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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 3. Distinctions 1 - 17.
Book 3. Distinctions 1 - 17
Third Distinction
Question One. Whether the Blessed Virgin was Conceived in Original Sin
I. To the Question
A. The Common Opinion

A. The Common Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

14. The common statement is, yes [that Mary was conceived in original sin], because of the authorities taken up, and because of arguments from two middle terms:38

One of these is the excellence of the Son himself;39 for, as universal redeemer, he opened the door for everyone; but if blessed Mary had not contracted original sin she would not have needed a redeemer and her Son would not have opened the door for her, because it would not have been closed to her (for it is only closed because of sin, and especially original sin).a

a.a [Interpolation] Again Augustine in book 1 on the baptism of infants [On the Merits of Sinners 1.29 n.57] says, “Only Christ was born without sin [whom the Virgin conceived without male embrace].” Again in book 2 [ibid., 2.29 n.47] the same Augustine says that the barrier came through sin, and because of it men were excluded from the entrance of the heavenly fatherland, and the door was opened by the passion of Christ; therefore the blessed Virgin, if she had been without sin and had died before the passion of her Son, would have entered heaven, and so the door would not have been opened for all by Christ; consequently the blessed Virgin would not have needed the redemption of her Son.

15. The second middle term comes from what is evident in the blessed Virgin:40 For she was propagated according to the common law and consequently her body was propagated by and formed from infected seed - and so the same idea of infection was in her body as is also in the body of anyone else propagated from the origin; and since the soul is infected by the infected body, the same idea of infection was in her soul as is also in the souls of others commonly propagated.

16. Likewise, she had the penalties common to human nature (as thirst, hunger, and the like), which are inflicted on us because of original sin;41 and these were not voluntarily taken up by her, because she was not our redeemer and repairer, for then her Son would not have been the general redeemer of all; therefore, they were inflicted on her by God - and not unjustly inflicted; therefore they were inflicted after sin, and thus she was not innocent.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

a. Against the First Reason

17. Against the first reason [n.14] the argument that she did not contract original sin is taken from the excellence of her Son - insofar as he was redeemer, reconciler, and mediator.

For the most perfect mediator has the most perfect act of mediating possible with respect to some person for whom he mediates; therefore Christ had the most perfect degree of mediating possible with respect to some person with respect to whom he was mediator; but with respect to no person did he have a more excellent degree than with respect to Mary; therefore etc.

18. But this would not be the case unless he had merited to preserve her from original sin. I prove it in three ways: first in comparison to God to whom he reconciles; second in comparison to the evil from which he liberates; third by comparison to the obligation of the person whom he reconciled.

19. [In comparison to God to whom he reconciles] - To see the first proof I set down an example in agreement with Anselm’s example in Why God Man 2.16: someone, when offending a king, injures the king so much that the king is offended in all the person’s natural sons and, being offended, disinherits him [and them] etc.; this offence is set down as not to be remitted unless someone innocent offers to the king some obedience that placates and pleases the king more than the sin was offensive to him; someone does offer an obedience thus pleasing, and reconciles the sons to the king so that they are not disinherited; yet the king is offended in each son, although he afterwards remits the offense because of the merits of the mediator. But if the mediator could supremely and most perfectly please the king, he would anticipate the king with respect to some son such that the king would not be offended in that son - for this would be greater than if the king remits now to the son an offense held against him; nor is this impossible, since the offense does not come from the son’s own guilt but was contracted from another.

20. From this example the argument goes as follows: no one supremely or most perfectly placates someone for someone’s contracting an offense unless he can prevent that someone from being offended in the other, for if he placates him so as to remit the offense when he is already offended, he does not most perfectly placate him; and indeed in the issue at hand God is not offended in the soul because of an interior motion in God himself, but only because of guilt in that very soul; therefore Christ does not most perfectly placate the Trinity for Adam’s sons contracting guilt if he does not prevent the Trinity from being offended in someone and if the soul of some son of Adam does not have such guilt - and consequently some soul of some son of Adam does not have such guilt, or it is possible that he not have the guilt.

21. [In comparison to the evil from which he liberates] - In the second way the argument is twofold:

First, because the most perfect mediator merits the removal of all punishment from him whom he reconciles; but original guilt is a greater punishment than the lack itself of the divine vision, as was made clear in 2 d.36 nn.170-173, because sin is for an intellectual nature the greatest of all its punishments; therefore if Christ has most perfectly reconciled us to God, he merited to take away from someone this gravest of punishments - but not from anyone but his Mother, therefore etc. This is confirmed by the example, because if the greatest punishment for a son of Adam were that the king was offended in him, no one would most perfectly reconcile him unless he took away from him not only his being disinherited but also his being an enemy of the king’s, etc.

22. In this same second way the argument proceeds secondly as follows: Christ seems more immediately to have been our repairer and reconciler from original sin than from actual sin, because the necessity for the incarnation and passion of Christ is commonly assigned to original sin [Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard of Middleton]; but it is commonly supposed [Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise (Innocent V), Richard of Middleton] that Christ was a very perfect mediator of some person, to wit Mary, because he preserved her from all actual sin; therefore, similarly, he preserved her from original sin.

23. [In comparison to the obligation of the person whom he reconciled] - In the third way I argue as follows: a reconciled person is not supremely obliged to a mediator unless he have from him the highest good that can be had from him; but the innocence in question, namely preservation from contracted sin or from contracting sin, can be had through the mediator; therefore no person will be supremely bound to Christ as mediator if Christ preserved no one from original sin.

24. And if you say that a person to whom sin is remitted is [not?] equally as much bound as a person who is preserved from sin, because of the saying of Luke 7.47, ‘He who is forgiven more loves more’ - look at the response there of Augustine,42 that all non-committed sins are dismissed as if they were committed sins; indeed, it is a more excellent kindness to preserve from evil than to allow to fall into evil and to liberate from it afterwards.

25. It seems too that, when Christ merited grace and glory for many souls, and when these souls are debtors to Christ for grace and glory as to their mediator, why will there be no soul a debtor to him for innocence? And why, although all the blessed angels are innocent, will no human soul in the fatherland be innocent save Christ’s soul alone?

b. Against the Second Reason

26. The second reason [n.15], which was taken from what is evident in Mary, does not seem conclusive:

For what is argued first, about infection of the flesh on account of begetting from seed, does not proceed according to Anselm’s way of original sin, as was touched on in 2. d.30 nn.30-32, 48-67 [Anselm holds that original sin is lack of owed original justice]. Or, given that commonly original sin is thus contracted [sc. from infection of flesh, as held by Lombard et al.], yet the infection of flesh - which remains after baptism - is not a necessary cause that original sin remain in the soul but, while the infection remains, original sin is destroyed because of the grace conferred on the soul; thus God could destroy the infection in the first instance of the Virgin’s conception by then giving her grace, so that there would be no necessary cause of infection in her soul but grace would take away the guilt in her soul.

27. The other point, about the sufferings of Mary [n.16], is not conclusive; for the mediator can so reconcile someone that penalties useless to him are taken away from him and he is left in penalties useful to him; original guilt would not have been useful to Mary; temporal penalties were useful to her, because in them she earned merit; therefore etc.