d. Scotus’ own Opinion

285. As to the second doubt [nn.97, 143, 180] of this second part, I say that the body of Christ per se includes matter, and at least one form of mixture prior to the intellective soul; and by this form is it in partial act and in proximate receptivity to the intellective soul, although it is not thereby in the genus of body as body is a genus, save by reduction. And into this composite, which however is per se a part of man, the per se conversion of the bread is made, that is, conversion of whole to whole and of parts to parts; and consequently this form is the formal term of the conversion, or the form of the term of conversion.

286. Now this form remains the same whether the soul be united to it or not united to it, because it is, at least by its in-forming, naturally prior to the soul; and it remained during the Triduum while the soul did not remain there. And so, during the Triduum the thing of this sacrament would have been the same, if the sacrament had then remained, because during the Triduum the form of corporeity was not separated from its matter in Christ, and consequently not separated from its matter as it is in the Eucharist. For just as the numerically same thing was the thing in itself in its natural existence, so also the numerically same composite, which is the first term of the conversion, would have remained always in the Eucharist.

287. It is of no avail, then, when saving this identity, to flee to the identity of matter or hypostasis, because contraries can exist in the same identity of matter when they succeed to each other in turn; even if the Word had assumed a stone, the stone would have been the same as the human nature by identity of hypostasis [Ord. III d.1 n.133, 152; cf. also William of Ware Sent. III q.9 a.1, Henry of Ghent Quod. III q.5].