible. The proof that it would be perceptible is that it would be per se in the third species of quality [Aristotle, Categories 8.9a28-10a10]. The proof that it would be imperceptible is that a non-quantum cannot be sensed. If this be denied it is proved as follows, that according to the Philosopher, De Sensu et Sensato 6.445b3-11 about a certain matter of doubt: “if what is perceptible were divided infinitely, the sense power would be divided infinitely.” This consequence is only valid if the sense power has to increase according to the decrease of the perceptible thing; if then some perceptible thing is disproportionately less, the senses would have to increase disproportionately; but an indivisible perceptible thing is disproportionately less (so to speak) than any perceptible quantum; therefore some sense power will be able to be disproportionately greater than any other. The consequent is false; therefore etc.

118. Again, if whiteness were without quantity, it would be a spiritual quality because it would be indivisible; and it would be a bodily quality because it is in the third species of quality; and so it would be spiritual and non-spiritual.

119. Again, if it were without quantity and so spiritual, there would be no repugnance to its being in a spirit, and so a spirit could be white.

b. Rejection of the Opinion

α. Against the Reasons for the Opinion

120. These reasons are not proofs.

The first [n.116] is not, because an accident is not a singular formally by something of another genus; for just as it is possible to find, in any genus, a supreme in the joint ordering of the genus and possible to find all the intermediate genera and species, so it is possible to find in that joint ordering something lowest per se of which they are all predicated and it not predicated of any;The ordering here is clearly one of predication, where the most universal term is predicated ultimately of the individual singular. So sense quality is most universal, color is less universal, red is less universal still, this individual red is least universal, and all the others are ultimately predicated of this individual red. So, individuation in color must be in the genus of color and not derived from individuation in something else, as say from the individual red being the color of this individual extension or quantity. ⁴⁰ therefore a quality, even when it is in a quantity, is not a ‘this’ formally through quantity; therefore if there is a cause, even a proximate but extrinsic one, of the singularity of the quality, the quality can be a singular without that extrinsic cause. More is contained about this in Ord. II d.3 nn.89-92.

121. Again the second reason [n.117], about perceptible and imperceptible, is not conclusive. For ‘perceptible’ can be said to be either what is in remote potency or what in proximate potency to being sensed. In remote potency there is whatever has a sufficient form but not under the fitting mode under which it must be had in order to be sensed; in proximate potency there is what has the form such that act could, when the impediment ceases, follow at once. This distinction is made clear in Ord. I d.7 n.32, and is proved there by the Philosopher in Metaphysics 5 and 9 [ibid. n.33]. It is plain also from Anselm On Freedom of Choice ch.4, where Anselm holds that we have in us no potency that suffices by itself for act (as he exemplifies about sight, which is not sufficient for an act of seeing without an object and an illumined medium etc.).

122. A separate whiteness would be perceptible in this way, by taking ‘perceptible’ for remote potency; because whiteness would be a form that was in itself an activator of sight, though not under this mode of being; and for this reason it would not be perceptible in the sense of proximate potency. Nor is there any contradiction because of this, just as neither would there be if you argued about divisible and indivisible. For the whiteness is divisible by remote possibility because it could be in a quantum, and then it would be in proximate potency to being divided; but it would not be divisible in proximate potency as long as it was without quantity.

123. And when you argue [n.117] that if the whiteness were perceptible then the sense [of sight] would disproportionately exceed every other sense - I say that the consequence does not hold unless the whiteness were perceptible to some sense in proximate potency; for then that sense would be more perfect than every other sense in the proportion in which the sensible object would depart from the other sensibles. But though I concede that it is perceptible in remote potency, yet I do not concede that it is perceptible to any sense in proximate potency; and so there is no need that some sense be able to perceive or know the whiteness under this mode of existing, nor consequently that it disproportionately exceeds the other senses; for this would only follow if the sensible object were in proximate potency, for thus does the Philosopher argue there [n.117] about every sensible object.

124. To the third [n.118] I say that whiteness would be simply a bodily quality or bodily whiteness, because directed simply to perfecting body; but it would be non-bodily in a certain respect because not bodily actually - just as a bodily substance would, though it were without quantity, still be bodily, because it would be naturally fitted to be under quantity (but an angel would not be thus fitted); and it would also be indivisible actually, but divisible in remote potency or aptitude, as was said [n.122].

125. As to the fourth argument [n.119]: it is thoroughly lacking in any plausible appearance, because just as a stone cannot be wise, for the reason that it in no way has the idea of being receptive in respect of wisdom, so an angel cannot be white, for the reason that an angel is in no way capable of taking up that form (whether the form were posited to be divisible or indivisible). Now indeed there is a double reason that an angel cannot be white: one is extension in the form and lack of extension in an angel; the other reason is that this form is this form, and an angel is an angel. And the second reason is the essential idea of the impossibility, the first reason is not; ‘therefore when the first is taken away, there is a possibility’ is a null consequence.The first reason (extension in the form of whiteness and non-extension in an angel) is based on a property of whiteness and angel. The second reason (this form is this form, an angel is an angel) is based on the essence of whiteness and angel (whiteness/color is the limit of the transparent in the surface of a body, an angel is a non-bodily substance). So even if the first reason were taken away, the second would remain and be sufficient by itself to prove the relevant impossibility; and thus denial of the second would not follow denial or dismissal of the first (contrary to what the initial argument supposed [n.119]). ⁴¹

β. Against the Conclusion of the Opinion

126. There is argument against this first reason [n.115] as to its conclusion as well:

First as follows: dependence on a first is more essential than dependence on anything posterior to it, speaking of absolute dependents and of absolutes on which there is dependence; but quality is an absolute form just as is quantity; therefore quality more essentially depends on substance than on quantity. So if a quality can be without actual dependence on a substance, it will be able to be without actual dependence on quantity.

127. Again, existing per se is not more repugnant to an absolute and a more perfect absolute than to a more imperfect absolute; quality is an absolute form, and (according to them [Giles of Rome]) more perfect than quantity; therefore etc.

128. Proof of the minor as to its second part [sc. quality is more perfect than quantity]:

First, because quality is a per se principle of acting with a real action - the point is plain and they themselves concede it; quantity is not, because no real action, as we are now speaking of it, belongs to quantity.

129. Second, because the order of qualities is considered according to the order of substances, for to more noble substances correspond more noble qualities. But the order of quantities does not so correspond, for a more noble substance is not always greater in quantity (for the largest bodies in the genus of corruptible things, of which sort are the elements, are the most imperfect). Now that seems more perfect which corresponds proportionally in its perfection to what is simply more perfect.

130. Third, because substances more perfectly attain their ends through qualities; for either the beatific act is a quality (which was touched on in Ord. I d.3 n.505), or if it is not, at least according to common opinion some supernatural qualities are required for beatitude, or some form that is a quality is [cf. Rep. IVA d.49 q.10]. But quantity is in no way a principle for substance of attaining its end.

131. Fourth, because quantity follows the composite by reason of matter, but quality follows it by reason of form; but form is simply more perfect than matter,

Metaphysics 7.3.1029a5-6. And this last point is perhaps the reason of the first, second, and third middle terms [sc. in the arguments in nn.128-130] for, on this account, the order of qualities corresponds in perfection to the order of substances [n.129], and for this reason quality is the principle of real action [n.128], and also the principle for substance itself of attaining its end [n.130].

132. Fifth, because what agrees more with perfection simply is simply more perfect; but some quality, as wisdom for example, agrees more with perfection simply (and likewise do understanding and willing) than any quantity, either because the one is the formal idea of divine wisdom and created wisdom, which is a quality (according to one opinion, touched on in Ord. I d.8 nn.3, 90-94), or if it is not, at least as to all nearness and analogy the nearness of created wisdom to divine wisdom is greater than that of any quantity to God or to anything of God. Hence just as it is possible for perfection simply to exist in a creature, namely with a limitation, the quality that is wisdom is a perfection simply of him who has it; but no quantity is a perfection simply, not even in the way it is possible for a creature to have perfection simply.

133. Against this reason [n.127] an objection is made as follows: what is closer to what is more perfect is simply more perfect; quantity is closer to substance than quality is; but substance is the most perfect of all beings; therefore quantity is more perfect than quality.

134. I reply: if many perfections (in what way ‘many’ I care not now) come together at once in the first perfect thing, perhaps something can be nearer to it according to one perfection and not according to another. For example:

135. God is a simply necessary existence, and this necessity in him is a perfection simply; the more necessary a thing is, therefore, the closer it is to God, and in this way the heaven is closer to God than is anything corruptible.

136. But besides this, God is a simply perfect intellectual nature; in this respect a merely intellectual creature, though finite, is closer to God, of which sort is the angelic nature; after this comes intellectual nature, but not merely intellectual, and, along with this, finite; after this comes sense nature, which more approaches intellectual nature than non-sense nature does. In this order, then, a fly is closer to God than the heaven is.

137. It could then be inferred from the first order [n.135] that the heaven would be closer to God and thus more perfect than a fly; but from the second order [n.136] that a fly is more perfect than the heaven, and so opposite to it.

138. I reply, therefore, that whenever perfections, however disparate, come together in the first [perfect thing, n.134], that perfection is simply more perfect which is closer to the first according to what has the idea of the simply more perfect - just as, according to the Philosopher Topics 3.2.117b17-19, it does not follow that a monkey is better than a horse, although a monkey is more similar to a man, because it is not more similar to a man in the simply better conditions. Now in the first thing intellectuality is a nobler condition than necessity of existing, understanding the ‘more’ in the way in which the distinction there is drawn [n.134]; and therefore man is simply more noble than the heaven.

139. Nor yet should you wonder that a diverse order is assigned to the first thing according to diverse perfections, because any perfection can be the principle of one natural hierarchy or, according to the philosophers, of one ‘golden chain’ [Henry of Ghent, Dionysius the Areopagite]; and so according to diverse perfections simply in the first thing, participated by diverse things in ordered fashion, diverse golden chains can be noted.

140. To the issue in hand I say that there is in substance, as it is the first of beings, a double order of priority: one in ‘standing under’ [sub-stans] other things, which includes receiving other things and being perfected by them; another the order of intensive actuality; and this second perfection is simply nobler than the first and greater, because it first belongs to the potential [of substance], or at least requires that to which potential being belongs. Now quantity is closer to substance according to the first idea of order, because it is more immediate in the order of receptivity; but quality is closer in the second idea of order, for it is the principle of acting (quantity is not so), and in this respect it appears a greater being.

2. Second Opinion

a. Exposition of the Opinion.

141. The second opinion is at the other extreme, namely that no accident can be the subject of any accident, and consequently that any accident whatever in the Eucharist is without a subject.

142. In favor of this opinion are the reasons given above, at the beginning, for the first part of the question [nn.104-113].

b. Rejection of the Opinion

143. On the contrary:

That is per se the subject of any accident of which the accident is predicated per se in the second mode [n.73 footnote]; but of some accident is some accident predicated per se in the second mode, as the proper attribute of it; therefore etc.

Proof of the major: that of which an accident is predicated per se in the second mode falls in the definition of that accident as something added to it, and only added as subject, because the defined thing has on such a defining subject no other dependence.

The minor is plain because universally all the properties demonstrated in the whole of mathematical science are demonstrated of accidents, and are said of them per se in the second mode. The point is plain by beginning from the first conclusion to the last of arithmetic or geometry, to such an extent that, if there were no incorporeal substance in the universe, any knowable property would be as equally known of that of which it is known; for a triangle no less has three angles [sc. equal to two right angles] even if triangularity were not in any substance; and three lines would no less be able to be the sides of an equilateral triangle even if no substance were the subject for them.

144. Again, Avicenna Metaphysics 2.1 manifestly maintains that some accident is the subject of another accident, and he gives an example, as motion for instance is the subject of fast speed and slow speed.

145. And third the fact appears in the issue at hand, in the argument given for the opposite [n.114], because it is manifest here that there are many relations by which things are related, as equality, likeness, passive circumscription [sc. being circumscribed by place]; but these relations would not be able to be posited, nor able to be so in a subject, since absolutes cannot be related by these relations were these relations not formally in them.

B. Scotus’ own Opinion

146. I reply to the question, then, by mediating between the said opinions: for I make a distinction in ‘subject’: as it is taken for the ultimate term of the dependence of another per accidens act, or as it is taken for any proximate term (though not the ultimate term) of that dependence, that is, taken for anything to which some act could be present per accidens as the form of it, not making something per se one with the subject.

147. In the first way [n.146] it is plain that nothing can be the subject of an accident save substance. In the second way I say that it is possible for some accident to be the subject of an accident, as the arguments prove that were touched on against the second opinion [nn.143-145]. And it is possible for any accident to be absolute without a subject in each way, as the arguments prove that were brought against the first opinion [nn.126-132].

148. But it is not possible that a respective accident is without a subject in the second way, because it is not possible that there be a respect between two things without the respect being of something to something, and this not by reason of ‘accident’ but by reason of ‘respect’; now there cannot be a respect of something to something unless it is in that of which it is the respect; and so, if it is the respect of an accident, it will be in that accident as an accident in a subject. And so, as to what is possible, it is plain that an accident can be without a subject, and this when subject is taken in this way and that way [sc. taken as substance or as accident].

149. But what is the case in fact?

I say that a respective accident is here in a subject, speaking of subject in the second way, because the relation of it is to a term.

150. But as to absolute accidents [nn.25-26], those who think in diverse ways about quantity will respond in diverse ways:

For those who say quantity is an absolute essence other than the essence of bodily substance and quality, as the common opinion says [Ord. II d.3 nn.71-74], would say that quantity here is without a subject but not quality, rather that quality is in quantity [nn.115-119]. And for this view there is this probability, that quality in this way is extended (it is plain to sense); and it is not extended essentially, but only per accidens, without an extension that is intrinsic to quality, according to this opinion [Giles of Rome]. But everything extended per accidens either receives in itself the extension by which it is extended per accidens, or receives it in extension or in something extended; now quality does not receive extension in itself, according to this opinion; therefore it is only extended per accidens, because it is received in something extended; and with this agrees the remark in the Categories 6.5b7-8, “Whiteness is as large as the surface is.”

151. But those who would say that the quantity of bodily substance is not other than the essence of this sort of substance, and that the quantity of color is not other than the color [Ord. II d.3 nn.132-135, 148-154], would say that the quality here is not in quantity, but rather that the quantity that appears is the quantity of quality.

152. But about this dispute there is discussion in Ord. II d.3 nn.4-6.

II. To the Initial Arguments

A. To the First

153. To the initial arguments.

As to the first [n.104], I concede that any accident there lacks a subject (taking ‘subject’ in the first way, namely as the ultimate term of the dependence of an accident [n.146])

154. Nor is more proved by the argument taken from Metaphysics 7 [n.105]; for substance is posited in the definition of every accident for this reason, that of none of them can a perfect concept, satisfying to the intellect, be attained without the addition of substance; but not on this account is substance an immediate addition in the definition of any accident whatever; rather it is an immediate addition in the case of some, as being the proximate receiver, while in the definition of another it is added as the mediated receiver, being the mediated term of that other’s dependence, and it is the immediate term of the dependence of some further accident on which that other depends.

B. To the Second

155. To the second [n.107] I say that an accident can be the subject of an accident, taking ‘subject’ in the second way, though not taking it in the first way [n.146].

156. And when the opposite is proved from the Philosopher Metaphysics 4 [n.108], a triple response can be made.

First, that the ‘because’ does not indicate cause but concomitance, so that the sense is: for an accident is not an accident of an accident save ‘because’ (that is ‘when’) both are accident to some other thing. For this was something necessary with the Philosopher, who did not reckon that an accident without a subject could support another accident, as was said in the preceding question [n.55].

157. Second, it can be said that the Philosopher is speaking of disparate accidents, as his example there shows; for he says, “I mean ‘white’ and ‘musical’.”

158. Third, it can be said that the remark ‘an accident is not an accident of an accident’ is not stated as true but is stated as something following from the hypothesis that he intends there to reject; for he argues as follows [Metaphysics 4.4.1007b18-20, 8.1012b13-22]: if contradictories are true together then every predication is per accidens, and consequently predication has to keep going infinitely; but in infinite things there is no order, Metaphysics 2.2.994b19-20, because where there is no first, there is no second; therefore no accident has an order per se to another accident, and consequently this other accident is no more an accident of it than it is of that other.

159. And the text agrees with this way of expounding it, for it does not say ‘an accident is an accident of an accident only because both are accident of the same thing’ but ‘an accident is not an accident of an accident, unless because etc.’ by which he indicates that he does not assert the proposition as true but that he is inferring it from prior premises. And if one expounds the text in this way, the opposite can more be deduced from the authority than the proposed conclusion; for, according to this exposition, it will be inferred as something unacceptable, not asserted as something true.

160. And when the proof is given about ‘being per se’ and ‘being in another’ [n.109], the response is plain from the preceding solution [nn.83-91]; for in the way these features are proper to substance and to accident, in that way can ‘to be per se’ and ‘to sub-stand’ not apply to accident, just as ‘to inhere’ cannot apply to substance; but this holds when ‘to sub-stand’ is taken as it applies to what is ultimately the term of the dependence of inherence.

161. And when, lastly, proof through the idea of dependence [n.109] is given, because an accident cannot be the term of a dependence of the same idea - ‘altogether of the same idea’ can be conceded, because a different independence is required in the ultimate term, and this independence prohibits a dependence altogether the same as that which is a dependence on it. But a dependence that is ‘in some way of the same idea’ is not repugnant to what is the term of the dependence - just as every creature depends on God (and that in idea of God as effective cause), and yet one creature depends on another as if on such a cause, but not as on the altogether first effective cause, of which sort is dependence on the First thing. Thus, in the issue at hand, all accidents depend on substance as the subject, when taking ‘subject’ in the first way [n.146]; and consequently, in the way that it is proper for substance to be the term, no accident can be the term of the dependence of accidents as the ultimate term of them.

C. To the Third

162. As to the third [nn.110-111] I concede the consequence about possibility when one is speaking of an absolute accident.

163. But if you are arguing about a relative accident [cf. n.26], using the fact that dependence on the First thing is more essential than dependence on anything posterior to the First - I reply that the dependence of a relation on a foundation is most essential, such that the idea of relation is impossible without it. If substance, therefore, cannot be the foundation of some relation but only an accident can, the relation must more essentially depend on the accident which can be its foundation than on the substance. But this is not because the relation is an accident, but because a relation is a relation, as was said in the preceding solution [n.53].

D. To the Fourth

164. To the fourth [n.112] I say that in no way can an accidental relation be without a subject (taking subject in the second way, the way in which the foundation of an accidental relation is the subject of it [n.146]).

165. As to the proof [n.113], when it argues by division ‘either as it is a relation or as it is an accident’ - I say the division is not sufficient, for it is possible to grant a middle in between them, namely ‘as it is an accidental relation’. For the relation that formally constitutes a supposit per se is not in any subject, because a per-se-being supposit does not have an inherent formal element, speaking properly of ‘inherent’; but no accidental relation is a constituent of a supposit, and consequently, since only that which constitutes a supposit is non-inherent, an accidental relation will be inherent.

166. The point is plain in other things: for there are many special things to which certain things are repugnant and yet not repugnant through the nature of one common thing found in them, nor through the nature of one or other of them, but through the proper nature that includes both the conjuncts. So that if you were to say ‘a is repugnant to man, therefore either insofar as man is intellectual or insofar as man is animal; and if insofar as man is intellectual, then it would be repugnant also to an angel; and if insofar as man is animal, then it would be repugnant to an ox’ - I say that neither in this way nor in that, but insofar as man is a rational animal.

167. So it is in the issue at hand: insofar as a relation is accidental is not being in a subject repugnant to it (taking subject in the second way [n.146]).

168. It could be said differently that it is repugnant to a relation, by its being a relation, not to be in some subject, extending the ‘in’ to the foundation and subject; for neither is a divine relation as per se as the divine essence is per se, namely ‘a being simply unto itself’, not needing anything else at all for its being; and neither is it as per se being as a supposit is per se being; but a divine relation according to its formal idea is necessarily in a foundation as in something presupposed, or as in something formally constituted by it.

169. Also, as for the proof there [n.113] that a [divine] relation is per se because infinite - although the consequence could be conceded, yet the antecedent seems it must be denied; for no perfection formally infinite is lacking to any divine person, because then the person would not be simply perfect; but each person lacks some relation of origin; therefore no relation is formally infinite. And this is plain from the idea of ‘perfection simply’ [or: ‘pure perfection’], because according to Anselm Monologion 15: a perfection simply is that which, in whatever it is, is “better it than not it”; now a relation cannot be simply nobler than its opposite, because ‘relatives are simultaneous in nature’ [Categories 7.7b15].

170. When the argument then is made: ‘the divine essence is infinite, paternity is the divine essence, therefore paternity is infinite’ [n.113], there is a fallacy of figure of speech, just as when arguing as follows: ‘deity understands, paternity is deity, therefore paternity understands’. And the reason for this was touched on frequently in Ord. I [d.33-34, nn.2-3], that in the case of abstract terms the predication can well be identical; but where the predicate is an adjective, predication cannot be true unless it is formal.

171. Whether, then, the major [sc. ‘the divine essence is infinite’] is true formally or identically I care not; and the minor [sc. ‘paternity is the divine essence’] is only true with identical predication. When inferring the conclusion, which can only be true with formal predication (namely because the predicate is an adjective), I am, in that inference, interpreting the identical predication of the minor to be formal predication, because the conclusion could not be inferred unless such was the predication in the minor. And this interpretation, which happens in the inferring of the conclusion, is an altering -just as in the case of him who infers from the premises ‘Socrates is man’ and ‘Plato is man’ that therefore ‘Socrates is Plato’ is interpreting ‘man’ to have been ‘this something’ in the premises, because otherwise he could not infer the conclusion from the premises; and so he is altering ‘this sort of thing’ [sc. human being] into ‘this something’ [sc. this particular man].

172. So it is in the issue at hand [n.170: ‘the essence is infinite’ is a formal predication; ‘paternity is the essence’ is identical predication; if ‘paternity is infinite’ be inferred the predication can only be formal, and it only follows if one interprets the predication that was before in the minor [‘paternity is the essence’], which was only identical predication, to be formal predication; and consequently the conclusion only follows by altering identical predication into formal predication.