C. Third Way, which is that of Henry of Ghent

1. Exposition of it

27. So in another way it is said that the distinction of hope from charity, though they perfect the same power, namely the will, is that hope is in the irascible part and charity in the concupiscible part, and that these parts are distinct not only in the sensitive appetite but also in the will.

28. The proof is fourfold:

First proof through the objects, as follows: the object of the concupiscible power is the good as pleasing, and the object of the irascible the good as hard: the pleasing good is what is desired by him who desires it because of its agreeability; the good as hard is something valuable or desirable for the sake of which the will desires to overcome all that is contrary. These two conditions, which do not belong to the same object under the same idea, belong to the good not only as it is conditioned here and now but belong to it simply; so they belong to the good not only as the good is an object of sense appetite (which is the good as it is here and now) but also as it is an object of will. Hence these two accidental conditions distinguish the irascible from the concupiscible not only in the sense appetite but also in the will.

29. Secondly, the same point is plain from acts, because ‘to be irate’ is an act of the irascible power alone; but it is possible to be irate not only through the passion that is in the sense appetite, but also through the passion that is in the will (Psalm 4.5, ‘Be angry and sin not’); therefore this act regards the will, and so it will be an irascible act.

30. The same point is proved, third, from comparison of diverse acts with each other; for when the concupiscible is resting in contemplation of something, the will sometimes also rises up to fight against the vices that impede contemplation, and this fighting impedes the contemplation. But no one and the same power has a per se act impeding itself in its own principal act; therefore the concupiscible power, which seeks to be delighted, does not oppose with an act of fighting what impedes it from its own delight; therefore it is another power.

31. The fourth is made clear through the diverse acts that belong to the irascible power in sense appetite, all which acts seem to be equally necessary in the will; therefore the same reason for positing the irascible power in the sense part is a reason for positing it in the will.

32. Added too is that “the concupiscible power is the principal power and the irascible is a certain force or energy in it.” “Just as all the passions of the irascible arise in the sense part from the passions of the concupiscible and terminate in them, so is it also in the will, since there too the irascible fights on behalf of the concupiscible.”

2. Rejection of it

33. Argument against this opinion.

And first against the first reasoning, which proceeds on the basis of the objects [n.28]. Since the point about ‘the difficult good’ can be understood well or badly, I ask what you mean by ‘difficult good’: whether an absent good, or not only absent but exceeding the faculty of the power for which it is said to be hard, or thirdly a valuable, that is desirable, good as it exceeds everything else that is contrary to it? If the first way then there will be no irascible power in the fatherland and consequently possession will not succeed to hope, for it would be necessary for possession to be in the same power as hope is if it is to succeed to it, and so it would have for object a difficult good that is absent, if this is how the word ‘difficult’ is to be understood - but this is false, for in the fatherland no desirable good will be absent. If in the second way then there would be no irascible power in God, for there is no object that is excessive for him; the consequent is false because if, in those who have hope, hope is a habit of the irascible part, then possession regards the same part; but it does not seem that God is to be denied possession with respect to himself. If in the third way, the object of hope is not rightly posited as ‘difficult’ in distinction from the object of charity, for charity most of all the virtues regards God under the idea of the valuable, because it regards him under the idea of the infinite good (On the Trinity 15.18).

34. Further, being valuable is understood of the object either actually or aptitudinally. If aptitudinally, because it is naturally apt to be thus valued, then this seems chiefly to belong to the object of charity, for - as was said [n.33] -charity most of all regards its object under the idea of infinite Good in itself. If actually, that is because the will does in fact thus value it, this valuing is badly assigned as the idea of the object of a power, for this actual valuing is because the will values the object in its act; so only this passive actual valuing is what is consequent in the act, but the formal idea of the object of any power necessarily naturally precedes the act of the power; but valuing cannot naturally be the idea of the object of a power or force.

35. Further, the act adequate to the irascible power is ‘to be irate’, just as the act adequate to the intellect is ‘to understand’; but being irate cannot have the difficult good for object, and cannot have it in any of the ways stated [n.33]. For according to the Philosopher in his Rhetoric 2.2.1378a31, ‘to be irate is to desire revenge or punishment’. This ‘desire’ takes for object either the punishment itself, or the one to be punished; neither is valuable; therefore the irascible power does not take the difficult good for object. - This argument disproves the second reason for the above position [n.29], for if ‘to be irate’ is an act of the irascible power [n.29], it follows that it is not distinguished from the concupiscible power by reason of a difficult good distinct from the pleasing good.

36. Against the third reason [n.30] the argument is that although what is of a nature to impede, through a positive act, the delight of any power must be subdued by some act that makes the power to enjoy in peace, yet what is not of a nature to impede save by way of privation does not need to be subdued positively but only privatively, namely by flight; now a vicious act does not positively attack the ordered delight of the concupiscible power, for the act that quasi-impedes the ordered act of the concupiscible power does not arise at the same time; therefore there is no need to subdue it save privatively, namely by fleeing it or preventing it happening. But fleeing the dishonorable belongs to that to which desiring the honorable belongs; therefore the concupiscible power is what subdues. - Besides, the concupiscible is posited as not fighting back or fighting for, because fighting back impedes delight [n.30], and yet later in the account it is said that the concupiscible power is defended by the irascible so that it is not perturbed in its delight; these two things seem to be opposites, namely that the power that does the fighting for impedes the concupiscible power and that it does not impede it but preserves it in its delight.

37. From this fact the fourth reason is refuted, which assigns these diverse acts to the irascible force [n.31]. It could also be argued that some of these acts do not belong to the irascible, at any rate in the sense part, which has no act about the future as future.

38. What is added in the first reason [n.28] - that the concupiscible power wants some good desired by the one desiring as advantageous for him - seems improbable, because the concupiscible is not denied existence in God as neither is the most perfect delight, and yet God does not desire anything as advantageous to him, because no other things are advantageous to him.

39. To this extent therefore, the doubt can be dismissed as to whether the irascible and concupiscible exist in the will (up to distinction 34, nn.48-50); and if they should be posited in the will, they seem to be posited because of the distinction between the moral virtues that perfect the will [d.34 n.51], and not because of the distinction between the theological virtues (namely hope and charity) as this opinion supposes [supra n.27].

40. Further, just as force presupposes power so object presupposes object; therefore the act of the force presupposes the act of the power about its object along with something added [infra nn. 90-99]; but such an addition is universally more noble (the point is evident in all acts that mutually add to each other); therefore if the irascible is the force and the concupiscible the power, the act of hope would be simply more noble than the act of charity, which is false.

3. What should be Said about the Rejection of the Third WayThis section is an extensive and somewhat fractured addition by Scotus to the basic text. ²

41. The first argument against Henry, about the arduous [nn.33-34], has a confirmation: if the excelling is a condition of the object of any supernatural virtue, then it specifies nothing; if the valuable is such a condition then it is so actually or habitually, so that the second argument is part of the first.

42. Again, the second argument of Henry, about being irate [n.29], is valid for a distinction of force, and it is not solved by saying that ‘to be irate is a certain not-wanting with respect to what impedes’ [n.35], and if the not-wanting is supreme (namely when it is known that what impedes cannot be removed), the sadness is supreme, and yet there is no anger.

43. I reply that just as wanting a thing for an end is not efficacious unless it follows knowledge about the possibility of attaining the end, so not-wanting an impediment is a sort of wanting the privation of a being relative to the end - nor is this not-wanting efficacious unless it follows knowledge of the possibility of attaining it; yet efficacious and non-efficacious wanting do not vary in species but only formally (as to the intention, perhaps, or as to the first knowledge of the possibility of attaining or not attaining).

44. On the contrary: he who is irate does not merely want (with an efficacious willing) the impediment to be removed but also wants the impediment to be punished, so that he does not rest in the ceasing of the impediment until the impediment is punished. The point is plain in the brutes: if what first impedes the delight of a withdraws, a does not rest until it exacts punishment; but if what impeded a was angry against some impediment, a was not angry, and then - when it withdraws - a does not pursue vengeance (namely crow with crow, crow with some third thing). As to what is supposed about ‘adequation’ [n.25], it seems false, because fear and hope are passions in the irascible; therefore not every passion in it is anger.

45. I reply that the first four passions [sadness, joy, hope, fear] can be about the delightful desirable and about an offense that needs to be avenged; these first four are in the concupiscible power and all others [love, desire, hatred, flight] in the irascible [Aquinas De Veritate q.26 a.5]. And just as the first four are about an object, namely the delightful, that is adequate to the concupiscible power, yet ‘to be apprehended in diverse ways’ is lacking in the present in the case of the future, so the four others are about an offense to be avenged that is apprehended as being now or as after having been avenged, but not as something to be angry against. So what is intended there [n.25] by the object is true.

46. However the premises given there for the adequate object [n.35] are not true. For although ‘to hope’ belongs in a way to anger, because it is a sort of efficacious will to avenge, yet ‘to fear failure to avenge’ is not a sort of anger, because it draws one away from avenging.

47. I reply that ‘to fear failure to avenge’ is a sort of ‘not-wanting not to avenge’, just as ‘to hope’ is a sort of ‘wanting to avenge’ and a certain pain in not getting it. Say that to be pained at this or that in the present is not formally to be irate but is a different passion, though consequent to anger, just as fear and excitement in the concupiscible are not formally to desire but they are different passions arising from the concupiscible. Therefore both forces or energies - both of the irascible and the concupiscible - do not get their names from an adequate passion but from the most principal passion. The point is plain about fear because when something hurtful is apprehended as future the concupiscible fears it, and from this pain [of fear] anger arises against what is bringing the harm, and command is given to subdue it; and in this way anger prevents the pain of a present harm and preserves one from it. But if the irascible is afraid to subdue it, supposing its fear is great, it does not subdue it, and pain arises because the harmful thing happens.

48. Similarly the first hope can exist without the second hope, if nothing is apprehended as impeding the object of the first hope.

49. Note: hope in the irascible lessens fear and pain in the concupiscible; but perfect fear in the irascible, or the pain of it, increases pain in the concupiscible. Hence there is supreme pain in the appetite when it is suffering a supreme present harm and despairs of being able to repel the harm.

50. Note to this [n.49]: the first part is perhaps true, the second false; for although an animal or the appetite feels perhaps more pain when it is pained in both forces, yet one diminishes the other since they are compossible.

51. The second arises from the first; an effect does not diminish the cause; therefore neither part is false when speaking properly as to the intensity of the forces - and both are true of the appetite as to extension.

52. Henry’s third reason is not well argued against above [n.36], because just as we fight in order to have peace, so the will fights against inordinate motions then arising in order that afterwards it may more agreeably and peaceably be at leisure for contemplation; therefore, at the time when the irascible is fighting, it impedes delight in the concupiscible, but the quiet that will follow is intensified. So Henry does not contradict himself when he says that it impedes the concupiscible from delight and that it fights in order to enjoy quietly (supply: afterwards, when victory is gained).

53. What the opinion of Henry says about power and force [n.31] is not well refuted [n.40] because it may be expounded thus: the concupiscible is more principle and the irascible less principle, because the latter is always about a being relative to the end in respect of the concupiscible; therefore the power gets its name (supply: of concupiscible rather than irascible) because of the principal part, though both belong to the same power.

54. On the contrary: then the power, as it is a power, cannot issue in an act immediately but only through one of its forces.

55. Again, not everything that has the concupiscible can do an act of the irascible but conversely; therefore the irascible is nobler according to the final argument [n.40] that rejects the opinion, because object adds to object as act adds to act.

56. My response here: where the irascible exists it does so because of the nobility of the concupiscible, whose being at rest nature was principally aiming at; where the irascible does not exist, nature does not care for it. The same about the resting of the concupiscible; that is why the argument [n.40] denied the irascible.

57. An argument for the opinion: hope is a passion in the irascible of the sense part; therefore hope is a virtue in the irascible of the will.

58. I reply: the consequence does not hold, because hope is passion as a sort of beginning of fortitude, which is in the irascible. Hope the virtue is for the act for which there is an efficacious desire of advantage, consequent to the apprehension of it, under the idea of reward for merit from someone, because ‘to desire’ means ‘to expect’; therefore it is in the concupiscible of the will. But that whereby the will subdues something is not hope, for it would not then have God for object, but the subduable; but the habit that corresponds to the second passion of hope is the virtue of fortitude.

59. On the contrary: every idea in the object, because of which the concupiscible is of a nature to draw back from what is desired, requires a perfection in the irascible fortifying the concupiscible so that it not draw back; of this sort is the excellence of the desired object and not just an impeding object; therefore perfection of the irascible is required because of the excellence of the object and not only because of something that offends.

60. The major is denied, because the adequate object of the irascible is what is to be avenged; therefore it is not the excellence of it.

61. To the contrary: the irascible is what per se strengthens the concupiscible; therefore it strengthens it in everything in which the concupiscible can fail and draw back.

62. I reply: the irascible is what per se strengthens as concerns the things that agree with fortitude (namely to confront and to withstand), but it does not fortify as to intrinsic degree; and therefore as to the defect that comes from drawing back from an excelling object, it comes from this; for because it is not raised higher, the object is excelling; therefore it is raised higher by an intrinsic habit so that it may be proportioned.

63. On the contrary: the concupiscible draws back from the hurtful because of its own imperfection, for if it were more perfect it would rise up; therefore the irascible is not required in it.

64. I reply: the concupiscible - however perfect it is - can withdraw from the hurtful, and it would not rise up against but only flee the hurtful; to flee is not to repel; therefore etc. But it would not have an excelling object above it in this respect, while the idea of the concupiscible stands in the object. And also it can desire in actual fact and, however much the act varies as to greater and lesser object, no other force is required but only perfection in the concupiscible. So it is in the case of the arduous, because the arduous, as arduous, is something to be desired; but a power, in order to be proportioned to the arduous so as to desire it perfectly (which is ‘to hope’), and so as to become proportioned by an intrinsic habit for overcoming impediments, embraces the whole objective idea in question as well as the acts that are operative about an impeding object. So by reason of this something else there is another force there.

65. Another response to the argument [n.59]: the major is true properly speaking about ‘draw back’, but it is never in fact so unless the reason for drawing back is something non-desirable; but the arduous is not such; rather the arduous has a special idea of being lovable; that which offends is something non-lovable.

66. The minor is false, although this proposition is true ‘a power tends of itself non-perfectly to the excelling’; for it is one thing to be disposed to tending perfectly toward it and another to drawing back; indeed drawing back presupposes an elevated power (as the cognitive power draws back from an ugly thing seen, and so hates it).

67. Again, it does not draw back by conditioned volition but by efficacious volition; but efficacious volition belongs to the same thing as conditioned willing does. Likewise no difference as to display of the possible and of the not possible is there required.

68. Again, if the irascible regards the arduous, since nothing is arduous for God, there is no irascible in him - which is false because he desires to avenge and does avenge.

69. Again if the irascible strengthens the concupiscible so that it not fear, then since it belongs to the same thing to be afraid and to be confident, the irascible makes the concupiscible confident. The consequent is false, both because confidence belongs only to the irascible and because a passion is not caused in the irascible by the concupiscible but conversely.

70. I reply that the concupiscible never fears because ‘to fear’ regards the arduous.

71. To the contrary: ‘to fear to lose’ is one thing, and ‘to fear to avenge offenses’ is another, because the first fear can be without the second. Example: let grace be apprehended as capable of being lost by the wayfarer; he fears to lose it; he does not then fear the devil taking it away, against whom he may be angry or fear to vanquish.

72. Again, from what passion of the concupiscible does anger against a future offense arise, namely against one about to take away the desirable? Surely from the fear of losing it?

73. Besides, some passion follows the apprehension of a future evil in the concupiscible, as pain follows the apprehension of a present evil. What is the passion that regards the future?

74. Again, pain and joy are in the irascible and, according to you [n.45], hope and fear. Why then cannot all the passions that concern the delightful be just like those that concern the arduous or offensive?

75. I reply: flight.

76. To the contrary: flight follows pain and the passion.

77. Nor is it a passion, because it does not come from the object.

78. If the irascible alone fears, then the concupiscible, if it were alone, would never draw back, because it does not draw back from the delightful as delightful; rather the delightful would thus not inhere as arduous, because it does not thus have any act about the arduous, because it is not its object; therefore the irascible is not required for strengthening the concupiscible.

79. I reply: the concupiscible draws back though it does not fear, because the arduous is proportioned to it in this way. And when it is said that it has no act about the arduous [n.78], I concede that it has none by way of tending toward it but does by way of drawing back from it.

80. Again, that the love of advantage and the love of justice are as it were two powers (and likewise about the irascible and concupiscible) is proved thus: that is not formally a power for any action with which, when possessed, an impossibility for that action can stand without repugnance, and this impossibility is an intrinsic one (‘intrinsic’ is added because of objections about impediments, [n.36]); but when the power or force for willing advantage is possessed, there can stand with it such an impossibility for willing what is just (likewise about desiring and being irate); therefore etc.

81. Proof of the minor [n.80]: the intellective appetite is, as such, a power for advantage; but along with it, as such, non-freedom stands without repugnance, for a prior can stand with the opposite of a posterior. These two things, ‘being an appetite’ and ‘being an appetite of such sort of cognitive power’, by nature precede the idea of freedom; and further, an impossibility for willing what is just stands along with what non-liberty stands along with. A confirmation: freedom is not the idea under which the intellective appetite per se desires known advantages, both because it would desire them even if it were without freedom, and because the will is naturally most prone to desire the greatest advantages; but freedom moderates this proneness so that we do not will immoderately; therefore freedom is not the idea in the will by which it desires advantage - on the contrary freedom is rather sometimes a sort of restraint.

82. All this is confirmed by Anselm De Casu Diaboli 12-16 about the will informed with love of advantage, if it were immoderately to desire advantageous things to be just it could not sin. If this separation of justice from the will were to involve a contradiction, Anselm’s position would be null not only in fact but also in understanding; nor could Anselm show what would belong to a will without freedom, because of the contradiction involved.

83. The minor about concupiscence and anger [n.80] is similarly proved, for whence does the appetite have its force of desiring? Not from the irascible unless it is posterior to the irascible; therefore the prior stands with the opposite of the posterior [n.81].

84. This argument [nn.80-83] could be common to many things. Therefore I reply to the major, ‘that is not formally a power for any action with which, when possessed, etc. [n.80]’; I concede it is not really a power, that is, the thing or nature is not a power. Then the minor [n.80] is false; and what is proved is only that a single idea is sufficient in itself for this and not for that, and so the idea can stand in the intellect with the opposite of the thing; but both are necessary in the one thing.

85. Note that second hope [nn.47-49] is a sort of beginning of fortitude, because things ‘naturally fitted for the mean’ are well adapted for regulating the passion and so for fortitude; second fear is a sort of beginning of the timidity of vice, hence someone naturally fitted for hope is naturally fitted for fear; for he who is naturally fitted for hope is disposed to audacity, and yet another to timidity. Second hope and fear are set down as concerned with avenging, which are passions of the irascible concerned with bearing up, since patience is a sort of fortitude and is in the irascible.

86. I reply: patience is constancy, and there is inconstancy.

87. If you say that no bearing up is disagreeable to the sense appetite save by command of reason -

88. On the contrary: a brute puts up with a moderate grief so as not to lose a great enjoyment.