b. Objection

313. Against this is that, although the positing of Christ’s body here is concomitant with the ceasing to be of the bread, yet the ceasing to be of the bread in its proper and primary idea, as it is distinguished from the positing of Christ’s body, seems to be annihilation; and it is not distinguished from annihilation because its term ‘to which’ is the nothingness of the bread.

314. There is confirmation through a likeness, that corruption now is not annihilation - not because of the mere fact that generation is concomitant with it, for if it were because of this not annihilation, that is, because of the term precisely of generation, then the corruption would, on account of the positive term of the change, be a positive change - which is false. But as it is, corruption in its proper idea, as it is distinguished essentially from the concomitant generation, is not annihilation, because something of the corrupted thing remains (that is, the matter). And from this follows that the negation (to which term the corruption is) is negation in a naturally suited subject; therefore, it is privation. Therefore, from the opposite in the issue at hand, since nothing of the term ‘from which’ remains, and the negation of the being of the bread is not privation (because it is not in a naturally suited subject) but pure non-being, it follows that this destruction of the bread is, in its proper idea, annihilation.

315. And this is confirmed lastly because the per se idea of a thing does not vary with something per accidens concurrent with it; but it is per accidens that with the destruction of the bread the positing of the body here of Christ is concurrent (the proof: for the first could be separated from the second); therefore, the idea of this destruction [of the bread] does not vary because of this positing of the body here of Christ, but the destruction, if it occurred alone without the positing [of the body here], would be annihilation of the bread; therefore it is annihilation now as well.