Single Question. Whether Every Lie is a Sin

1. About the thirty eighth distinction I aska whether every lie is a sin.

a.a [Interpolation] About the thirty eighth distinction, where the Master deals with certain sins belonging to the explanation of the fifth commandment, as about lies and perjury, which are prohibited in that commandment, the question asked is whether...

2. That it is not:

Genesis 22.5, “I and the boy will go thither and after we have given worship we will return to you.” But Abraham intended to kill the boy because that was commanded of him. Therefore he intended that the boy would not return with him; so he said the opposite of what he had in mind. Therefore he was lying. Nor is it likely that he then sinned in carrying out the command, namely the command for which he was so much commended by God.

3. Further, the same is proved through many other examples:

As is plain in Genesis 27.32 about Jacob, who said he was Esau, the first born, which he knew to be false.

4. Again, in Genesis 42.16, 44.5, 15 Joseph said to his brothers, “By the health of Pharaoh, you are spies,” and yet he knew the opposite to be true. Again the same Joseph also frightened his brothers about the cup found in Benjamin’s sack, and said he used the cup in divination, although he was not a diviner, because divination was not permitted to those who kept the law of God [cf. Leviticus 19.26].

5. Further, Rahab lied about the spies (Joshua 2.2-21), and Judith likewise (Judith 10.11-13, 11.4-17), and Rachel when she spread garments on the camel to cover the gods of her father, said that it was happening to her after the manner of women (Genesis 31.19, 31-35). The midwives also lied saying that the Hebrew women had the midwife’s art (Exodus 1.15-21); and it does not seem nor is it said that they sinned in this, because “God did well by them and built up their houses,” and God does not give good for evil. Therefore etc.

6. Further, dissimulation in words is not a greater sin than dissimulation in deeds, because just as deeds are more evident signs than words so, if there is falsity on both sides, the falsity in deeds seems more blamable than falsity in words, for the falsity of a deed provides more cover for something other than what is in one’s soul than the falsity of a word does. But a lie or dissimulation in deed is not always set down as a sin, as is plain of what David did when he pretended in the presence of King Achis to be mad when he was not [I Kings 21.20-15]. And Jehu too pretended to worship Baal, although however he wanted to destroy the worshippers of Baal. Nor is he blamed in that pretense but rather is praised, because he seemed to have zeal for God against Baal [IV Kings 10.-1830].

7. To the opposite is Augustine frequently in his book ‘On Lying’, and his authorities are cited by Lombard in the text.

8. Further, here is proof that every lie is a mortal sin:

Because it is against the commandment and against the law of nature, “You shall not do to another what you do not wish done to yourself” [Matthew 7.12], for no one wishes to be deceived by his neighbor when his neighbor is bound to tell him what he thinks; therefore no one ought to treat anyone else differently.

9. Further, whatever is against some virtue or against the act of some necessary virtue is a mortal sin; a lie is of this sort because it is against veracity, which is a virtue contained under justice. For a truthful man shares with his neighbor what is to be shared, namely the thought in his heart according to the way it is. Now a liar does not share but takes way what he should share in speaking, for he speaks so as to express his thought and by lying he does not express it but the opposite.

10. Further, lying is an abuse of speaking. For, as Plato says in the Timaeus 216b, spoken sounds are instituted and imposed to stand in as signs of one’s will; but liars do not use spoken sounds as signs of their will but of the opposite; therefore etc.

11. Further, certain authorities in the aforesaid books of Augustine seem to say this, and they are cited in Lombard’s text.

I. To the Question

A. A Lie is a Sin

12. In this question the conclusion that a lie is a sin is commonly held by everyone.

13. They are persuaded by Augustine’s reasoning in his book Against Lying, “It is stupid to believe him who is permitted to lie.” But there are many people we must believe, otherwise a joint human life sharing thoughts and affections of mind would be abolished. Therefore, we must believe people, and it is not permitted to lie.

14. But the reason for this is set down in different ways by different people.

For some say [William of Auxerre] that for this reason a lie is necessarily a sin because it necessarily turns one away from God, who is truth, and a lie is against truth.

15. But against this is that a lie does not immediately oppose the first truth but the truth of some thing that the speaker is lying about. Therefore, just as malice opposed to some created good does not necessarily turn one away from the first uncreated good, so neither does a falsity opposed to any truth not pertaining toAdopting the reading from Q ‘impertinenti’ and not the ‘in particulari’ of the Vatican editors. ¹⁰ the first truth turn one away from the first truth.

16. In another way it is said [Aquinas] that an act is called good or bad from its object in the genus of morals, and a genus is taken from something potential, and therefore is it potential with respect to its differences. But the first thing through which an act is constituted in the genus of morals (so that it can then be further determined through its circumstances as through differences) is the object. For over and above the goodness of nature, which an act has from its quiddity, the first thing that determines it so that it is quasi-potentially and materially moral, is the object. So as to the issue at hand, it is said that an act bad in its genus can never be good, for no additional circumstance can take away the malice that it has per se from the object, for every other circumstance presupposes the object. But lying is an act bad in its genus, because it concerns matter disagreeing with the act. For the matter agreeing with an act of speaking should be true or believed, and ‘being true’ is opposite matter in the case of a lie.

17. Against this:

The matter for speaking when one believes everything one says is false is not more undue or illicit than ‘a man innocent and useful to the republic’ is illicit matter for killing. But when these latter conditions are in place on the part of such illicit matter (namely a man), killing such a man can become licit, namely if God revokes the commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’ (as was said in d.37 n.13). And not only licit but meritorious, namely if God commands one to kill, as Abraham was commanded to kill Isaac. Therefore, by similarity or by the argument ‘a minori’, speaking words one believes to be false can become licit if the commandment is revoked that seems to be about not deceiving one’s neighbor. For the commandment about not lying is not more binding than the commandment about not killing; for it is a lesser evil to take a true opinion away from one’s neighbor, or occasionally to generate in him a false opinion, than to take from him his bodily life; indeed, there is hardly any comparison between the two.

18. There is a confirmation, that if lying necessarily got its malice from the fact that it concerns the sort of matter it does, then lying is not prohibited by a commandment of the second table, because in the second table only things bad to one’s neighbors are prohibited. But, according to you in this opinion, lying is not only bad because it harms one’s neighbor, for then (as argued [n.17]) it would be a lesser evil than killing, and it would be possible, or more possible, for it, like killing, not to have the idea of evil. So it would be against a commandment of the first table. But this does not seem probable, because lying does not immediately turn one away from God, just as neither does the opposite act [sc. telling the truth] immediately have God for object (when speaking of some indifferent truth).

19. Further, if someone who says ‘he is running’ were deceived and believed it to be true, his act of speaking concerns the same matter as it would if he were not deceived and believes it to be false. But when he is deceived and believes what he says to be true he does not sin. So there is no malice there from the object that the act concerns.This criticism does not apply to Aquinas’ way of understanding the object of an act of lying, since for him the object includes the intention to say other than what one thinks. Scotus seems to hold, nn.20-21, that this way of understanding the object of an act conflates two different things. ¹¹

20. In a third way it is said [Bonaventure] that ‘lying’ in its very idea states a bad intention, because it states an intention to deceive. So although some acts, which do not include an evil intention, could sometimes be good from some good circumstance, yet an act that includes in itself an evil intention can never be good because it formally includes an evil ‘willing’. So it is in the issue at hand.

21. This view can be expounded as follows. Although a positive act and malice are not something per se one, either in fact or in concept, yet a name can be imposed on it that does not signify only the act or only the deformity of the act but the whole thing at once. It is like the name ‘adultery’ which is imposed to signify not only the natural act of intercourse but the deformity of its being with another’s wife. And the name ‘theft’ is not only imposed to signify the receiving of something but also to signify the taking of what belongs to another against the will of the owner, and of any superior owner there may be. Such totalities, which are introduced by such names, do not seem able to be good, but what the substrate is of them can be without the relevant deformity (namely an act of intercourse or of receiving something). So it is in the issue at hand. Although the speaking of such and such words, whatever they signify or do not signify, could be without sin, yet the speaking of them with knowledge of the opposite, and consequently with the intention of deceiving, cannot be without sin, for this includes the substrate act along with the circumstances necessarily accompanying or deforming the act. The assumption is plain, because the words ‘I do not know him’ and ‘I will be a liar like you’ were spoken by Christ [John 8.55] but not assertively. Besides any Latin words whatever and however false can be pronounced by a Greek without sin.

B. What Sort of Sin a Lie is

1. About the Three Kinds of Lies

22. Second we must note what sort of sin a lie is.

And although lies are distinguished in many ways, yet for the present purpose a triple distinction suffices, namely into pernicious, useful, and jocose lies.

23. A pernicious lie is one that harms or is harmful of itself to the one I lie to or lie about. And if it harms him as to the Christian religion, namely as to faith or morals etc., then it is a mortal sin. But if it harms him as to his bodily life, or not preserving his conjugal fidelity, or taking away his children or persons in any way connected with him, or as to other temporal goods, then as the lie causes him more or less harm (which is to be weighed by the good it takes away), then it is counted as more or less serious. And generally every such lie, whereby one deliberately asserts what one does not know or what one knows the opposite of, is a mortal sin. For this is simply prohibited by the commandment, “Thou shalt not bear false witness against your neighbor” [Exodus 20.16]. And ‘witness’ is not precisely what is given in court, but is when anyone deliberately asserts something he does not know or whose opposite he does know. Whoever therefore has the intention to deceive someone to whom he is speaking or about whom he is speaking and says the opposite of what he knows to be true, and by thus speaking harms him to whom or about whom he is speaking, then he gives false testimony against his neighbor. But whether not doing so deliberately counts as an excuse will be touched in d.39 nn.13-21.

24. A useful lie is when it is useful for someone and harmful to no one.

25. A jocose lie is to tell stories about what everyone who hears knows is not true and not told as true. For the hearers are not deceived and the speaker does not intend to deceive, nor is his speech of itself deceptive because it is not such as to be naturally believed by the hearers. Rather it is known to be said without making any opinion as to its truth. The like holds if a jocose lie is when someone does intend to deceive by joking, so that the one deceived really is deceived, but not in anything that inflicts any great harm on him, and those too are joking who know he is deceived. And lastly he can be himself joking in the way that Augustine says of Joseph’s lie, who did truly want to deceive his brothers in the words ‘you are spies etc.’ [n.4], and yet he himself, who knew the truth, could be joking about their deception and about the fear that the deceived were running into. And the others, if any knew, could themselves also at last be joking when they perceived that the thing was not seriously said.

2. Opinions of Others

26. About the last two, namely the useful and jocose lie [nn.24-25], it is commonly admitted that neither of them is a mortal sin in the case of imperfect men, because neither is per se against charity, nor even against anything that is of itself necessarily required for the state of those persons.

27. But in the case of perfect men both lies are said by some to be mortal sins, because the authority of these men is taken away so that they are not believed, and in this they make their state to be cheapened and even harm their hearers because of the scandal.

28. An argument against this [n.27] is that no circumstance makes what in one person is a venial sin to be in another a mortal sin unless one of the persons is necessarily obligated to what the other is not obligated to. But a perfect man does not obligate himself to keeping truth in his words, either by a vow or an oath, more than any other Christian does. Therefore the circumstance of the person (because the person is not specially obligated) does not change a venial sin into a mortal sin.

3. Scotus’ own Opinion

29. Here one can reply by drawing a distinction, that some perfect persons are in the state of exercising perfection (as prelates), others are in the state of acquiring perfection (as religious).

a. About Persons in the State of Exercising Perfection

30. One can concede about the first that, when they are performing acts that belong to them by reason of such state of perfection (as teaching, judging, preaching), both sorts of lies [sc. useful and jocose] would be a mortal sin in their case, for they take away the authority and usefulness of the doctrine being preached, according to the remark of Augustine, based on three letters to Jerome [Letters 26 ch.3 nn.3-4, 40 ch.3 n.3, 82 ch.2 n.21], “If lies, however jocose, had been introduced in the Sacred Scriptures, nothing of solidity would remain in them.” For instance, if a prelate while preaching introduced a jocose lie, nothing of solidity remains in his teaching. For anyone can be in doubt about anything said by him as he can be in doubt about anyone else. Or the reason the hearer would not assent to the jocose lie would be a like reason not to assent to anything else that was said. And thus the authority of the teachers of the Church in their teaching will perish, and also their utility for the people listening. The same for solemn judgment or solemn teaching. And I mean this, that the lie is not perceived as said apart from the act of judging or teaching. For while someone is sitting in judgment it is possible to mix some scam in it, which from the manner of speaking is known not to belong to the judgment.

31. It seems, however, that a single jocose or useful lie does not impede the authority of a judge or teacher, but such a lie often repeated or the custom of thus lying does. But then, since according to the laws [Gregory IX Decrees I tit.6 ch.34] ‘a twice repeated act introduces a custom’, it follows that the second act is a mortal sin and not the first, although however the second is altogether like the first (as it seems) in all its circumstances.

32. Whatever may be true of one or several such lies in teaching and judging, at least in other acts it would not be a mortal sin, once the idea of scandal is removed.

b. About Persons in a State of Acquiring Perfection

33. If we speak of him who has the state of acquiring perfection, not of exercising it, something else seems it needs to be said. Such a person does not seem to be obligated more than others to anything that belongs to perfection, but only to what he has vowed. For he has not taken up the state of pastoral care, and so not an act pertaining to his person. Such a one, therefore, if he is not exercising a work of perfection (of which sort are teaching, preaching, and the like) does not seem to sin mortally in telling a useful or jocose lie more than any other Christian, save perhaps because of scandal. For the imperfect can be scandalized more by a lie from such a person than from a common person.

34. But deeds cannot be judged as to what they are from a scandal that does or does not accompany them

For generally, according to the evangelical law, all scandals whatever of the weak are to be avoided, according to Matthew 18.7, “Woe to the man through whom scandals come.” But the scandals taken by the Pharisees, not given to them, are not to be avoided, according to the words of the Savior in Matthew 15.12-14: when the disciples said that the Pharisees were scandalized when they heard Christ’s word, Christ replied, “Let them alone, for they are blind and leaders of the blind.” Whether then it is a question of deeds indifferent in themselves, of which sort is eating meat (about which the Apostle says I Corinthians 8.13, “If my brother is scandalized, I will not eat meat for ever”), or of deeds that have some malice, namely venial malice, yet naturally give occasion or cause of scandal to the weak who are present, these are to be avoided because of the scandal. But we cannot thereby judge what sort of sin it is from the nature of the deed in itself.

35. But as to what belongs to the nature of a jocose or useful lie in deeds said in the second way [sc. without accompanying scandal, n.34], it does not seem that someone in the state of acquiring perfection [nn.29, 33] is obligated by his profession to avoid them for any reason or severity of the precept more than any other Christian. However if right reason dictate that a single act of his or a frequent act is a scandal to the hearers, although a like act in another would not be a scandal, he is bound by charity or the salvation of his neighbor to avoid the scandal; just as in a moment of flight during time of suffering a pastor is bound sometimes not to flee, according to John 10.12-13, “A hireling, who is not the shepherd, sees the wolf coming and flees etc.” Augustine treats the matter well in

Epistle 228 to Honoratus (see Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 15 q.16). But someone else, who is in the state of acquiring perfection and is not a pastor, is not bound of necessity not to flee if he can do otherwise. But he is bound not to scandalize his neighbor by fleeing, and sometimes his flight would be scandalous when the flight of the weak would not be scandalous. For neighbors would judge, from his flight, that because such a person, who has chosen so strict a life, does not expose his life to defend the faith, life should not be exposed even for this cause, and that such a one does not think well of the faith.

II. To the Principal Arguments

36. To the arguments of this question.

To the first [n.2] I say that Abraham did not speak against what he had in mind, for (as Josephus relates in his book Antiquities I.13 n.3) while he was walking alone with his son, having left the servants behind, he informed his son how he had been miraculously conceived and how, if he were sacrificed, God would raise him miraculously from the dead. And he is believed to have firmly expected this, because he did not doubt the promise of God that “in Isaac shall your seed be called” [Genesis 21.12]. So although he intended to sacrifice Isaac yet he intended that he was to be miraculously resurrected by God and would return with him to the servants. Hence his saying ‘we will return to you’ was said according to what he sensed in his heart. Nor was a lie to be easily imposed on Abraham whose life was so exemplary.

37. As to what is argued about Jacob [n.3], although some strive much to save him and other fathers of the Old Testament from having lied, however since they allow that they had an imperfect law and a little grace, while we conversely have a perfect law and abundant grace, and they do not deny about us that sometimes we lie or have lied - it does not seem very reasonable to deny that they sometimes lied or could lie. And if it is so, although we praise their good deeds and take them as example, yet we do not take their bad deeds as example nor do we stubbornly defend or excuse them. Yet it is said that these words of theirs can be understood figuratively or with other meanings than the words primarily express - but there is no need to delay over such meanings.

38. To the one about Joseph [n.4], who was himself a perfect keeper of the divine law [Genesis 39.2-23], one can say that his lie against his brothers was only a jocose one - as appears from the event. For at the end he opened to them the truth [Genesis 45.1-4], and while in the meantime he made them afraid he punished them as they deserved to be punished [Genesis 42.9-44]. For their betrayal, whereby they sold their brother into Egypt, well deserved to be punished not only with such fear but with an even greater punishment.

39. To the other arguments:

About Rahab and the midwives and Rachel [n.5] there is no need to give excuse, nor is their deed commended in Scripture as to the lie; but the providence of Rahab, whereby she provided for herself and her own and procured their safety, is praised.

40. As to what is argued about the midwives, that ‘God built them houses’ [n.5], there are opinions about this, as the Master of the Histories [Scholastic History, Petrus Comestor, on Exodus 3] relates on the passage. And perhaps that opinion is more probable which says they had a good movement of piety, and because of it God rewarded them temporally, because the sin annexed to it did not deserve an eternal reward. Or one can more probably say that the lie was a useful one, because it was useful for saving young Jewish boys and was harmful to no one. And therefore God rewarded them for the good motion of their wills, and yet did not deny them eternal life for a sin that in them was venial.

41. However there would there be a doubt: might such a lie or venial sin, along with a great movement of piety, be sometimes more worth choosing, or are both together to be avoided? A proof of the latter seems to be that a venial sin is in no way to be chosen. A proof of the former seems to be that a venial sin will be destroyed in time and will not remain to eternity, either in this life or after this life. A great movement of piety, which has great merit, merits a great reward because it merits an eternal reward, or at any rate it merits some degree of reward that will be eternal. It does not seem that, because of any evil whatever which is not of itself eternal but temporal, something has to be omitted that is of itself cause in some way of an eternal good. - I dismiss this question.

42. However, about the midwives one can hold (relative to the issue at hand) that they only sinned venially, because their lie was altogether useful. And their movement of piety, even if other things would have been required for merit, would have been of great merit, so that the midwives would have merited eternal life and also temporal good, because at that time God rewarded his worshippers with temporal good.

43. To the one about Judith [n.5] it is said that she lied in nothing, because the exaggerated words she spoke to Holofernes she did not intend to direct to Holofernes but to God. And she was not necessarily bound to speak outwardly according to the intention of the recipient, but she could speak according to her own intention as a speaker. However, when speaking to a superior, to whom one is bound to reply in good faith, it is said that a speaker must reply to the intention of the questioner, so that by responding in that case through words that would have been false if directed to the intention or authority but true if directed to God, the speaker does not speak truly, for in that case it is not licit to address God.

44. But on this supposition [sc. that Judith spoke to her own intention not that of Holofernes] there seems nothing certain in human conversation, nor does anyone seem to have certainty about the conversation of his neighbor; at any rate no one seems to be lying whatever he says in the second person provided it could be made true by directing it to God. But if you are bound to speak truth to your superior (not to someone extraneous), by not saying the truth to him you could be disobedient; but when not saying it to someone extraneous you will not be disobedient. But it does not seem how this could be, if you are not lying or are a liar more to yourself than to him.

45. If those words [sc. of Judith] then, which are said there and seem to be excessive, cannot be saved in any other way, it does not seem a great inconvenience to concede that Judith told a lie useful to her race but pernicious to him whose death she intended. However the utility is preferred to the perniciousness because the good of the republic (which greatly worshipped God) is preferable to the temporal good of a private person (especially an infidel) -unless it be obvious to the latter that in fighting against anyone faith must be kept, so that the infidelity or lie of any Christian (in war even against the infidel) is condemned, though it is possible to use certain precautions of war that are not per se repugnant to truth nor include lies.

46. Also if Judith adorned herself with the intention that Holofernes be captivated by the sight of her, and this when wanting him to sin mortally with her, and ‘to want another to sin mortally’ is to sin mortally - it does not seem altogether certain that she guarded herself from every mortal sin. And so her deed is narrated in Scripture and recited in the Church as praiseworthy in regard to certain matters that there belonged to religion, although other things connected with them are not praised and not licit.

47. To the last one about pretense [n.6], I say that someone can pretend through some probable arguments, by assigning some good to be present in himself which is not present (as by genuflections and acts of adorations to pretend one has a devotion that one does not have), and such pretense is hypocrisy and a mortal sin.

48. But someone can pretend that evils are not present, either by showing signs opposite to those evils or by not showing signs that are accustomed commonly to follow those evils. And the first of these seems to pertain to hypocrisy, namely if some lascivious person, hearing talk about women, spits curses in sign of chastity, though he has the opposite in his heart. The second is not any reprehensible evil; rather to the extent it can be an evil it is praiseworthy, because it is blamable to preach in the way some are said to have done, “they preached their sin as Sodom and were not silent” [Isaiah 3.9]. For although there is evil inside in the heart, yet to add an evil sign outwardly is to add evil to evil.

49. But in indifferent matters one can do certain things that of their nature are signs of something. Someone else also can do things that are not of their nature signs, but he knows that they are conceived to be signs by those present. For instance, by the nature of the thing to sweat is a sign of fatigue or some bodily exhaustion; but to spit, so that saliva run down the beard, is not of its nature a sign of insanity of mind (for someone sound of mind can emit saliva so that it flows down the beard). Yet from the circumstances one can know that this is to be judged a sign of fury or madness (as that these are signs of madness in that country).

50. Generally, therefore, about the first and second pretenses [nn.47-48] I say that they are sins and that they are frequently mortal sins, because they are hypocrisy. The third pretense [n.48], provided another evil is not committed with it, is praiseworthy, so that a man not show one evil because of another evil. In indifferent matters the first pretense [n.49], if it existed in anyone, would perhaps be evil, but not by reason of the matter, that is, if someone could make himself sweat although he had not labored (in the way some comedians use their bodies for certain motions, signifying some dispositions that are not in them nor were there before). But the other pretense, which is the second one in indifferent matters [n.49], is no sin.

51. And such was the pretense of David [n.6]. The pretense of Jehu should not be excused, for beside the pretense, which perhaps could be excused, he added a lie, “My great sacrifice is for Baal” [IV Kings 10.19]. This lie, although by his intention it was in a way useful because destructive of the cult of Baal, yet it was of its nature pernicious: not only of its nature pernicious because it procured the death of others but also because, as concerned itself, it procured the cult of Baal. And although Jehu is commended for the destruction and persecution of the cult of Baal, yet he is blamed because he did not refrain from [worshipping] the calves of Jeroboam, nor was he a true worshipper of the God of Israel [ibid. 10.28-31]. .