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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 3. Distinctions 26 - 40.
Book 3. Distinctions 26 - 40
Twenty Sixth Distinction
Single Question. Whether Hope is a Theological Virtue distinct from Faith and Charity
I. Various Possible Solutions
A. First Way
2. What should be Said about this Sort of Way.

2. What should be Said about this Sort of Way.

12. If one holds this conclusion [n.9], one could say that hope in some way combines in itself two virtues, namely faith and charity; for the act of hope which is expectation [Lombard: ‘hope is the certain expectation of future blessedness’], includes certainty, and this certainty belongs to faith in the intellect, and it includes desire, which pertains to the will; and if so, meritorious desire pertains to charity, which perfects the will. Just as, then, perfect and meritorious expectation includes the certainty of the intellect and the desire of an ordered will, so hope, as a perfect virtue, would be said to include, by a certain combination, both faith and charity; and accordingly hope would not be posited as a third virtue simply but only formally, because it combines two virtualities in itself each of which is a perfect virtue, while hope is not, save formally by the formality of combination.

13. However the desire for what is not possessed can be present in the will without charity; also the whole act of hope, and even hope itself in itself, can be unformed, and so it agrees more with faith than with charity. Therefore it seems better to posit that hope, to the extent it is not a different virtue, agrees with faith, because a habit does not have a different form for universal and particular, as is clear in the case of all the intellectual habits; but faith regards the universal, because by faith I hold that ‘every finally just man is to be saved’, and hope regards the particular, because by hope I hold that ‘I as finally just am to be saved’; therefore the habit is not formally different in the two cases.

14. There is a confirmation, that someone who despairs is not said to hate but to be deceived; and therefore persuasion makes him love and desire, because he would very well desire it if he believed it was attainable by him.

15. Accordingly one would say that faith in all the revealed articles, to whomever the articles pertain and at whatever hour, is true and universal faith.1

16. Further too faith is rather in a way particular faith, because it is about revelations pertaining to him who has faith, and only about things pertaining to the future. Nor does this specification vary the habit, just as neither does it do so with other intellectual habits, but the habit is the same, and possesses a certain specification on the part of the object.

17. So no third habit or virtue is posited, but faith as to certain things, namely future things belonging to the believing person, is called hope, although faith does extend itself to the person believing and to other things.

18. But if it be said that futurity in the object varies and so distinguishes faith from the other virtues, there is objection against this:

20. First that the same habit is universal and particular, as is plain in all intellectual habits; so just as there is faith about ‘everyone finally just will be saved’, so there will be faith about ‘I, if I am finally just, will be saved’.

20. Second, that if futurity were the formal idea of an object, then hope would not be a theological virtue, for it would not concern something eternal as object but something temporal, for temporality would be the formal idea of the object.

21. Third, if futurity requires its own object, by parity of reasoning so would pastness, and so there will not be the same habit of faith about the past and the future.

22. Anyone who holds this way [of understanding hope] could say that, just as there are in the soul two powers, namely intellect and will, of a nature to attain God under the idea of object (and that by acts proper to those powers), so each power is sufficiently perfected by a single habit in respect of that object; and thus, just as the intellect is sufficiently perfected in respect of that object by the habit of faith, so the will likewise is sufficiently disposed in respect of the same object by the habit of charity, and the following statements about hope will be preserved: either that it is a third habit, including the other two by combination; or (which is more probable) that it is a certain particular faith respecting future goods to be attained by the person, and that to this extent it is distinguished from faith absolutely taken, which has regard to all persons generally and all articles of faith at any time whatever.

23. This way is not satisfactory, because it seems to oppose the authorities of the saints, which rely on the words of St. Paul (I Corinthians 13, nn.7-8).