III. To the Arguments of Henry of Ghent

A. As to the First Article

41. To the arguments for the opinion.

As to the first [n.10], it is plain that it fails in many ways, both because the object does not necessarily move the created intellect, and because - even if it did - the will would not necessarily enjoy, and especially if the will not necessarily have the supernatural habit wherewith to enjoy.

42. To the other argument [n.12], about essence and powers, I say that a creature cannot be beatified in itself, because it is not the infinite good; but it is beatified in the infinite good as in the object that is attained by the operations of its powers, and not in the way that such good is the perfecter of the creature’s essence as to first act; for the following reason, therefore, does the beatitude of the power redound to the essence, that beatitude, when it is in the power, is in the essence as it is of a nature to be in the essence, because the redounding is there mediately and not formally, as if there were there a beatitude different from the one in the powers. Therefore I say that the essence cannot be beatified as it is distinct from the powers, and consequently neither can its beatitude redound to the powers as it is distinct from the powers.

43. And when the reason is confirmed on the ground that beatitude is in the essence first [n.13], the opposite of this was proved in 2 d.26 nn.15-23. - And when you prove that beatitude is something supreme in the soul [n.13], I say that if it is altogether the same as the powers themselves then there is no order of supremacy in the thing; but if beatitude [in the soul] is in some way the foundation of the powers, then although it is supreme by reason of first act, yet it is not of a nature to have a supreme second act, nor consequently of a nature to attain a supreme extrinsic object save by mediation of the power, because the supreme object is only attained by operation of the power. Beatitude then, it is true, is in what is supreme as it is of a nature to be in it; but it is not of a nature to be in the essence save by mediation of the power.

44. And if you argue that beatitude falls into the essence and therefore into the powers, and so it is in the powers by mediation of the essence, I reply and say that this is true as to first act, as to giving being to the powers; for whatever is in the assumed human nature depends in some way on the being of the Word, but there is no need that, in order to give supernatural operation, [beatitude] fall into the power by mediation of the essence.

B. As to the Second Article

45. Hereby is clear the answer to the argument [n.24] adduced for the second article, that just as there is truly a special in-falling as to being, whereby namely the being of the Word is communicated to the created nature, so there is necessarily a special infalling whereby namely the Word could operate as to the operations of that nature (in the way that, as the Word could be said to be fire if he had assumed the nature of fire, so he could be said to heat with the heat of fire); but there is no need that there be an in-falling as to operations repugnant to that nature, as are the beatific operations, such as to understand and to will [sc. the beatific object], in the way that God, by a general infalling, falls into any creature as to the being and operation fitting to that creature but not to any operation not fitting to it or exceeding it.