1. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

35. As to the third article [n.13], what is set down is that nature does not suffice for this act without an infused habit.

First, because nature is determined to one thing; but it is determined to desiring its own being (On Generation 2.10.336b27-29); therefore it cannot desire its own non-being, and that in whatever way the point is put (unless it be said that nature is determined only to desiring its conditioned being, which does not seem probable). Therefore every intellectual nature is more determined to desiring its own existence than to desiring God’s existence, if both could not stand together; for nature is determined to the desire of its own existence as to one natural object, to whose opposite it cannot be inclined whatever condition one supposes to hold of it; for then it would not seem to desire its own existence save under a condition.

36. Besides natural appetite seems only to regard what is agreeable to the desirer, and consequently it primarily regards that for which the agreeable thing is desired; but that is the lover himself (if it is first in regard o itself); therefore it cannot regard something else more.