b. Objection to the Aforesaid Explanation, and Rejection of this Objection

365. And if it is argued [Godfrey of Fontaines] that then the soul of man has a twofold active power of moving in regard to a body in place (namely it has one organic power, as is plain, and besides this it has, for you, this non-organic power); but to posit this twofold power seems superfluous, first because both powers seem to be of the same nature, second because one of them cannot issue in act in our present state (as is manifest); - I reply that just as the soul is like an angel in many other respects, so too is it in respect of non-organic power to move a body. For there is no reason why this substance [sc. the soul] does not have this sort of power of moving a body. And universally, no substance should be denied something that would be a perfection in it unless it is plainly manifest that such perfection is repugnant to it; for, according to the Philosopher, On Generation 2.10.336b27-29, “nature is always to be considered worthy of what is better, as far as possible.”

366. And when you argue that the powers would be of the same nature [n.365], I deny it, for this non-organic power that moves the whole body at once, not in ordered parts the way an animal body moves limbs in forward progress - this non-organic power, I say, is of a different nature from the power of progression, because this power has the action of moving the whole body immediately, not part after part. But the other power cannot move the whole save by orderly movement of parts, and of part after part, just as now the power of progression first moves some parts, then others through them. and then the whole body. The two powers, therefore, are of different nature, because of parts that are of different nature.

367. To the second point, when you say that this non-organic power is vain, because no act of it can now be possessed [n.365], I say that we now posit taste and the other senses as necessary for the perfection of human nature, and yet there is no need for all of them to exist in their own act, nor to exist precisely in their own act in beatitude. But they are not vain, because they belong to the natural perfection of that in which they are. If therefore those senses are not vain whose use is vain for the state that is simply the perfect state of human nature (but their possible use is precisely for this [present] unnatural state), much more will the non-organic power of moving not be vain, although the use of it now will not be able to be possessed - but its use will be perpetual in beatitude, because not only will the blessed then be able to move their body progressively (that is, by moving one part first, and then another through it, and then the whole), but they will also be able to move their body in ‘where’ at once and immediately without such ordered motion of parts. More about this below, in the discussion of agility [Ord. IV d.49 suppl. p.2 q.5].