II. To the Principal Arguments

35. To the first argument [n.2] I say that Christ’s response to the question asking ‘who is my neighbor’ must be understood as follows. ‘Neighbor’ asserts a relation of equivalence, like ‘friend’ or ‘brother’. Therefore, if he who shows mercy is a ‘neighbor’ (as is got from the Pharisee’s reply), then it follows that he to whom mercy was shown was held by him to be his neighbor; for he was not part of his family nor tied to him by sameness of nation but (as shown by the parable) was a foreigner. Therefore, anyone whom I can serve in a case of necessity, however much he is a foreigner, is to be held to be my neighbor. And this is what the Savior adds, “Go and do thou likewise” [Luke 10.37], that is, hold as neighbor anyone whom you can benefit, even if he is a foreigner to you. So not only is a benefactor a neighbor, but so is everyone who can be benefited by us -and benefited either by a good external feeling or by a good interior and passive love (which is an interior motion). And in this way even the blessed, whom we cannot benefit, can be loved and be our neighbors. But God, although he can be loved, can yet not have any other good added to him by anyone’s love. And so God is not included among our neighbors.

36. To the second [n.2] I say that all the precepts of the second table [of the Ten Commandments] are explications of the command ‘Love thy neighbor’, for they specify that wherein we must not hate our enemy. For ‘do not kill’ includes not unjustly hating our enemy’s bodily life; ‘do not steal’ and ‘do not commit adultery’ include not hating the good of our enemy’s fortune or family, and so on as regard the others.No reply to the third argument [n.4] is given by Scotus, but it is in effect responded to in the quotation from Bonaventure in the next footnote. ³

37. To the authority from Augustine [n.5] - look for it.The Vatican Editors refer to Bonaventure Sent. 3 d.30 a.1 q.4 ad 3. “To the objection that loving one’s enemies is something marvelous, one must say that ‘marvelous’ means something that is above the power of nature. But this can be taken in two ways, as to the operations of nature simply or as to the operations of rational nature. Now to do marvels beyond the power of nature simply...is not given to everyone, while to do marvels beyond the power of rational nature comes [to everyone] through sanctifying grace, namely through faith and charity. For by faith we believe many things that we could not believe without faith and that seem to infidels to be extremely incredible; and by charity we love things that seem hateful to those who lack charity. And these marvels are contained in the divine law, and to do them is given to everyone who wants to receive sanctifying grace. And so one cannot argue that we are not bound to love our enemies; for this belongs to a different kind of marvel than what Augustine is talking about.” ⁴

38. As to the verse from Matthew 5, “You have heard that it was said to the ancients...”, it is significant that our Savior speaks of ‘what was said’ and not of ‘what is written’. For although ‘love your friend’ was written, ‘hate your enemy’ was not written, but the Jews, perverting Scripture, proved it by arguing from the opposite, and it was thus that they kept it as a law. But that they were understanding the Scripture badly is proved there by our Savior, because he says [Matthew 5.46], “if you love only your friends who love you, what reward will you have?” The Pharisees had in this way a bad understanding of other precepts, as is plain about the command ‘Honor your father and mother’ [Exodus 20.12], and the Savior gives an argument against them [Matthew 15.4-9, Mark 7.9-13]. For their interpretation was that if anyone offered his goods to the temple, and did not give them to a needy parent, he would be keeping the commandment, because God is our ‘spiritual father’. But Christ refutes this by saying, “You make void the commandment of God because of your tradition” [Matthew 15.6].

39. Hence appears the answer to the quotation from the Topics [n.7], because that rule holds only of precise causes [cf. I d.43 n.13, II dd. 34-37 n.94], that is, where the contraries on one side do not both fall under one extreme of the other contrary. For if color had a contrary, for instance a, the inference would not follow ‘white is colored, therefore black is colored, namely is a’. Now so it is in the matter at issue, because under the idea of ‘loving’ is contained both friend and enemy per accidens. The thing is plain about enemy, because the same reason to love is found in both enemy and friend, namely the possibility of loving the primary object of charity, which they both have insofar as they are the image of God.