II. To the Principal Arguments when Holding to the Negative Side of the Question

149. To the first argument [n.133] I say that a proportion of agreement is not required for this union, but the proportion of dependent nature to independent supposit is, and this sort of proporition is perhaps not in a created nature to a created supposit but is in an uncreated supposit. And as to the confirmation about the absolute in created nature, I say that absoluteness does not make the instantiation but only the fact that the person is independent, not being of a nature to be act or potency with respect to another unitable thing - which would not be the way it is here.

150. To the next [n.134] I say that although both opposites are limited, yet they cannot both be in the same thing at the same time; even if this does not entail unlimitedness in them formally, nevertheless it does entail incompossibility; so if one nature - existing per se in a supposit - is repugnant to another nature which may be there per accidens, then these two cannot at the same time come to be because of their incompossibility, but not because of the fact that they are unlimited.

151. To the third [n.153] I say that not every superior contains the perfection of an inferior.