A. Opinion of Aquinas

10. An opinion stated hereScotus takes Aquinas’ opinion from numerous of Aquinas’ writings (and also from summaries by Henry of Ghent), including Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences, the Summa Theologica, and Commentary on the Ethics. ⁵ is that the Philosopher took the negative side of the question [sc. the moral virtues do not belong to the will], or that elsewhere he spoke incompletely about the moral virtues. For whenever he speaks about them he seems to admit that they are in the sensitive part, and never that they are in the intellective part, save for justice, in Ethics 5.1.1229a6-9.

11. The reasons given for this are as follows:

The first is of this sort. The will is of itself determined to the good simply, because its proper object is contrasted with the good in the present moment (which is the object of the sensitive appetite). Or if the will can tend to the good in the present moment, it can be sufficiently determined to tend or not to tend to it by what reason displays to the will (for the apprehended object, as it is apprehended, seems to be what moves the will); so there is no need to posit a habit in the will, but it is enough if the intellect is sufficiently perfect in showing it what is right.

12. Further, a second argument is given from the freedom of the will. For the will, which is free, can sufficiently determine itself, and so it needs nothing else to determine it. The same point is argued in another way, that if the will acts freely of itself then ‘a determinate willing’ inclining it to act is repugnant to it. But virtue gives inclination by way of nature, and so is repugnant to the mode of action of the will; and so there is no virtue in the will.

13. A third argument is “wherever there are extremes there is a mean between them” [Eudemian Ethics 3.4.1231b34-35]. So wherever there are extreme passions, there will be virtue, which is moderator of the passions. The passions are in the sensitive appetite and not in the will [Ethics 3.13.1117b23-24].

14. A fourth argument is that if there could be in the will a virtue arising from the will’s right acts (which are other than the acts of the sensitive appetite), then an angel could acquire virtues from morally virtuous correct willing. This result seems unacceptable and is manifestly against the Philosopher Ethics 10.8.1178b8-18, where he denies moral virtues of them [sc. of god or spiritual beings].