b. Rejection of the Opinion

32. Against this:

First that the distinction does not accord with the Philosopher, in Physics 6.4.234b5-17, “change, or what is changed or can be changed, is what can be disposed differently now than before.” This idea belongs only to the subject, not to the term, because the term is not disposed differently now than before. For if it is the term ‘to which’ it now first exists and so is not disposed differently now than before; if it is the term ‘from which’ it does not now exist, and consequently is not disposed differently now than before. Therefore, nothing changes save subjectively.

33. One response [Henry of Ghent] is that the Philosopher said [Physics 5.1.225a25-27] that nothing is produced save from a subject, and therefore change with him requires a subject. But we posit another possible change, and so we can attribute the idea of change to it, though not the one the Philosopher is talking about.

34. Another response [Henry of Ghent] is that if the argument is about the ‘differently’ taken in the definition, that it requires an entity insofar as ‘other’ is a difference of being, as Aristotle says Metaphysics 10.3.1054b25 - this is not conclusive because ‘existing now under privation and earlier under form’ is said to be a case of being differently disposed, and yet ‘being under privation’ is not a case of being disposed in the way an entity is disposed, because privation is not an entity. Therefore, from the fact that the term ‘differently’ is used, one cannot conclude that there is some entity common to both terms.

35. Against the first response [n.33]: it is one thing to reject the Philosopher as to the idea of the name and another to do so in positing or not positing the existence of the thing signified. For many things he did not posit that however if he had posited he would have spoken of in agreement with us as to the idea that fits them. But universally, when he posited some proper idea of something, he would have said that it only belonged to that in which the idea was preserved, whatever he would have said about the existence or non-existence of the things to which that idea applied. But now there is in the Philosopher this idea of the name “to change is...”, set down above [n.10], and it only belongs where some subject remains. Therefore, were he to suppose with us that transubstantiation is possible, he would yet deny that it was a ‘change’, because the idea of change is repugnant to it.

36. The second response [n.34] does not work, because it does not argue from the ‘differently’ posited in the description of change. For it is true that ‘differently’ is taken generally there for the positive entity in contraries, either privation or form. But the argument proceeds from what is said to be ‘disposed’, for this includes something remaining that is common to what is ‘disposed differently now’ and ‘disposed differently before’, because ‘to be disposed differently’ is affirmed equally on both sides.

37. Again, this distinction does not accord with the sayings of the saints, because according to Gregory Moralia 5 ch.38 n.68, “to change is to go from one to another”, and this belongs only to the subject of change.

38. One could also argue against the stated response [n.34] that, if something is said to change objectively, then that thing is the object, because it is object by distinction from the subject; but the term ‘to which’ here does not change, therefore the transubstantiation cannot be called ‘change’ objectively.

39. If it be said that ‘objectively’ is taken there generally for the term either ‘from which’ or ‘to which’, and in the case of creation objective change is true of the term ‘to which’, but here of the term ‘from which’. And the proof is that it is true to say ‘the bread is converted into the body of Christ, therefore the bread is changed’ because the bread is not disposed in the same way now as before. But this is disproved by examining the reasoning of the Philosopher [n.32], because neither term is disposed differently now than before. For the term ‘from which’ does not remain and so it is not disposed differently, because ‘being disposed differently’ includes in it an entity. And then one can say that this does not follow ‘the bread is converted into the body, therefore it is changed’, because the antecedent only denotes the passing of the term ‘from which’ to the term ‘to which, but the consequent denotes the passing of some subject common to both terms.

40. And if objection is still made that what is corrupted is changed, and not subjectively, because the subject does not remain, therefore objectively - I say that what belongs per se to a part is said per accidens of the whole, Physics 5.1.224a21-34; but the matter of what is corrupted is per se changed from form to privation, and therefore the whole can be said to be changed per accidens. But it is not like this in the matter at issue, because no part of what is transubstantiated per se changes.

41. To the argument, then, adduced for the opinion about being generated objectively and subjectively [n.31], I say that it can be drawn to the opposite. For generation is not distinguished into subjective and objective generation, although something may be said to be generated subjectively and objectively. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, neither will change be distinguished into objective or subjective.

42. And if you say that, if ‘to be generated’ is thus distinguished, then so is ‘to change’; and in addition, how could ‘to be generated’ be thus distinguished and not ‘generation’?

43. To the first I say that generation is only under the genus of change as it belongs to the subject of generation, but as it is compared with its term it has the idea of production, as was said in Ord. I d.5 nn.94-97.

44. To the second I say that from the same abstract term many terms can be imposed denominatively, or the same term can be imposed equivocally. Because a form can have different relations to diverse things, and diverse concrete things; or the same thing taken equivocally can be signified by the form as the form is under this or that relation. An example about health: that since health exists as a single form which yet can have one relation to sign [e.g. blood is called healthy as sign of health], another to cause [e.g. medicine is called healthy as cause of health], another to subject [e.g. an animal is called healthy as subject of health], this concrete term ‘healthy’ is imposed to signify the form of health in different relations, and so it is equivocal. And simply diverse concrete terms could be imposed as healthy, significative etc. Thus, in the matter at issue, when generation exists the same in itself, it can have diverse relations, namely to the subject in which it is and to the term to which it is. And accordingly a concrete term imposed from it can be taken equivocally, so as to denote the informing of this thing or of that, and in this way is a thing equivocally said to be generated, although generation in itself is not thus distinguished but is only in a different way said to be [variously] taken, as it is generation of this thing or of that.