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First Article: About the Possibility of Transubstantiation
8. As to the possibility of transubstantiation I ask two questions: first whether transubstantiation is possible, and second whether it is possible for anything to be converted into anything.
Question One. Whether Transubstantiation is Possible
9. As to the first question, argument is given that transubstantiation is not possible:
Because transubstantiation is the same as change of substance into substance; but such a change is nothing but generation or corruption, according to the Philosopher, Physics 5.1.225a15-18, and neither the one nor the other of these is transubstantiation; therefore transubstantiation is not possible.
10. Again, in the case of every change some common subject remains, from the definition of change in Physics 6.4.234b5-17 “to change is to be differently disposed now than before.” The fact is plain from running through all the species of change, Physics 5.1.225a7-20. But in transubstantiation nothing common remains; therefore there is no mutation or change; nor can there be anything other than change, because nothing is permanent or also successive other than motion and change (as time and the like); therefore etc.
11. Again, in the case of every change the terms are incompossible; but the terms of transubstantiation are not incompossible because they can be simultaneous; therefore transubstantiation is not change, and then, as before, nothing else can be posited; therefore etc.
12. On the contrary:
Ambrose On the Sacraments (and it is in Gratian Decretum p.3 d.2 ch.69), “To give things new natures is not less than to change them.” From this he concludes that, since God could give new natures to things that before did not exist, he could also change nature into nature, and consequently transubstantiate them.
I. To the Question
13. Here one needs to understand that a question about possibility presupposes nothing but what the name signifies. First then, following the procedure about the sacraments kept to above [IV d.1 nn.174, 262, 269], one must look at the idea of the name; second whether something could exist under that idea; third what that something is in particular, as what genus it belongs to, or what species in the genus it could have the nature of.
A. About the Nature or Definition of Transubstantiation
14. On the first point I say that this is the common idea of this name ‘transubstantiation’: transubstantiation is the total transition of substance into substance.
15. First I explain the term ‘total’; for a whole, a totality, is in one way said to be something completed from parts; in another way for any part categorematically or syncategorematically.20
16. Accordingly, there can be a transition of a whole into a whole in two ways:
In one way, when taking ‘whole’ for a whole complete with its parts, according as there succeeds to one whole of parts another whole of parts. And in this way the Philosopher, On Generation 1.2.317a20-22, says that generation is the change of a whole into a whole, because the whole of parts that was truly ‘a per se one whole’ does not remain but another whole succeeds to it - not, however, that each part succeeds, because, in his view, the matter remains common.
17. And, by contrast, there is no transition of whole into whole in the case of alteration (because each whole per se one, which precedes the alteration, remains at the term of the alteration), but one whole passes over only in a certain respect, or per accidens, into another whole per accidens (as hot wood passes into cold wood), neither of which is a whole properly speaking but only a whole per accidens, just as it is one per accidens.21
18. Now each whole, which, namely, is per se one, and consequently is a whole in the genus of substance, remains the same under each term of this sort of change [sc. alteration, n.17].
19. Hereby is plain that this authority of Aristotle [n.16] does not make anything against the position about the plurality of forms [Ord. III d.2 nn.108-113], because however much the first form is posited as remaining (according to material identity) in the generated and corrupted thing, yet the same whole does not remain (even in this way of speaking of whole), because the whole that simply preceded corruption included the specific ultimate form, and that form does not remain in the term of generation but only a part of it does.
20. Therefore was it well said in the definition of transubstantiation [n.14], by way of distinguishing it from transmutation or alteration, not that transubstantiation is the transition of ‘whole into whole’ (for then there could be equivocation over the term ‘whole’22), but that it is ‘total’ transition.
21. About the second part added to this idea of the name [n.15], that is, ‘substance into substance’, I say that ‘substance’ there is posited in distinction from ‘accident’ - as is manifest, because transition of accident into accident would be called ‘trans-accidentation’ rather than ‘transubstantiation’. But as to what is said about ‘substance into substance’, it must be understood according to the Philosopher in Physics 1.6.189a34-b16, that in two ways is something said to come to be from something, namely either from a subject that remains or from a term that is corrupted (for fire comes from the matter of fire in one way, and from air or non-fire in another way, according to him ibid.).
22. The partial transition, then, of substance into substance can be either of a subject passing from term to term [sc. fire coming to be from fire] or of a whole term passing into the opposite term [sc. fire coming to be from air].
23. But in the issue at hand [sc. transubstantiation], when ‘total transition’ is spoken of, the first understanding is excluded, for nothing common in this case passes from term to term (for then the transition would not be total but partial); so there is only transition of substance into substance as of a term totally ceasing to be into a term (as into a substance) totally beginning to be.
B. Whether there could be Anything under the Idea of Transubstantiation
24. About the second point [n.13] I say first that it is possible for something to exist under this idea of the name [n.14]; second that this is not possible for any active virtue save divine virtue immediately.
25. Proof of the first statement: it is not repugnant to whatever can be totally new that it succeed to something else that can totally cease to be; but some substance can be totally new, as was expounded above [n.23]; ‘totally’ means not only according to the whole of itself, composed of parts, but also according to anything belonging to it; and the something else can cease to be in the same way. Therefore this new substance can totally succeed to the thing totally ceasing to be, and consequently the former can be totally converted into the latter, and thus be transubstantiated.
26. The assumptions are plain, because neither the total beginning of a substance nor the total ceasing of a substance involve a contradiction, and consequently neither does the total beginning of this toward the total ceasing of that involve a contradiction, and this transition includes transubstantiation.
27. Therefore the first conclusion is true, that transubstantiation is possible.
28. Proof of the second statement [n.24], namely that this is possible for God alone. For he in whose active power is each extreme, both as to total being precisely and as to total non-being precisely, in his active power is also the transition of extreme into extreme, and it belongs precisely to him to convert one into the other. But now the total being of a substance and the total non-being of it fall under active divine virtue and under it alone, because any created virtue requires a subject on which to act. Therefore total transition of substance into substance belongs to this virtue and to this alone.
29. The major and also the whole argument are confirmed through a likeness about partial transition. For he to whose active virtue the partial being and non-being of each extreme are subject, to his virtue is subject the transition of partial extreme into partial extreme (this is plain about generation and corruption, for a virtue that has power over the non-being of a preceding form and over the being of a subsequent form, while another part common to the composite remains, namely the matter, has power over the generation of the latter from the former, and this is partial transition of one into the other). Therefore by similarity, a virtue that has power over the being and non-being of each extreme has power totally over the total transition of one extreme into the other extreme.
C. What Specifically falls under Transubstantiation
1. Opinion of Others
a. Exposition of the Opinion
30. As to the third point [n.13], an answer is given [Richard of Conington, William of Ware] by drawing a distinction between change taken on the part of the subject and change taken on the part of the object. Transubstantiation is not change on the part of the subject but on the part of the object.
31. In favor of the distinction the following probable reason can be given, that a thing can be generated subjectively and a thing can be generated objectively, as was proved in Ord. I d.5 nn.59-63; and, by parity of reasoning, generation can be distinguished as taken subjectively and objectively, and consequently change can too.
b. Rejection of the Opinion
32. Against this:
First that the distinction does not accord with the Philosopher, in Physics 6.4.234b5-17, “change, or what is changed or can be changed, is what can be disposed differently now than before.” This idea belongs only to the subject, not to the term, because the term is not disposed differently now than before. For if it is the term ‘to which’ it now first exists and so is not disposed differently now than before; if it is the term ‘from which’ it does not now exist, and consequently is not disposed differently now than before. Therefore, nothing changes save subjectively.
33. One response [Henry of Ghent] is that the Philosopher said [Physics 5.1.225a25-27] that nothing is produced save from a subject, and therefore change with him requires a subject. But we posit another possible change, and so we can attribute the idea of change to it, though not the one the Philosopher is talking about.
34. Another response [Henry of Ghent] is that if the argument is about the ‘differently’ taken in the definition, that it requires an entity insofar as ‘other’ is a difference of being, as Aristotle says Metaphysics 10.3.1054b25 - this is not conclusive because ‘existing now under privation and earlier under form’ is said to be a case of being differently disposed, and yet ‘being under privation’ is not a case of being disposed in the way an entity is disposed, because privation is not an entity. Therefore, from the fact that the term ‘differently’ is used, one cannot conclude that there is some entity common to both terms.
35. Against the first response [n.33]: it is one thing to reject the Philosopher as to the idea of the name and another to do so in positing or not positing the existence of the thing signified. For many things he did not posit that however if he had posited he would have spoken of in agreement with us as to the idea that fits them. But universally, when he posited some proper idea of something, he would have said that it only belonged to that in which the idea was preserved, whatever he would have said about the existence or non-existence of the things to which that idea applied. But now there is in the Philosopher this idea of the name “to change is...”, set down above [n.10], and it only belongs where some subject remains. Therefore, were he to suppose with us that transubstantiation is possible, he would yet deny that it was a ‘change’, because the idea of change is repugnant to it.
36. The second response [n.34] does not work, because it does not argue from the ‘differently’ posited in the description of change. For it is true that ‘differently’ is taken generally there for the positive entity in contraries, either privation or form. But the argument proceeds from what is said to be ‘disposed’, for this includes something remaining that is common to what is ‘disposed differently now’ and ‘disposed differently before’, because ‘to be disposed differently’ is affirmed equally on both sides.
37. Again, this distinction does not accord with the sayings of the saints, because according to Gregory Moralia 5 ch.38 n.68, “to change is to go from one to another”, and this belongs only to the subject of change.
38. One could also argue against the stated response [n.34] that, if something is said to change objectively, then that thing is the object, because it is object by distinction from the subject; but the term ‘to which’ here does not change, therefore the transubstantiation cannot be called ‘change’ objectively.
39. If it be said that ‘objectively’ is taken there generally for the term either ‘from which’ or ‘to which’, and in the case of creation objective change is true of the term ‘to which’, but here of the term ‘from which’. And the proof is that it is true to say ‘the bread is converted into the body of Christ, therefore the bread is changed’ because the bread is not disposed in the same way now as before. But this is disproved by examining the reasoning of the Philosopher [n.32], because neither term is disposed differently now than before. For the term ‘from which’ does not remain and so it is not disposed differently, because ‘being disposed differently’ includes in it an entity. And then one can say that this does not follow ‘the bread is converted into the body, therefore it is changed’, because the antecedent only denotes the passing of the term ‘from which’ to the term ‘to which, but the consequent denotes the passing of some subject common to both terms.
40. And if objection is still made that what is corrupted is changed, and not subjectively, because the subject does not remain, therefore objectively - I say that what belongs per se to a part is said per accidens of the whole, Physics 5.1.224a21-34; but the matter of what is corrupted is per se changed from form to privation, and therefore the whole can be said to be changed per accidens. But it is not like this in the matter at issue, because no part of what is transubstantiated per se changes.
41. To the argument, then, adduced for the opinion about being generated objectively and subjectively [n.31], I say that it can be drawn to the opposite. For generation is not distinguished into subjective and objective generation, although something may be said to be generated subjectively and objectively. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, neither will change be distinguished into objective or subjective.
42. And if you say that, if ‘to be generated’ is thus distinguished, then so is ‘to change’; and in addition, how could ‘to be generated’ be thus distinguished and not ‘generation’?
43. To the first I say that generation is only under the genus of change as it belongs to the subject of generation, but as it is compared with its term it has the idea of production, as was said in Ord. I d.5 nn.94-97.
44. To the second I say that from the same abstract term many terms can be imposed denominatively, or the same term can be imposed equivocally. Because a form can have different relations to diverse things, and diverse concrete things; or the same thing taken equivocally can be signified by the form as the form is under this or that relation. An example about health: that since health exists as a single form which yet can have one relation to sign [e.g. blood is called healthy as sign of health], another to cause [e.g. medicine is called healthy as cause of health], another to subject [e.g. an animal is called healthy as subject of health], this concrete term ‘healthy’ is imposed to signify the form of health in different relations, and so it is equivocal. And simply diverse concrete terms could be imposed as healthy, significative etc. Thus, in the matter at issue, when generation exists the same in itself, it can have diverse relations, namely to the subject in which it is and to the term to which it is. And accordingly a concrete term imposed from it can be taken equivocally, so as to denote the informing of this thing or of that, and in this way is a thing equivocally said to be generated, although generation in itself is not thus distinguished but is only in a different way said to be [variously] taken, as it is generation of this thing or of that.
2. Scotus’ own Opinion
45. I say, therefore, that properly speaking transubstantiation is not change. Nor should one labor over it to inquire into the genus of transubstantiation, because although change gives one to understand, or includes, a subject that changes and a form according to which it changes and a relation of subject to form, yet beyond this relation transubstantiation formally imports an immediate succession of being formed to not being formed, and conversely.
46. Just as, therefore, in baptism something is said to be material (as washing) and something formal (as the words), even though both are material simply with respect to what is formal simply (that is the signification), yet this is said to the extent that the words are more formal with respect to the washing - so, in like manner, in the matter at issue, the subject is imported materially and the term of the change formally, but the term is more formal among these two than the subject. Therefore is the term said to be imported more formally and also more truly than the respect of succession (although the relation is truly more formal), for the term is something more true in itself because it is an absolute form, or at least a positive thing. But the order of posteriority and succession is only a relation in a certain respect. There would not then be a genus of transubstantiation (if it were a change), save as to that formal element which adds relation over and above the term, which relation is an immediate order of something to something else that precedes.
47. But if you altogether want to extend the term ‘change’ so as to assert it of transubstantiation, one can say that just as, according to the Philosopher in Physics 5.1.225a7-10, change is threefold, namely “from a non-subject to a subject, from a subject to a subject, from a subject to a non-subject” (and here ‘subject’ is taken for a positive entity and ‘non-subject’ for its privation). So in the same way one can make ‘turning round’ a distinction by extending this term to supernatural change, so a ‘turning round’ from non-subject to subject is called ‘creation’, a ‘turning round’ from subject to non-subject ‘annihilation’, a ‘turning round’ from subject to subject ‘transubstantiation’. But one does not get from this anything about a remote genus of transubstantiation (namely a genus of ‘turning round’), save in that each falls formally under a certain relation of order or succession.
II. To the Initial Arguments
48. To the first argument [n.9] the answer is plain from the last section [nn.45-47].
49. And the same to the second argument [n.10].
50. As to the third [n.11] I say that this is true of change properly speaking, because opposite succeeds to opposite in the same receptive subject. For there is a partial transition there, namely of form to the opposite while the same subject remains; and therefore the first terms there are incompossible. But this is not the idea in the matter at issue; for here it suffices that the being of this term and of that be disparate - although they could be compatible in the entity together, because in their succeeding to each other they are not compared to any same subject that needs to receive a form. Or one could concede that they were simply incompatible in the same numerical thing, though they are not absolutely incompossible in being (just as white and black are in the same entity together, and indeed are truly contraries, according to the species in which they are, but they are not together in any same receptive subject [sc. black and white are in the same species of quality that is color, and in the same subject, namely surfaces, but not in the same surface, or part of the surface, at the same time]).
Question Two. Whether it is Possible for any Being to be Converted into Any Being
51. Proceeding thus to the second question - it is argued that anything could be converted into anything.
First that a creature can be converted into divinity, because it is not repugnant to a Divine Person to be the term of some real action, as is plain in the Incarnation, whose term was the Word; therefore by similarity in the matter at issue.
52. Second as follows: it is not repugnant to the divine nature to be the term of that action which does not require changeability or possibility or limitation in the term. But transubstantiation is of this sort, because it does not require its term to change nor consequently does it require any possibility in the term; nor does it require anything to be added to its term, and consequently not limitation or composition either; therefore etc. A confirmation of the major is that it is not repugnant to the divine nature to be the term of understanding and volition, to the extent these actions do not require change or possibility or limitation.
53. Third thus: no creature is able to be converted into another because of the agreement of the term ‘from which’ with the term ‘to which’, for in this conversion no agreement of any abiding common subject is required; therefore, however much one creature does not agree with another, it is none the less convertible into it.
54. To the opposite:
First, it is plain that nothing can be converted into the divine nature, because then the divine nature could be converted into something else, for the terms of this change can be mutually terms for each other. Also, the divine nature could then begin to be somewhere it was not before or in a way it was not before - which seems unacceptable.
55. Again, then the quantity of the body of bread would be converted into the quantity of Christ’s body, and consequently Christ’s body quantum would be where the bread was before. The consequent is impossible because then a larger body would be in a smaller place.
56. Again, Augustine in Literal Commentary on Genesis 7 ch.12 n.19 and Boethius On Person and Two Natures ch.6, “in no way can a body be converted into a spirit or conversely.”
57. Again, then an absolute could be converted into a relative, and consequently a relation could per se be without a foundation and without a term, just as the absolute is which is converted into it. The consequent is impossible, as is manifest, because it is a contradiction for a relation to be without a foundation and a term.
II. To the Question
58. This question, as is plain from the arguments, contains two articles, namely about the conversion of deity into a creature and of a creature into a creature.
59. About the first I answer no.
60. And the reason was touched on in the preceding question [nn.28-29], because nothing can be converted, whether as term ‘from which’ or as term ‘to which’, unless its being and non-being are totally subject to the power of what does the converting; but nothing intrinsic to God is subject to the divine power, because that power has for object only what is possible, but what is intrinsic to God is necessarily existent.
61. About the second [n.58] I say that anything can be converted into anything for the same reason, that each extreme in creatures is subject to the divine power both as to total being and as to total non-being.
II. To the Initial Arguments of the First Part
62. [To the first argument] - To the first argument [n.51] I say that ‘the Word is Incarnate’ does not state that the Word is the term of any action of the genus of action.
63. And when it is said that ‘the Incarnation has the Person of the Son as term’ [n.51] I say that that union (speaking of a union that introduces relation) introduces the Word as term, because in the human nature there is a real relation to the Word, and only a relation of reason on the other side. But a term of action of the genus of action is something that receives being through the action; but this is the real union of the human nature with the Word.
64. And if it is argued that “the Son of God is incarnate, therefore he is the subject or term of the action, because ‘to be incarnated’ signifies an undergoing that one must indeed place in the subject or the term;” - and further, “to any action there responds its proper passive undergoing; the Three Persons were carrying out the Incarnation by action properly speaking; therefore what responds to it is passive undergoing properly speaking [Ord. III d.1 nn.74-83]; but this is ‘to be incarnate’, therefore etc.”
65. Solution: to the first point I say that ‘to be incarnated’ is ‘to be united to flesh in unity of person’, and this according as ‘united’ states a relation of reason, not a real relation.
66. To the second point [n.64] I say that to the action of the Trinity there corresponds some real passive undergoing; but the object of it is the human nature and the term is something in the human nature, namely formal unity of that nature with the Word, so that the union of the Trinity, or rather the uniting, which is the action of the
Trinity, is for the union formally of the human nature with the Word, which union is really in the human nature.
67. And when it is said that ‘to be incarnate’ states a passive undergoing as ‘to incarnate’ states an action, I say that if ‘to be incarnate’ or ‘to be incarnated’ grammatically introduces passive undergoing because of the mode of signifying, yet not in reality in that of which it is said, but only in something else that connotes being united to it; and this other thing is said to be the subject of the undergoing really introduced by ‘to be incarnated’, which namely corresponds to the action that ‘to incarnate’ introduces.
68. [The second argument] - To the second argument [n.52] I say on the contrary that unchangeability, necessity, and infinity belong to anything that can be the term of some action of the genus of action properly speaking.
69. And when the actions of understanding and willing are spoken of [n.52], I say that this is not to the purpose, because (as was said in Ord. I d.3 n.501, Rep. IA d.3 nn.191-195) these are called actions because they are operations, for by actions of the genus of action some term receives ‘being simply’ (if it is produced), or ‘being in some way’; but through intellection the object understood in no way receives being; rather being is altogether presupposed to the intellection. And this is for the reason that these operations, which are called actions, are ultimate terms, and are not for the sake of other terms.
70. But there still remains the argument that action of the genus of action does not require the term to change.
I say that it does not seem easy how an action of the genus of action could be posited whereby the term does not receive being; rather, the way such action is posited in divine reality, the Son does receive being by active generation. But whether something could be the term of action or generation thus taken and yet in no way receive being will be stated in a section of the following question [nn.180, 189-190, 192-196].
III. To the Arguments for the Opposite
72. To the arguments for the opposite.
[To the first] - The first [n.54] I concede.
73. [To the second] - To the second [n.55] I say that if the bread were converted into the quantity of Christ’s body yet Christ’s body would not be here nor its quantity, as was touched on in the first question of distinction 10 [nn.39-41].
74. To the proof touched on above but not solved [d.10 n.29], namely that ‘the thing generated is where the thing corrupted was’, I say that for this reason is it the case there, because the matter remains common, which in generation is not moved from there in place; and consequently the matter receives the form where it is, and hence what is generated from the matter and the form is where the thing corrupted was.
75. On the contrary: the matter is not the reason for being located in place, but quantity is; and the same quantity does not remain in the thing generated and the thing corrupted save as it is in the matter; therefore matter is not the reason why the generated thing is where the corrupted thing was before.
76. I say that matter by itself is disposed to be in place definitively, just as is any limited substance; but it has being in place circumscriptively as it is under quantity. So because it remains definitively where it was, therefore does it receive form there, and for this reason is the generated substance definitively there where the corrupted substance was before; and where a substance is definitively, there is it circumscriptively as it is a quantum. And therefore does it follow that the generated thing, as possessing quantity circumscriptively, is where the corrupted thing was circumscriptively. But one must not think that sometimes it was a substance here or there definitively and not circumscriptively anywhere; because it was never without the quantity that was the idea of circumscription.
77. Nevertheless, by not positing any quantity that remains the same (which I believe to be more true), one does not have to posit something remaining circumscriptively the same, nor posit the idea of being in the same place in the generated thing and in the corrupted thing; but the matter remaining in the place definitively where the thing corrupted was is sufficient.
78. It could be said, therefore, that where also an agent finds a passive subject it gives it form there; but the agent generates, and in generating does not change place; therefore it gives being to the passive subject there; and where the passive subject receives form, there it is a composite of passive subject and introduced form; therefore etc.
79. Having conceded, then, according to the common opinion that ‘the term of conversion could be there where the thing converted was’, I say that the ‘where’ should not be understood precisely, but in this way or that way part by part; and thus, where the bread was before, the body of Christ could be as a quantum precisely, or as in a part of its ‘where’, so that a part would be there and a part in the surrounding ‘where’. Let it also be that the principle common to some people [Aquinas, Richard of Middleton] were maintained, that ‘the term of conversion is where the thing converted was before’, yet it is not located there in place.
80. And thus one could concede that, if the quantity were the first term of the conversion, it would be where the substance of the bread was before, yet it would not be located there in place. And this is the argument against the other way [Richard of Middleton, Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines], which posits that for this reason is the quantity of Christ not here as in a place, because it is the second term and not the first -for let it be that it was the first, still it would not necessarily be here in place; for this mode could as much be separated from the first term of the conversion as from the second.
81. [To the third] - To the third [n.56] the answer is made that Augustine and Boethius are speaking by comparison with created potency.
82. But this is nothing, because no created virtue can convert any body whatever into any body whatever.
83. Therefore I say differently that there are as many reasons for impossibility as there are reasons for repugnance, and when some of these are removed there is a possibility that there was not before - not indeed a possibility simply, but from a part of it. For example, sight cannot receive intellection, both because intellection is not extended while sight is extended, and because sight knows something only under the idea of a singular and intellect understands not precisely under the idea of a singular. Take away one impossibility, namely if sight were a power that could have an object under the idea of a universal, and yet another idea of impossibility were to remain, this latter case would be impossible just as the former would be. And yet the latter would be said to be possible in reference to the former, not simply but because the idea of impossibility in the latter is not the idea of impossibility in the former.
84. To the matter at issue: each body has some non-repugnance to being converted into a body, namely because it has a quantum of matter and the like concurring ideas for being convertible; every spirit has opposite reasons to these. Therefore, although it is impossible simply for a celestial body to be converted into an elemental body, in the way it is impossible for a spirit to be converted into fire, because with respect to any created agent both are impossible, yet, with respect to an uncreated agent, just as one is possible so is the other. However, the one is said to be possible and the other impossible, because there is an idea of impossibility here that there is not there.
85. [To the fourth] - To the fourth [n.57] I concede that an absolute could be converted into a relative and conversely, but it does not further follow that there would be a relative without a foundation and term, because a term of conversion receives being through conversion in the way that it can have being; but a relation cannot have being without a foundation and term.
86. Nor does it follow that if the term ‘from which’ was without these therefore the term ‘to which’ can be without them, just as this is not the case in other things where one term requires different things for its being that the other term does not require.
87. I say, therefore, that if an absolute were converted into a relative, the relative would require a foundation and a term - and it would have them, whether the old ones that preceded the conversion or new ones. An example of this response in the case of other things: This inference does not hold: ‘a stone can be converted into knowledge and conversely, and a stone does not inform any intellect, therefore neither does knowledge inform it’. For however much something is converted, the term of the conversion will always have its proper mode of existing, just as the term ‘from which’ of conversion had its own proper mode of existing before the conversion.