d. Proof of the Foruth Conclusion

317. The proof of the fourth conclusion is that what in no way has a moving power over anything when that thing exists per se, does not move it per accidens when that thing is with another thing with which it does not make a unity, the way act and potency make a unity. But created virtue has altogether no power over the body of Christ in itself as it exists in this way, so as to move it. Therefore when that body is under something else to which it is not disposed as potency nor as act, the result is that the created power will not be able to move that body, not even per accidens. But Christ’s body is under the host in this way, as is plain, because the species is not the form of the body nor the body the form of the species.

318. If the major here [n.317] is denied [Richard of Middleton], because a heavy object in a ship is moved by the mover of the ship, although the heavy object is not the form of the ship nor conversely - the objection is not to the purpose, because the moving power of the ship could act on a heavy object per se if it were heavy per se; and therefore I added in the major ‘neither of which is the act of the other’, because although a thing that is the act of something could not per se be moved by anything, yet it could per accidens be moved by the same thing that can move the whole of which it is the act.

319. But in order to remove all objection against the major, let this major be taken: “When certain things are conjoined by an act precisely of will that is contingently disposed to the conjunction, then if one of these things is something in itself movable that is altogether disproportionate to some mover and the other is proportionate to it, the mover cannot move both of the conjoined things with the same motion.” The point is plain, because if the mover moves the one proportionate to it, not for this reason does it per accidens move the other, because the other is not present to the thing moved, neither as act of its potency, nor conversely, nor is it present simply from any necessity natural to it (as the heavy object is present to that on which it rests and is, for this reason, moved along with it). Rather it is only present to it by a will that is contingently disposed to the conjunction, and this will is consequently able not to will the conjunction while nevertheless the motion of the other of them continues.

320. An example of this: if an angel were voluntarily to make himself present to a stone, then if I move the stone, not for this reason do I move the angel, because the angel is not movable per se by my power, nor per accidens in this case, because he is not the form nor a part of anything movable by me. If therefore an angel were, at the end of the motion, present to the stone that was moved by me, this would not be by my act but by the angel’s own proper action, whereby he would make himself present there.

321. In the same way in the matter at issue; since Christ’s body is present to the species only by act of divine will, then if I make the species to have a new ‘where’, the body will not be there by that motion, because the presence, new or old, of the body is not subject to my will, not even per accidens, because it is neither form nor part of what is subject to my motion.

322. On the contrary [Richard of Middleton]: whatever moves something per se, moves per accidens whatever is in it; therefore the created virtue that per se moves the host moves per accidens the body that is per se in the host.

323. Secondly: because otherwise a new miracle would be performed every time a priest moves the host, because this moving could not be done, nor the truth of the Eucharist preserved, without special divine dispensation.

324. To the first [n.322] I say that the first proposition is false, unless it be understood of that which is in the moved thing either as act in a potency or as part in a whole or as something conjoined by natural necessity (as a heavy thing is conjoined with what it rests on). For if this thing is contingently conjoined with that thing by act of will, when the one moves it will not for this reason move the other. Rather there is need that the will, which is cause of the conjoining, be also cause of the motion of that which is not conjoined by any natural necessity to the moved thing. So it is in the matter at issue. And the thing is plain from the example about the angel; for what moves the stone per se does not for this reason move the angel per accidens.

325. To the second [n.323] I say that there is no new miracle, because God, by the same miracle by which he instituted the Eucharist in the Church, has determined to make the body of Christ always present to the species after consecration. And therefore, as long as the species, however it is moved, remains, God’s making Christ’s body to be present with the presence of something else (speaking of presence with respect to what contains a thing, the way the species, as primarily contained in place, has different presences) is not a new miracle but the previous determination of the divine will. Just as if an angel had determined that he would always be with this stone, his being moved with the movement of the stone would not be said to be a miraculous operation by the angel. Nor yet would he who moves the stone move the angel by his action, but the angel would move by his own will.