Appendix B

[Note by Duns Scotus]The Vatican editors say about this note, which seems out of place where it is added, that it was written by Scotus on pieces of paper some of which were lost. So what remains is partial. ²¹ To the third [see Appendix A above] one can well say that an absolute can terminate a relation, and an absolute always does terminate in the case of relations in the mode of measure [sc. the relation of measured to measure], and this principally, as is sufficiently maintained in 1 d.30 nn.30-34, because the relations of creatures are terminated at God insofar as he is absolute; but, speaking universally [cf. ibid. n.35], one should not concede that the term of a relation is an absolute save in unlike relations, about which the argument is there [ibid. nn.35-38], namely relations that are in the genus of quality (and divine relations are not of this sort), or about the formal term (namely by reason of which the first term terminates), but not about the first term; for just as the foundation in the relatum is absolute but not always that which is related (according to this opinion [sc. Scotus’ own, about constitutive absolutes, 1 d.26 nn.57, 59, 72]), so too that which is the reason for terminating a relation is always absolute, and this is pre-required on the part of the relative term the way the foundation is required on the part of a created substance.

...The Vatican editors say that there were probably before this, but now lost, three confirmations about some statement or argument, since Scotus next immediately responds to the two final confirmations. Most likely these confirmations were drawn from Rep. IA d.26 nn.45-58, 77-82. ²²

Using the same pointNamely the point made in response to a preceding confirmation, now lost. ²³ one can reply to the next confirmation, whereby it is inferred that ‘the identity of a created substance with its supposit would be truer than the identity of the divine nature with its supposit’ [cf. Rep. IA d.26 nn.45, 79-80]; this does not follow if it is understood on the part of the thing, because although individual entity in a creature per se determines the nature and makes something per se one with it, yet that something one is a composite with some composition, even real composition; but a relation, although it does not per se determine the divine nature, is yet so truly the same as it that no composition arises in it. And therefore, speaking really or metaphysically, the identity of the divine supposit is much truer, both in itself and with the nature, than the identity of a created supposit is in itself or with its nature; but speaking logically, one can well concede that a created substance is more formally predicated of its supposit (because it is predicated in the first mode of per se), but not so is ‘God’ predicated of the Father, because ‘Father’ does not have a concept in the intellect that is as per se one as ‘Socrates’ is. - If you infer, ‘therefore the latter predication is truer than the former’, the consequence can be denied, because some less formal predication, or one that is not as per se, can be truer than some more formal and per se predication; but there is a greater identity in reality in the case of extremes that have a lesser or less formal inclination or inherence conceptually.

As to the last confirmation, one can concede as a matter of logic that of neither quiddity is there a per se supposit; in reality, however, the supposit is supposit of the nature, not of the relation, because relation there is an incommunicable property while the nature is not [Rep. IA d.26 nn.48, 81-82]. Similarly, relation passes over into the essence and not conversely, because of the infinity of the essence.

To the fourth [Rep. IA d.26 n.60, the fourth after those in nn.45, 51, 52]. Primary substance in creatures does have something of perfection to it, namely final unity (and so it is indivisible), and this is consequent to final actuality, and because of this ‘per se existence’ belongs to it; two opposites come together in secondary substance, which is both divisible and does not have ‘per se existence’ save in primary substance. These conditions of primary substance the divine essence has of itself and not formally by relation; for the essence is of itself a ‘this’ and it per se subsists, or at least it is the whole reason for subsisting, according to Augustine On the Trinity 7.6 n.11, who says that the Father is not Father by that by which he is God. In addition to this, created primary substance -because it is limited - has incommunicabilitiy, because the numerically same limited thing is not communicable; and this property does not state perfection, and so this property of primary substance does not belong to the divine essence.

Hereby is plain the response to the first argument touched on there [Ord. 1 d.26 n.60], because I concede that primary substance in divine reality, as to its being ‘most of all substance and per se subsistent’, is not constituted formally by relation, but divinity or ‘this God’ is that by which it is most of all substance and subsists.

Likewise to the second [Ord. 1 d.26 n.60] I say that the proposition ‘primary substance does not include non-substance’ is true, because of the conditions of perfection that belong to it - and so, wherever these conditions are preserved, the thing will not exist through non-substance. But as to something where this condition cannot exist through substance, which is a condition of imperfection, namely incommunicability (unlike what is posited in God, where everything that is a ‘for himself’ is posited as a perfection simply and so as communicable), there primary substance - as concerns its having this condition [sc. incommunicability] - must include non-substance.

To the third argument there touched on [Ord. 1 d.26 n.62] my reply is that paternity and this incommunicable paternity - whatever may be true of them conceptually - are in reality altogether the same, so that there is no distinction, whether real or formal, between them; and therefore that reality, in the first instant it is or burgeons in the essence, exists there under the idea of the ultimate determination possible for it. So, because determination to incommunicability is not repugnant to relation, therefore it is not only quiddity and ‘this’ but also incommunicable, and it is not at all in reality a ‘this’ before it is incommunicable; but ‘this deity’ is communicable, so that, according to this opinion [sc. the one which says the persons are constituted by relations], it is repugnant for ‘this deity’ to be incommunicable through something of its genus as it were. Therefore I deny the inference, ‘in relation there is quiddity, and this is incommunicable insofar as it is relation, therefore these cannot be found in what is for itself’, because the last one [incommunicability] is repugnant to anything that is ‘for itself’; in God, according to this opinion, incommunicability is not repugnant to relation, and therefore relation immediately has it.

To the fourth there touched on [Ord. 1 d.26 n.63]: ‘per se existence’ is conceded to ‘this essence’ or to God ‘as he is God’, but not a ‘per se existence’ by which formally something is incommunicably per se; and this latter does belong to a created person on the grounds of his limitation, because of which he is incommunicable both as ‘what’ and as ‘in which’ (this double incommunicability was spoken about in 1 d.23 n.16). It is true, then, that created substance has ‘per se existence’ and not per accidens existence, and this belongs to the substance on the grounds of its perfection - but that a created substance cannot communicate this ‘per se existence’ to anything in which it is, this is a mark of limitation. I concede here, then, that [the divine] essence is determined of itself to ‘per se existence’ (whether as to ‘what’ or as to ‘in what’), but that, along with this, it is communicable to a relative person, as being that in which the relative person has the same ‘per se existence’.

To the arguments about the fourth way [Ord. 1 d.26 nn.53-55]

To the first, from Augustine [ibid. n.53], I reply that Augustine there (On the Trinity 7.4 n.7) is saying how ‘one essence’ is spoken about, and how ‘three substances’ is said by the Greeks and ‘three persons’ by the Latins;“By our Greeks ‘one essence, three substances’ is said, but by the Latins ‘one essence or substance, three persons’, because...in our speech, that is in Latin, ‘essence’ is not usually understood differently from ‘substance’.” ²⁴ and in the text from 7.4 n.9 there adduced [Ord. 1 d.26 n.54], he says that ‘substance exists for itself’,“But it is absurd for substance to be said relatively; for every thing subsists for itself. How much more God!” ²⁵ and that ‘three substances are not properly spoken of, because substance (as is conceded in the case of divine reality) exists for itself’,On the Trinity 7.5 n.10, “However, whether essence is said (which is what is properly said) or substance (which is abusively said), both are said ‘for itself’ and not relatively to anything. Hence for God to exist is for him to subsist; and therefore if the Trinity is one essence, it is also one substance.” ²⁶ and he is taking essence and substance to be the same. Therefore he says, “one should not say ‘there are three substances’, so as not to say ‘three essences’.” Therefore he himself is not intending that substance as the Greeks take it (namely as person) exist for itself, but that he himself is not conceding that there are three substances properly, but he is only using the phrase because of necessity of speech;Ibid., 7.6 n.11, “The Greeks have preferred to say this (namely ‘three substances’), which is perhaps the more fitting expression in the custom of their speech.” ²⁷ hence he seems to prefer the Latin way of speaking, that there are ‘three persons’;Ibid., 7.5 n.10, “Perhaps therefore ‘three persons’ is a more suitable expression than ‘three substances’.” ²⁸ but this too he proves subsequently not to be proper, showing that ‘person’ is said simply ‘for itself’ as essence is.Ibid., 7.6 n.11, “For it is not one thing to be God and another to be person, but altogether the same thing. Indeed ‘person’ is said for itself.just as God is said for itself.” ²⁹ Finally, then, he draws his conclusion from this material [7.6 n.11], “We want some single word to serve for signifying what is meant by the Trinity, so that we may not be altogether silent when asked ‘three what?’” And whether ‘three persons’ is said by the Latins or ‘three substances’ by the Greeks, Augustine would say that this is said improperly and only because of the necessity of speaking. - One cannot, therefore, get from his intention that some term, signifying ‘incommunicable subsistence’ in divine reality, is for itself, but only that the names (which some adapt for expressing such an incommunicable) are in themselves absolute names, indeed are purely absolute, so that they are essentials. But one ought to have got the first point from him [sc. just above, ‘that some term.. .is for itself’] in order to get the proposed conclusion for the third opinion [sc. about absolutes, Ord. 1 d.26 n.56] in this question (which posits that in reality ‘this incommunicable subsistent’ is for itself [ibid. nn.59, 62]), and not merely that it can be expressed by some essential name, accommodated to the purpose from usage or the need to speak.

Hereby is response made to everything adduced from Augustine for this opinion [ibid., nn.54, 73-75].

To the third argument, from Richard and Boethius [ibid., n.55] the response is that just as something quidditatively common can be abstracted from an absolute and a relative - speaking of them quidditatively - , so also is something common abstracted from such and such an incommunicable, and this common thing is of itself neither an incommunicable absolute nor an incommunicable relative; something like this is described by Richard and Boethius, with this addition, that it is in an intellectual nature, so that, just as the description of a higher should not include the proper idea of something lower, so too the description of person - which states an incommunicable in intellectual nature - should not include anything that properly pertains either to an incommunicable absolute or to an incommunicable relative, but should be indifferent to both; and in this way do both describe person. I concede therefore that neither in the definition of person assigned by Richard nor in that assigned by Boethius is anything relative posited; and so I concede that there is given to person - as it is defined -neither absolute being nor relative being but something indifferent to both, so that, just as in the case of some nature (as in that of a creature) the idea is only in particular found in an absolute or in the idea of an absolute, so in the case of the divine nature it is only found in a relative.