Thirty Ninth Distinction

Single Question. Whether all Perjury is a Mortal Sin

1. About the thirty ninth distinction I aska whether all perjury is a mortal sin.

a.a [Interpolation] About the thirty ninth distinction, where the Master deals with perjury, the question asked is whether...

2. That it is not:

Because sometimes one swears what it is illicit to fulfill. Gratian Decrees p.2 cause 22 q.4 ch.5, “In evil promises end faith in it, in a base vow change the decision, do not do what you have rashly vowed; a promise is impious that is fulfilled by crime.” But what is of itself illicit does not become licit by an oath, therefore it remains illicit after the oath. And so, fulfilling what was sworn is to sin mortally. Therefore by not fulfilling it one does not sin mortally. For no one is in perplexity in the Christian law, namely so as to sin mortally whether he does a thing or does not do it (which seems to be perplexity). And yet by not fulfilling what he swore he perjures himself. Therefore perjury is not a mortal sin.

3. Again, it is a graver matter to swear by God than by the Gospel [Gratian, p.2 cause 22 q.1 ch.11], just as it is a graver matter to swear by the temple than by the gold (for the temple that sanctifies the gold is greater than the gold that is sanctified by the temple [Matthew 23.17]). And this as to reverence. Therefore if it is a mortal sin to perjure oneself, it is a very great sin to perjure oneself swearing by God. Therefore common persons as a result sin mortally the whole day, because they have to swear by God for nothing, even asserting something false or doubtful (something not certain), which seems harsh.

4. Again, not every oath of a promise obligates necessarily, Gratian p.2 cause 22 q.4 ch.1, “It is better not to fulfill the vow of a stupid promise than to commit a crime.” Therefore neither is perjury there a mortal sin.

5. Proof of the antecedent:

About a coerced oath, see Gregory IX Decretals II tit.24 ch.8 “Clerics who have been coerced to abjure the ministry of the Church have deserved the benefit of absolution from their oath, and are permitted to serve in the same Church.”

6. About a deceitful oath it is plain that the swearer does not intend to obligate himself, for no one is obligated unless he intends to obligate himself [ibid. ch.31, Innocent’s gloss], where it is said that “if anyone swears five times not to oppose someone else, he can in a cause of the Church or the community oppose him the sixth time, notwithstanding that it is against his oath.”

7. About a rash oath there is proof that if the swearer fulfills it he verges on a worse fate [Gratian, p.2 cause 22 q.4 ch.19]. Therefore it is a worse evil to fulfill the oath.

8. And about these two oaths, namely the deceitful and the coerced, there is proof by similarity with marriage, for a coerced or deceitful (that is pretended) consent does not obligate a man to marriage [Gregory, ibid. I tit. 40 ch.2, IV tit.1 ch.14].

9. On the contrary:

Exodus 20.7, “You shall not commit perjury, but you will fulfill your vows to the Lord your God.” And Psalm 75.12, “Vow, and fulfill it to the Lord your God.”

I. To the Question

10. In this question one must first consider the nature or idea of an oath; and second, on this basis, that perjury is a mortal sin; third one must consider the distinction of oaths, and how specific oaths are sins.

A. About the Idea of an Oath

11. As to the first point I say that an oath is the assertion that a human statement is true, and this ultimately according to Hebrews 6.16, “the end of every controversy is the swearing of an oath.” For man, knowing that man is mendacious and ignorant and can consequently deceive and be deceived, cannot give sure faith to his statements. And so a way was found of asserting statements by bringing in another witness, a true and knowing witness, who can neither deceive nor be deceived; and this is done by swearing an oath. For God is there brought in, who knows the truth and cannot lie, as being a witness of my assertion.

B. Perjury is a Mortal Sin

1. Solution

12. Hence follows the proposed conclusion about perjury, because to bring in God as witness of what is false is to do irreverence to God: - either by bringing him in as a witness ignorant of the truth and so not omniscient, or bringing him in as willing to testify to what is false and so not completely truthful. In either way irreverence is done immediately to God, against the commandment of the first table, “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain” [Exodus 20.7]. And so, in either way, if done deliberately, it is a mortal sin.

2. Two Doubts Against the Aforesaid

13. But here there are two doubts. The first is whether perjury’s not being deliberate excuses it from being a mortal sin. Second whether one sins mortally by bringing in God as witness in the aforesaid way for anything that one believes to be true though it is not true, or for something about which one has some opinion but assents rather to the opposite.

a. About the First Doubt

14. As to the first of these doubts it is commonly conceded that a single slight perjury is not a mortal sin.

15. However, to be a perjurer habitually is a mortal sin. And this it seems can be proved, because a habit generated by many acts inclines one to a graver act than are the preceding ones.

16. But against this: if the first act of perjury is not a mortal sin, then neither is any other, even from whatever habit it comes to be, because an inclining habit cannot make an act graver. For if someone acquired a great habit from acts of incontinence and quickly repent, then if after repentance he have some movement of incontinence, although his great habit incline him to it, yet it is not a mortal sin in him; indeed neither is it notably graver than it would be in someone else who has no habit.

17. A confirmation is that a habit cannot be graver, if it has any gravity. Since however gravity has no culpability, properly speaking, save from acts, then since the acts from which the habit is generated are venial, the habit will not produce any mortal gravity in acts elicited by the habit.

18. It seems then possible to say that a habit or custom does nothing for the proposed conclusion. But perjury, with full consent, is against the commandment of the first table and consequently turns one aside immediately from the ultimate end, and so nothing of the idea of mortal sin is lacking to it.

19. But if a perjury is not done deliberately, however often it is done, then since a meritorious act requires that it be fully human and so fully deliberate, an act of demerit would require altogether the same (for God is not more prone to punish than to condone) - if so, one can say that a non-deliberate perjury, even repeated ever so often, is not a mortal sin.

20. However, as was said before in the material about the virtues [d.33 n.77], a virtuous man has quick deliberation (which does not seem to be deliberation because of its quickness), because he has great prudence wherewith he is prompt to deliberating as it were in imperceptible time. So too someone could, from a habit opposite to prudence, acquire for himself a facility in deliberating promptly about the opposite, as if in imperceptible time, and this deliberation, following the habit, would be sufficient for the idea of sin; just as the like deliberation in a good man would be sufficient for the idea of merit.

21. Therefore, as concerns the idea of mortal sin, I do not distinguish so much between the rarity or frequency of perjury as between its deliberation or lack of deliberation, so that when deliberation is concurrent it makes mortal sin (and that whether the act is single or customary), and lack of deliberation excuses, whether once or as many times as you like.

b. About the Second Doubt

22. As to the second doubt [n.13] I say that he to whom one swears either accepts (from positive law or common custom) that the oath is as it were simply assertive of what is sworn, or that it is not as it were simply assertive but induces to probable belief of the thing sworn.

23. In the first way I say that one who swears something that is in any way doubtful (that is, something not simply certain and true and deliberate) sins mortally, because he is bringing in God as witness to confirm that what he asserts is simply certain and true when it is not simply certain.

24. And in this way must be understood all oaths of those who swear in court, where the sort of sentence accustomed to be passed there should not be passed unless what is asserted is simply certain. For example, a sentence of death should not be passed save for a crime that is certain. Therefore, he who swears that the accused is guilty of the crime when he is not certain, however much he may nevertheless conjecture that the accused is guilty and swears this in such a forum (where, by positive law or custom, a condemnation to death follows), he sins mortally. The like holds of any forum where (from the fact someone is convicted through sworn oaths) the accused is condemned as simply guilty or as infamous with the infamy of law. For in this case not only is irreverence done to the name of God against the commandment of the first table, but there is a pernicious lie because harmful to one’s neighbor [cf. d.38 n.23].

25. And if you say ‘it is useful for the republic; otherwise evil people will be too much multiplied’, God replies “You will execute what is just justly” [Deuteronomy 16.20]. For there are certain evils that are not to be punished by men but are to be left to divine vengeance - for instance all things where man, as man, cannot even sufficiently teach the truth in the way it ought to be taught for the purpose of justly passing a due sentence of punishment. Nor are the witnesses alone guilty in these cases but the judge too. And if a judge knows that by custom witnesses only swear under oath what they believe, then he should not pass such sentence as should be passed if guilt were simply proved before him. For he knows from custom that guilt is not proved before him sufficiently for the infliction of such a punishment.

26. But if by positive law or custom it is held that a sworn witness is not bound to depose what he is certain of but only what he believes, then the swearer does not sin, provided he make conjecture for this side rather than another from probable signs. The point is contained in Gregory IX Decretals I tit. 12, about making examination for holdy orders, where Pope Innocent replies, “as far as human fragility allows us to know, [the Church] both knows and testifies that this man is worthy of the burden of this sort of office.” Hence Pope Innocent says that

“in making such response we do not believe that anyone sins, provided he not speak against his conscience; for he does not assert simply that the candidate is worthy but asserts it as far as human fragility allows one to know, since one should judge him worthy whom one does not know to be unworthy.”

27. Therefore, in such promotions either to any dignity of office by election or to holy orders, or also in other colleges (as to mastership in universities, to prelacy in religions, or to other acts of the sort), if there is an approved custom that the responses of the respondents (under proffered oath, or under pledge of faith, or under promised obedience) should be understood only of belief ‘as far as human fragility permits us to know’, and that the presider does not know of any indignity in the candidate, then all such responses should be understood according to the common custom and the respondents do not sin in anything (though it would be safer to speak there with some qualification, as in the aforesaid Decretal, that one speaks not simply but as far as human fragility allows). And in such cases a judge who promotes such a candidate does not sin, because the custom is that giving such testimony of one’s belief is enough.

28. Here then ‘favor is enlarged and hatred is restricted’ according to the maxim of the law [Boniface VIII Decretals 6.V tit.12], because in matters of hate a sworn witness should speak the truth strictly, and a truth that is certain, for otherwise it is not a reason that the sentence of condemnation afterwards passed should be passed. In favorable matters it is sufficient for the person sworn to say what he believes to be true, above all where the custom or positive law in the college is of the sort that one speak one’s belief. For because of the truth as to belief thus testified, the presider can promote the candidate to such and such a rank.

29. Now universally, whether in favorable or hateful things, he who swears something the opposite of which he more believes than anything else, swearing even to that about which he is simply doubtful and where he does not assent in his heart more to one side than the other - such a person sins mortally in swearing, because he brings in God as witness for something he is in no way certain about which he ought to be certain about.

3. Third Doubt against the Aforesaid

30. If objection is raised against the statement that perjury is against a commandment of the first table, for it seems that according to Master Lombard [III d.39 ch.3 nn.1-2] perjury is a sort of lie and so against the commandment of the second table, “Thou shalt not speak false witness against your neighbor” [Exodus 20.16] - one can reply that in perjury there is a double sin: namely a lie or lying as material, and the taking of the Lord’s name in vain, that is, taking it not only uselessly but irreverently and against reverence. The first sin belongs to the second table but the second belongs formally to the first table, because of the irreverence prohibited there.

31. Perjury is also possible without lying, for example, where he who simply doubts swears to the part he doubts - which would not be a lie if he asserted it, for he does not have the opposite in his mind. At any rate, in a case where the swearer is bound to be certain, he commits perjury if he is not certain, and yet if he asserted it without an oath he would not lie because he does believe it more than the opposite.

32. It is dangerous therefore to have an oath frequently on one’s lips, because, in the case of many statements, there would be no sin without an oath, but there is sin when an oath is added, and grave sin if done deliberately [n.21]. Therefore useful is the counsel of our Savior, Matthew 5.37, “Let your speech be yea yea, nay nay.”

C. On the Distinction of Oaths and How Specific Oaths are Sins

33. As to the third article [n.10] I say that a human statement is either about the present and the past, where the truth is determinate, or about the future, where the truth is uncertain and indeterminate. And a statement, indeed, about the first is said to be assertive, in the sense in which ‘assertion’ is extended to cover affirmative or negative assertions. But about the future, when something is in the power of the promiser or swearer, it is called promissory. And accordingly, since an oath is the assertion of either of these kinds of statement, an oath is assertoric or promissory. Both, to be sure, impose an obligation: the assertoric because it obligates the swearer to tell the truth, whereby it leads the witness to assertion of what he says; the promissory because it obligates the swearer to confess ‘this is true’. And because the assertoric obligates one only for the time for which one swears, and a promissory oath is called an obligation as it regards the future, therefore a promissory oath is rightly called obligatory, because it obligates one to the future doing of what is sworn.

34. And these two kinds of oath are assimilated to two kinds of obligation in sophisms, namely position and petition. Position obligates one to upholding as true what is laid down, and petition to carrying out in fact what was asked for [Topics 8.155b-164b].

35. But here there is a doubt whether in a promissory oath the quality of its being an oath is presupposed, and by the weight of it a witness is brought forward who is suitable for confirming what is said. Or whether the veracity of the witness is presupposed, so that the quality of his speaking it under oath is considered secondarily. For if the first were true it would seem sufficient for a swearer about the future to have the intention, when he swears, to do what he swears to do in the future, even if afterwards he change his intention. The second seems more consonant with common opinion, because in an oath one is said to remain always obligated until one fulfills it.

36. As to assertive perjury, therefore, there is no need in particular to touch on more than was touched on I the article about perjury in general [nn.12, 18-21].

37. As to promissory or obligative perjury, I say that it can be deceitful or rash or coerced, or it can lack all these undue conditions.

38. A deceitful oath is when he who swears he will do something intends, even in the act itself of swearing, to do the opposite, and does not intend to obligate himself to what he swears. Such a person sins mortally in the very act of swearing, because he brings in God as witness of his proposal to fulfill what he swears though he is proposing the opposite. However, after the oath he remains without obligation, because no one is obligated in the case of private obligations when he does not intend to obligate himself. Nor does it follow that he gains advantage from his deceit (because had he not sworn deceitfully he would have been obligated), for it is no advantage to gain mortal sin, and if he had not sworn deceitfully he would not have sinned mortally. Yet he who does not swear deceitfully would be bound to his oath and the other not. And the intention of the former is not as damaging as the loss that the latter incurs in his very deceitful oath, because the latter sins mortally.

39. A rash oath can be said in two ways:

Either because it concerns matter that is altogether illicit (for example, someone swears he will do the opposite of some commandment, as if he swears to kill someone or commit adultery with someone). And such an oath does not obligate the swearer to fulfill the oath, such that after the oath he should fulfill the act. However, after he has sworn, if he had no such intention, he has sinned mortally, because he has brought God in as testimony to what is false. Also, if he had such intention, he has sinned mortally, because to want to sin mortally is to sin mortally. Therefore, in every way, such a one sins mortally in the very act of swearing. But after having done so he should not fulfill the oath, because he ought not to add sin to sin. For something that was illicit does not become licit for him because he has illicitly sworn something; for mortal sin does not make his condition freer.

An oath is rash in another way because it concerns some matter that would be of itself licit but is not licit for the swearer; for instance, someone abjures the works of perfection and thereby interposes an obstacle to the movement of the Holy Spirit. To observe such an oath verges toward a worse outcome [n.7]. Nor should one keep what has been sworn after the oath has been made. For although it is licit absolutely not to do the works of perfection, it is however not licit to have a fixed ‘willing’ never to do the works of perfection, for this is to have a fixed ‘willing’ against the movement of the Holy Spirit.

In these two oaths, then, namely the deceitful [n.38] and the rash (in the two aforesaid ways [n.39]), it is plain that one does not, after the oath, stay obligated to fulfill what has been sworn, but one sins mortally in the very act of swearing.

40. Another rash oath could be posited when someone swears he will do what however he cannot do. And if, when he swears, he thinks he can, judgement must be made about him the way said in the article about oaths in general [n.28]. But if he could do it in the future, he is bound by the oath. If however he cannot, yet when he swore he believed he could, he is excused in the case of favorable matters.

41. About coerced oaths (with the coercion that can afflict a man of constancy), there are opinions - see Ord. IV d.29.

42. A promissory oath, which lacks the three conditions (deception, incaution, coercion [n.37]), obligates the swearer never to have a will opposite to what he swears. But if he defer fulfilling it for certain circumstances that seem to require its deferral, he does not sin. He only becomes a perjurer when he has a will of not fulfilling what he swore, because only then does he want to God to have been a witness of what is false.

II. To the Arguments

43. As to the first argument [n.2] plainly, ‘in a base vow, change the decision’. However, in making the vow one sins mortally.

44. To the next [n.3] I say that, other things equal, the greatest vow is to swear ‘by God’, because by nothing else is it to licit to swear save insofar as God is there in a special way (for instance, ‘by the Gospel’, because God is specially luminous in the Gospel; ‘by heaven’ because God dwells there in a special way; ‘by the Church’, because God is worshipped there in a special way). However, the custom is also reasonable that establishes that certain oaths are made with greater solemnity than others; and about those made with solemnity it is presumed that they are never done without deliberation. Other light oaths can be made without deliberation. Therefore God and the Church have established, for purposes of fear, that these sort of oaths [sc. ‘by the Gospel’, ‘by heaven’ etc. Matthew 5.33-37] only be sworn solemnly, and consequently with deliberation and where the truth is to be simply asserted. But oaths ‘by God’ are sworn commonly and lightly, and frequently without deliberation.

45. I say then that, other things being equal, it is a very grave thing to swear ‘by God’. But if there is no deliberation on this side and there is full deliberation on another side, as is the case when an oath is sworn ‘by the Gospel’, there can be mortal sin in the latter case and not in the former - not because of the reverence of him by whom one swears, but because of deliberation in one case and not in the other.

46. And if you object ‘why then does someone who swears by the Gospel become infamous, but not someone who swears by God?’ - I reply that infamy does not always follow the quality of the guilt but the public character of the crime; but it has been established [Gratian Decree, p.2 cause 3, q.9 ch. 20] that an oath be sworn on the Gospel, or be done with deliberation, and that it be public and done publicly. And therefore a transgressor of the oath is presumed to be a violator of the faith, and is reasonably held to be infamous. The same is not presumed about someone else who lightly swears by God falsely.

47. As to the final argument [n.4] it is plain that a promissory oath obligates, but not to fulfilling the act sworn to.