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I. To the Question
A. Opinion of Aquinas
10. An opinion stated here5 is that the Philosopher took the negative side of the question [sc. the moral virtues do not belong to the will], or that elsewhere he spoke incompletely about the moral virtues. For whenever he speaks about them he seems to admit that they are in the sensitive part, and never that they are in the intellective part, save for justice, in Ethics 5.1.1229a6-9.
11. The reasons given for this are as follows:
The first is of this sort. The will is of itself determined to the good simply, because its proper object is contrasted with the good in the present moment (which is the object of the sensitive appetite). Or if the will can tend to the good in the present moment, it can be sufficiently determined to tend or not to tend to it by what reason displays to the will (for the apprehended object, as it is apprehended, seems to be what moves the will); so there is no need to posit a habit in the will, but it is enough if the intellect is sufficiently perfect in showing it what is right.
12. Further, a second argument is given from the freedom of the will. For the will, which is free, can sufficiently determine itself, and so it needs nothing else to determine it. The same point is argued in another way, that if the will acts freely of itself then ‘a determinate willing’ inclining it to act is repugnant to it. But virtue gives inclination by way of nature, and so is repugnant to the mode of action of the will; and so there is no virtue in the will.
13. A third argument is “wherever there are extremes there is a mean between them” [Eudemian Ethics 3.4.1231b34-35]. So wherever there are extreme passions, there will be virtue, which is moderator of the passions. The passions are in the sensitive appetite and not in the will [Ethics 3.13.1117b23-24].
14. A fourth argument is that if there could be in the will a virtue arising from the will’s right acts (which are other than the acts of the sensitive appetite), then an angel could acquire virtues from morally virtuous correct willing. This result seems unacceptable and is manifestly against the Philosopher Ethics 10.8.1178b8-18, where he denies moral virtues of them [sc. of god or spiritual beings].
B. The Opposite Opinion of Henry of Ghent which Rejects the Opinion of Aquinas
1. Henry’s Opinion in Itself
15. This opinion [of Aquinas] is refuted in ways like those used to support it:
First is the authority of Aristotle, for he himself says in Politics 1.131102b30-31, “it is necessary for the ruler to have virtue so that he may rule rightly, and this in a greater way than in a slave so that he may be ruled rightly.” And Aristotle applies this analogy to the superior and inferior parts in the soul.
16. Further this view concedes that justice is in the will [n.10]; so the general reasons about the will and moral virtue [nn.11-15] are not conclusive. Nor even should the authority of the Philosopher in Ethics 1.13.1102b30-31 about ‘being obedient to reason’ be understood of the sensitive appetite alone; for if he means only the sensitive appetite by the term ‘obedient to reason’ then he is incomplete in his division of the soul as to its capacity for moral virtue. And so, to the extent he intends to treat of the soul, he is incompletely dividing it. For he treats of it as it is susceptive of moral virtue, for instance justice, so at any rate the soul is susceptive of virtue as to justice, which is neither in the reason nor in what is obedient to reason, the way this opinion understands these two divisions.
17. Further, in Ethics 1.6.1097b34-98a5, before the definition of virtue, when Aristotle is intending to investigate the idea of happiness,a he speaks as follows, “We must separate off the nutritive part. Next is the sensitive part, and this seems common to all animals. What is left is a certain practical part, and the part of it persuadable by reason, and this insofar as it has reason and understands.” From this text it is plain that the Philosopher first excludes the sensitive part, because there is in it no activity of man as he is man. The sort of activity of man as man accords with the moral virtues, and consequently these virtues will not be placed principally in the sensitive part. Therefore, what is left, namely activity of the part that has reason, is per se a part of the soul, surpassing the whole sensitive part - and this part the Philosopher himself divides into the understanding part and the part that is persuadable by reason. So by ‘persuadable by reason’ he means there the will, because it is plain that by ‘the understanding part’ he means the intellect. Therefore, it seems that what can be got expressly from his words is that he sometimes calls the will ‘able to obey reason’ and sometimes he calls the sensitive appetite ‘able to obey reason’, as at the end of the Ethics [n.16]. And so ‘able to obey reason’ is taken in two ways, and ‘rational’ is taken in two ways: in one way strictly and primarily and thus it belongs only to the intellect; in another way not strictly or primarily, though simply such, and thus it belongs to the will; to the third part, namely the sensitive appetite, it belongs not properly but by way of transference. The intermediate part, then, the will, is sometimes called ‘rational’ by reference to one extreme and sometimes ‘obedient to reason’ by reference to the other extreme. For when taking ‘rational’ strictly, the will is able to obey reason; but when taking ‘rational’ broadly (not however improperly, but only for that which belongs to the mind) the will is rational.b The sensitive appetite is not only persuadable by reason but also obedient to it; and these words can very well be proved, for what is free is persuadable, but not properly ‘persuadable but obedient’. The sensitive appetite, however, which is not free, is not properly persuadable but is obedient, for it can be subjected to the command of the will.
a.a [Interpolation] which is in the work of man as he is man.
b.b [Interpolation] and only persuadable by reason and not obedient; and this belongs not to reason but to the will alone.
18. Further, there are many authorities to this effect:
Augustine in Morals of the Church 1.15, where he holds that the four moral virtues are only ordered love or loves.
19. Augustine City of God 14.5-6, at length.
20. Avicenna Metaphysics 9.7.a
a.a [Interpolation] Look for other authorities in Bonaventure Sentences III d.33 un. q.3 note 1.
2. Against the Reasons for Aquinas’ Opinion
21. Further, the reasons adduced for the opinion are adduced for the opposite:
22. [Against the first reason] - The first [n. 11] is as follows: the will is indeterminate to opposites, not only to opposite objects but to opposite modes of action, namely rightly and not rightly; therefore, it needs something determinative inclining it to right action, and this will be virtue. The consequence is plain: for the only necessity to posit virtues in a power is so that powers able of themselves to act rightly and not rightly may be regulated. The proof of the antecedent is that the will can choose anything shown it in which is shown the idea of its first object; but in eliciting such choices it can act not rightly.
23. Now if you say, ‘it suffices that reason show things rightly, therefore a virtue is not required in the will but in the reason’ - this is false, because then it would be necessary for reason first to err in its showing before the will chooses badly; and so, before the first sin of the will there would be error in the intellect -which is irrational, for then punishment would precede guilt.
24. Further, given that the will could be sufficiently determined by the intellect for right action, it does not follow that no habit will be generated in the intellect whereby it is more determined to right judgment, for insofar as the intellect has an action prior to an act of will it acts merely naturally; and yet there is no denying that in the intellect a habit for right judgment (namely prudence) is generated by repeated acts. Since therefore the will is not of itself a power more determined to one thing than the intellect is, then from acts repeatedly elicited by the will a certain right disposition can be generated in it for similar acts, and that I call a virtue.
25. Further, habits are not only posited so that powers may act rightly through them, but so that they may act with pleasure and promptly [Ethics 2.5.1106a15-17, 1.9.1099a14; Scotus Ord. I d.17 n7]. Now though the will could be determined by reason to choose rightly, yet not to choose with pleasure and promptly without the proper habit. The proof is that if someone first vicious begins newly to be recalled to the opposite, and reason tells him that something opposite to his vice is to be chosen, then although he choose it yet he would not do so with pleasure; for the whole vicious habit is not at once corrupted in the first act, but rather it is then corrupted not at all or only very slightly. Experience makes this plain, because someone newly converted chooses the good with difficulty, and it would be pleasant for him to choose according to his preceding bad custom. Therefore, in order for the will to do with pleasure what is told it by reason, a habit is required in it for eliciting an act conformable to that habit.
26. To the first argument then [n.11] I reply that it proceeds by equivocation over the phrase ‘the good simply’. For this can be understood either as the good simply is contrasted with the apparent good, or as it is contrasted with the good taken in a singular case. If in the first way ‘the good simply’ is not the adequate object of the will, because then the will could not act on the apparent good, for no power can act on that in which is not preserved the idea of its first object - and thus any will of a wayfarer would, by its object, be confirmed or be preserved from being able to sin. In the second way one can admit that the good under the idea of good is the object desired by the will and is the object of its proper cognitive power. But the senses, according to what is commonly said, know the singular and the intellect the universal. Therefore, the sense appetite has for object ‘the good in the now’, as it is a singular good with its individuating conditions. But the will has for object the good as shown to it by the intellect, which is the universal good and is the good simply.
27. As to what the argument adds, that it is enough for reason to show things rightly [n.11], then against this is: ‘that the will cannot do the opposete in the case of the universal and particular: error’ [Articles condemned by Archbishop Tempier in 1277, article 219].a
a.a [Interpolation] Extra ‘On Heretics’ in Gregory Decretals 5 tit.7 ch.9, and in Gratian Decrees p.1 d.15 ch.3 ‘Montanus’.
28. [Against the second reason] - The second reason [n. 12] leads to the opposite conclusion: for the will needs a disposition more in respect of what it has the doing of in its power than in respect of something else. For if it did not have the action in its power, then when and how it does it would not be imputed to it for praise or blame. But because the will has it in its power, it acts in a way deserving of praise or blame; and therefore it needs a principle by which it can act in a way deserving of praise; such a principle is virtue.
29. It also seems surprising that that because of which a man is praised in his acts should exist in him precisely as to that which is common to him and the brutes.
30. Nor is it valid to argue here that ‘a natural agent is determined to its action, so the will is as well, since it is a certain naturally active power’, for everyone removes habits from purely natural agents because these agents are inclined supremely of themselves. But the intellect, which acts more naturally than the will, is not denied to have a habit, for of itself it is not supremely inclined. Nor does the indetermination come from the imperfection of the active power, but from its lack of limitation, which lack is a perfection of the active power. For the other merely natural things are limited to one thing, so that they do not have power for contrary, or at least contradictory, opposites - the will is not thus limited, as was stated in II d.25 nn.37, 93. 93.
31. Also the other argument there adduced [n.12] that ‘virtue inclines by way of nature’ is not valid, because it would prove also against them that charity and hope are not in the will - which is against all the theologians.
32. In answer then to these two proofs [n.12]:
To the first: although the will can of its own freedom determine itself in its action, yet it is receptive of some disposition left behind from the action, a disposition inclining it to similar actions. For the single determination of it does not come through a natural form (of the sort found in fire for fire’s operation), but is from the free action that proceeds from an indeterminate power, and so the power is determinable through a habit.
33. To the second proof [n.12] the answer is plain from what was said in I d.17 nn.32, 40, 69-70 and II d.25 nn.69-74, about how a second cause naturally acting can go along with a prior cause freely acting, and about how an effect is said to be free because of the freedom of the principal cause; but a habit, if it is cause of the substance of an act, is a second cause in respect of the will.
34. [Against the third reason] - The third reason [n.13], about the moderation of the passions, leads to the opposite:
First because there are passions in the will, according to Augustine City of God 14.5-6; and for this reason, if a virtue is to be posited in a power where there is passion and action because of that action and passion, then it follows that, since there are passions in the supreme part of the soul, virtues may be posited there.
35. Second because the moderation of a passion can be understood in two ways: the moderation either of an existing passion or of a future one.
An existing passion can be moderated in two ways: Either by lessening the passion that is naturally introduced by the object in itself, so that the passion is not immoderate in the way the object, left to itself, would naturally cause when delighting the sensitive power. Or by referring the delight to an end agreeable to right reason, to which end it would not be referred by the mere idea of the object of the sensitive appetite.
The moderating too of a future passion can be understood either as a flight from the object that naturally gives immoderate delight, or as a taking up only of objects that naturally give moderate delight; and then the future passion is not in itself moderated, but precaution is taken against the presence of immoderate passion.
36. In whichever of these two ways the moderation of passion be understood, it can belong more to the will than to the sensitive appetite, whether the passion is present, or will be present, in the sensitive appetite.
For as to an existent passion, provided it can be lessened, the will, which acts freely, is able to lessen it more than the sensitive appetite can, which appetite is affected by the object or acts along with it as much as it can. The will can also refer the passion to an end consonant with right reason more than the sensitive appetite can, because the will is the proper appetitive force of the reason, and so it properly directs things to the end that reason shows. For ‘to use’, which is to direct things to the due end, is not an act of the sensitive appetite but of the will, since so to direct things is not admitted properly to belong to the sensitive power the way that the will, the intellect, and reason so direct things.
If passion be understood as what should be guarded against if immoderate, and accepted if moderate, it seems sufficiently plain that the will can have a right act about the future more than the sensitive appetite can, because the cognitive power of the will, which is reason, can deliberate about the future but not so the senses.6
37. [Conclusion] - It is plain from these reasons, then, which were adduced for the opposite opinion [nn.10-13], how the opposite conclusion can be drawn. First because the will is made right with respect to its proper operation and is not right of itself. Second because it is indeterminate, and is no less determinable than is the intellect, of which habits are not denied. Third because it is of a nature to be properly delighted in its own operation, and so to have a habit by which it may operate delightfully. Fourth because the lead in performing human actions belongs to it, for it is free, and praiseworthy human actions require virtue in the leading agent, for praise is of virtue. Fifth because the will is able to moderate the passions in due manner by a habit more than the sensitive appetite is (if it were to have the passions).
3. Against the Conclusion of Aquinas’ Opinion
38. One can, in addition to these arguments [nn.15-37], argue against the holder of this opinion as follows: If, according to him, ‘in the state of innocence there would not be in the sensitive appetite any passion repugnant to right reason’ [Aquinas ST Ia q.95 a.2], there would be no need to posit virtue in the sensitive appetite; and yet the virtues did then exist, because man was then perfect in accord with them - from the Master in the text.
39. There is also the authority Augustine in Letter 35 or 36 [Letter 155 to Macedonius 3.12: “There will be one virtue there, and it will be both virtue and the reward of virtue. It will be prudence...and courage...and temperance...and justice”].
40. Also in his Soliloquies I. 6.13, “Perfect reason is the soul reaching its end.”
41. Again in his City of God 11.15 [14.6: “Love itself is to be loved, whereby that is loved well which should be loved, so that the virtue by which we live well may be in us”].
42. Again the Master lists the acts that can remain in the fatherland, and they are not acts of the sensitive appetite.
C. Scotus’ own Opinion
43. As to the question, one can say that although the will without a habit is able to do right and morally good acts, and not only this but also that the intellect can make right judgments without any intellectual habit (indeed the first right act of the intellect and the first right action of the will precede the habit, even as to any degree of habit, because from these right acts is generated whatever of a habit is first present) - yet, just as the habit of prudence is generated in the intellect either by the first elicited act or by several elicited acts, so too right virtue is generated in the will, inclining it to right choosing, either through the first right act of choice consonant with the dictate of right reason, or by many right choices.
44. The proof is that the will naturally chooses first before it or reason command anything to sensitive appetite. For reason does not seem to reach sensitive appetite save through the intermediary of the will, which is properly rational appetite. The will too first wants something in itself before it commands an act about it to the inferior appetite. For not because it commands the inferior appetite does the will therefore want it, but conversely. In that prior stage, therefore, the will can generate in itself from its right choices (for it is as indeterminate and determinable as the intellect) a habit inclining it to right choice. And here the habit will most properly be a virtue, for most properly does a habit of choice incline one to act in accord with the right choices that generated it.
45. However one can admit that if the will, in willing, is able to command the sensitive appetite either by moderating its passion or by commanding pursuit or flight, then, if there are acts of the sensitive appetite, the will can, from its right commands, leave behind some habit in the sensitive appetite, a habit inclining the sensitive appetite to be moved with pleasure to similar things by command of the will. And this habit left behind, although it is not properly virtue, for it is not a habit of choice nor does it incline to choice, can yet be admitted to be in some way a virtue, because it inclines to what is consonant with right reason.
D. Objections against Scotus’ own Solution
46. Against the first part [nn.43-44] an objection is raised that then, on this account, there could be moral virtues in an angel [cf. n.14]. The proof is that an angel can have a right act of will about things that sensitive appetite is naturally excited to have a passion about, and so from many such right acts of will a virtue would be generated in the angel. There is a confirmation, that it is possible not only to have right choice about passions present in the sensitive part but also about passions shown by the intellect, even though they will never be and never were there present, as was touched on in the question on practical knowledge in Prol. n.288. Therefore, from such choices a virtue is generated in the will and there is no concomitant virtue in the sensitive appetite.
47. Further, if moral virtue were in the will, then it would be nobler than prudence, because the perfection of a nobler perfectible power is itself nobler [cf. Prol. n.353]. The consequent is against the Philosopher in Ethics 6.11.1143a8-9; so the antecedent is too.
48. An argument against the second part [n.45] is that if, by the sole fact that the sensitive appetite is moved by command of the will, a quality can be generated in that appetite inclining it to similar acts, and if that quality is a virtue, then by parity of reason a moral habit can be generated in the part of the body that is moved frequently by command of the will; and not only so, but also in the inanimate and irrational things that the will uses.
E. Response to the Objections
49. [To the first objection] - As to the first objection [n.46] one can allow that if an angel were created with purely natural powers and did not have moral virtues in his will, these virtues could be generated therein from right choices done many times - not indeed about passions in the sensitive appetite existing in the angel (which neither were present in him nor will be nor could be), but only about the sort of passions shown to him in universal terms by the intellect. And by positing this intellectual showing, and by commanding what thus in the passions should be chosen by one who can have them, a will consonant with such command can possess, from many choices, a right moral habit.
50. And there is a proof of this:
First because every will that does not necessarily lack the perfection which befits the will has belonging to it every perfection of the will; but to will the good about what is doable not only for oneself but also for another (and this not only in its order to the divine good but also insofar as it is a certain proper good) is a perfection of the will; and the will of an angel is not necessarily imperfect. Therefore a habit can belong to this will whereby it wills for me the good of temperance insofar as temperance is a good fitting for me. This habit cannot be called charity because (as was just said) this habit is not only a good for loving God but a good under the proper idea of the goodness of temperance; nor is this habit other than temperance, because the formal idea of a habit does not vary according to ‘for me’ and ‘for you’. Therefore just as by the habit of temperance I formally choose this good for myself, so by a habit of the same idea anyone else wills this good for me. And so in an angel there will be a temperance whereby he wills this good for me.
51. In this way too can, as a consequence, the idea of moral virtues be posited to exist in God, just as charity is allowed to exist in him without its being an accident in him [Lombard, Sent. III d.32 ch.2 n.1].
52. And so from this reasoning about angels that was brought against the proposed solution [n.46] an argument can be taken in favor of that solution. For the will of an angel can will me the good that is the proper habit of temperance insofar as this proper habit is ‘this sort of good’; therefore, an angel can will it for me from the habit of temperance (as was argued [n.50]), and so there will be temperance in him - and not in the sensitive part, so in the other part [sc. the will].
53. But if the objection is made that this is against the Philosopher, who in Ethics 10.8.178b8-18 [n.14] denies moral virtues of the gods, my reply is that the Philosopher is perhaps thus denying of them all accidental habits, if, as some say, he posited that the gods were good naturally.
54. Alternatively, if one is not pleased to posit moral virtues in the gods, one can deny the consequence of the reason that is brought against the proposed solution [n.46], and that in one or other of the following ways:
Either because virtue does not concern just any good but the difficult good. Now this sort of good, which is posited to be the sort of object of the will, is only difficult for someone who has a sensitive appetite that is of a nature to be carried to the opposite of this good, at least as to some circumstance of this good. And from the fact that the sensitive appetite is so inclined, the will in him who has sensitive appetite is of a nature to be thus delighted along with it. And therefore is it difficult for the will to tend to the good that has its due circumstances. So as to an angel, who does not have a sensitive appetite - his will is not of a nature to delight along with any such habit or appetite, and therefore it tends without difficulty to the moral good, that is the good which is rightly circumstanced.
55. Or in another way one can say that volition is twofold. One is simple and is a certain taking pleasure in the object; the other is effective, namely that by which the one willing pursues the willed thing so as to have it in himself, unless he is impeded. Only the second is properly speaking choice, the way the Philosopher speaks of it in Ethics 3.4.1111b20-23, “will is of impossibles, choice is not,” for no one chooses the impossible, that is, effectively wills it with a will by which he pursues it, although someone could with simple taking of pleasure want impossible things (in which way perhaps the first angel sinned, or could have sinned, by willing the impossible, namely equality with God [cf. Ord. II d.6 n.11]).
56. One can say, therefore, that in those who have sensitive appetite the will can be the principle of many choices with respect to the moral good, and choice is the above effective volition, which alone is of a nature to generate a habit; and although it is prior to every habit in the sensitive appetite, it is yet of a nature to be a principle of commanding such appetite. In an angel, however, there can be simple volition but not of a nature to command.
57. [To the second objection] - As to the second objection [n.47], although one can say that not every perfection of a nobler perfectible thing need be itself nobler, yet, if there is indeed in a nobler thing some perfection less noble than a perfection in a less noble thing, the supreme perfection of a nobler thing must surpass the supreme perfection of a less noble thing; now moral virtue is not the supreme perfection of the will, nor is prudence the supreme perfection of the intellect, but charity is of the will and faith of the intellect; and charity seems to exceed faith.
58. This response, however, does not seem sufficient, because the nobler power seems to have a nobler act with respect to the same object when each is acting according to the utmost of itself, because then there is no excess on the part of the object (for it is the same in both cases), but only on the part of the powers, and to that extent the nobler exceeds. Therefore, when there is an act of the practical intellect and of the will about the moral good, which is the same object, then if both powers are acting perfectly (the intellect in dictating and the will in choosing) right choice will be simply nobler than right dictating; and consequently the habit generated by choices will be simply more perfect than the habit generated by nobler acts - which I concede.
59. And as to the Philosopher when he prefers prudence [n.47] I reply: prudence is in some way the rule of the other virtues, to the extent that it or its act precedes in generation the habit and the act of moral virtue; and in this priority moral acts and habits conform to prudence as to what is prior, and not the other way around. This priority seems in the Philosopher to prove the idea and thereby the dignity of [prudence as] the rule and measure - but not simply.
60. [To the third objection] - As to the third [n.48], it is agreed that there can be virtue and habit in a part of the body, as is plain in the case of the hand of the writer and the painter; for my unexercised hand is unsuited to that ability, or in its facility for playing the lyre; but an exercised hand is suited, and this comes only from the facility inhering in the hand. This suitability is posited and conceded to be a certain virtue, because it is a certain suitability suiting something for the work of moral virtue. The same is also further conceded of irrational things, as of a horse, which is suited for certain acts to which it has become accustomed. But such suitability is not found in merely inanimate things; for a stone is not thrown upwards more easily by custom.