II. To the Principal Arguments

36. To the arguments of this question.

To the first [n.2] I say that Abraham did not speak against what he had in mind, for (as Josephus relates in his book Antiquities I.13 n.3) while he was walking alone with his son, having left the servants behind, he informed his son how he had been miraculously conceived and how, if he were sacrificed, God would raise him miraculously from the dead. And he is believed to have firmly expected this, because he did not doubt the promise of God that “in Isaac shall your seed be called” [Genesis 21.12]. So although he intended to sacrifice Isaac yet he intended that he was to be miraculously resurrected by God and would return with him to the servants. Hence his saying ‘we will return to you’ was said according to what he sensed in his heart. Nor was a lie to be easily imposed on Abraham whose life was so exemplary.

37. As to what is argued about Jacob [n.3], although some strive much to save him and other fathers of the Old Testament from having lied, however since they allow that they had an imperfect law and a little grace, while we conversely have a perfect law and abundant grace, and they do not deny about us that sometimes we lie or have lied - it does not seem very reasonable to deny that they sometimes lied or could lie. And if it is so, although we praise their good deeds and take them as example, yet we do not take their bad deeds as example nor do we stubbornly defend or excuse them. Yet it is said that these words of theirs can be understood figuratively or with other meanings than the words primarily express - but there is no need to delay over such meanings.

38. To the one about Joseph [n.4], who was himself a perfect keeper of the divine law [Genesis 39.2-23], one can say that his lie against his brothers was only a jocose one - as appears from the event. For at the end he opened to them the truth [Genesis 45.1-4], and while in the meantime he made them afraid he punished them as they deserved to be punished [Genesis 42.9-44]. For their betrayal, whereby they sold their brother into Egypt, well deserved to be punished not only with such fear but with an even greater punishment.

39. To the other arguments:

About Rahab and the midwives and Rachel [n.5] there is no need to give excuse, nor is their deed commended in Scripture as to the lie; but the providence of Rahab, whereby she provided for herself and her own and procured their safety, is praised.

40. As to what is argued about the midwives, that ‘God built them houses’ [n.5], there are opinions about this, as the Master of the Histories [Scholastic History, Petrus Comestor, on Exodus 3] relates on the passage. And perhaps that opinion is more probable which says they had a good movement of piety, and because of it God rewarded them temporally, because the sin annexed to it did not deserve an eternal reward. Or one can more probably say that the lie was a useful one, because it was useful for saving young Jewish boys and was harmful to no one. And therefore God rewarded them for the good motion of their wills, and yet did not deny them eternal life for a sin that in them was venial.

41. However there would there be a doubt: might such a lie or venial sin, along with a great movement of piety, be sometimes more worth choosing, or are both together to be avoided? A proof of the latter seems to be that a venial sin is in no way to be chosen. A proof of the former seems to be that a venial sin will be destroyed in time and will not remain to eternity, either in this life or after this life. A great movement of piety, which has great merit, merits a great reward because it merits an eternal reward, or at any rate it merits some degree of reward that will be eternal. It does not seem that, because of any evil whatever which is not of itself eternal but temporal, something has to be omitted that is of itself cause in some way of an eternal good. - I dismiss this question.

42. However, about the midwives one can hold (relative to the issue at hand) that they only sinned venially, because their lie was altogether useful. And their movement of piety, even if other things would have been required for merit, would have been of great merit, so that the midwives would have merited eternal life and also temporal good, because at that time God rewarded his worshippers with temporal good.

43. To the one about Judith [n.5] it is said that she lied in nothing, because the exaggerated words she spoke to Holofernes she did not intend to direct to Holofernes but to God. And she was not necessarily bound to speak outwardly according to the intention of the recipient, but she could speak according to her own intention as a speaker. However, when speaking to a superior, to whom one is bound to reply in good faith, it is said that a speaker must reply to the intention of the questioner, so that by responding in that case through words that would have been false if directed to the intention or authority but true if directed to God, the speaker does not speak truly, for in that case it is not licit to address God.

44. But on this supposition [sc. that Judith spoke to her own intention not that of Holofernes] there seems nothing certain in human conversation, nor does anyone seem to have certainty about the conversation of his neighbor; at any rate no one seems to be lying whatever he says in the second person provided it could be made true by directing it to God. But if you are bound to speak truth to your superior (not to someone extraneous), by not saying the truth to him you could be disobedient; but when not saying it to someone extraneous you will not be disobedient. But it does not seem how this could be, if you are not lying or are a liar more to yourself than to him.

45. If those words [sc. of Judith] then, which are said there and seem to be excessive, cannot be saved in any other way, it does not seem a great inconvenience to concede that Judith told a lie useful to her race but pernicious to him whose death she intended. However the utility is preferred to the perniciousness because the good of the republic (which greatly worshipped God) is preferable to the temporal good of a private person (especially an infidel) -unless it be obvious to the latter that in fighting against anyone faith must be kept, so that the infidelity or lie of any Christian (in war even against the infidel) is condemned, though it is possible to use certain precautions of war that are not per se repugnant to truth nor include lies.

46. Also if Judith adorned herself with the intention that Holofernes be captivated by the sight of her, and this when wanting him to sin mortally with her, and ‘to want another to sin mortally’ is to sin mortally - it does not seem altogether certain that she guarded herself from every mortal sin. And so her deed is narrated in Scripture and recited in the Church as praiseworthy in regard to certain matters that there belonged to religion, although other things connected with them are not praised and not licit.

47. To the last one about pretense [n.6], I say that someone can pretend through some probable arguments, by assigning some good to be present in himself which is not present (as by genuflections and acts of adorations to pretend one has a devotion that one does not have), and such pretense is hypocrisy and a mortal sin.

48. But someone can pretend that evils are not present, either by showing signs opposite to those evils or by not showing signs that are accustomed commonly to follow those evils. And the first of these seems to pertain to hypocrisy, namely if some lascivious person, hearing talk about women, spits curses in sign of chastity, though he has the opposite in his heart. The second is not any reprehensible evil; rather to the extent it can be an evil it is praiseworthy, because it is blamable to preach in the way some are said to have done, “they preached their sin as Sodom and were not silent” [Isaiah 3.9]. For although there is evil inside in the heart, yet to add an evil sign outwardly is to add evil to evil.

49. But in indifferent matters one can do certain things that of their nature are signs of something. Someone else also can do things that are not of their nature signs, but he knows that they are conceived to be signs by those present. For instance, by the nature of the thing to sweat is a sign of fatigue or some bodily exhaustion; but to spit, so that saliva run down the beard, is not of its nature a sign of insanity of mind (for someone sound of mind can emit saliva so that it flows down the beard). Yet from the circumstances one can know that this is to be judged a sign of fury or madness (as that these are signs of madness in that country).

50. Generally, therefore, about the first and second pretenses [nn.47-48] I say that they are sins and that they are frequently mortal sins, because they are hypocrisy. The third pretense [n.48], provided another evil is not committed with it, is praiseworthy, so that a man not show one evil because of another evil. In indifferent matters the first pretense [n.49], if it existed in anyone, would perhaps be evil, but not by reason of the matter, that is, if someone could make himself sweat although he had not labored (in the way some comedians use their bodies for certain motions, signifying some dispositions that are not in them nor were there before). But the other pretense, which is the second one in indifferent matters [n.49], is no sin.

51. And such was the pretense of David [n.6]. The pretense of Jehu should not be excused, for beside the pretense, which perhaps could be excused, he added a lie, “My great sacrifice is for Baal” [IV Kings 10.19]. This lie, although by his intention it was in a way useful because destructive of the cult of Baal, yet it was of its nature pernicious: not only of its nature pernicious because it procured the death of others but also because, as concerned itself, it procured the cult of Baal. And although Jehu is commended for the destruction and persecution of the cult of Baal, yet he is blamed because he did not refrain from [worshipping] the calves of Jeroboam, nor was he a true worshipper of the God of Israel [ibid. 10.28-31]. .