[Appendix] Twenty Third Distinction

Single Question. Whether Infused Faith must be posited for Matters Revealed to us for Belief

Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d.23 q. 2, a.1
Scotus, 3 Sent. d.23 q.1
Thomas, ST IIaIIae q.6 a.1
Richard of St. Victor, 3 Sent. d.23 q.2
Durandus, 3 Sent. d.23 q.2

1. About the twenty third distinction the question asked is whether infused faith is necessary for us.

2. That it is not:

We can attain by acquired faith every act of believing we have about revealed matters of belief; therefore infused faith is not necessary. The consequence is plain because habits are only put in place by acts. The proof of the antecedent is plain, because a heretic sometimes believes articles of faith that he is in error about as firmly as one of the faithful does, and would expose himself to death on their behalf; and yet he does not have infused faith, as is plain from the fact he is a heretic, and especially if he was born among heretics such that he was never one of the faithful nor baptized.

3. Again a habit, which we cannot acquire by our own proper power from purely natural resources (of which sort is every infused act, otherwise it would be vain to infuse it), is more perfect than any acquired habit; for a result of its perfection is that we cannot acquire it of ourselves. But to a more perfect habit corresponds a more perfect act, for habit comes through act; now we can naturally acquire the habit of principles, which is intellect, and of conclusions, which is science; therefore if we posit infused faith, the act of belief will be more perfect in us than an act of science and an act of understanding a first principle, which is very absurd, since acts of believing are accompanied by darkness and obscurity.

4. On the contrary: the Apostle enumerates faith, like charity, among the theological virtues; therefore it is an infused virtue like charity; and that it is necessary for us is plain, because in Hebrews 11 it is said, ‘without faith it is impossible to please God’; therefore etc.

To the Question

5. I reply first about acquired faith, and second about infused faith. Third I speak to the question.

6. About the first point I say that it is manifest there is in us acquired faith about matters of belief that are necessary for us for salvation. The point is plain, because, if there is one of the faithful and he happens to begin to err about just one article of faith while the others he retains, it is certain that the whole of infused faith is corrupted by this one error, otherwise faith and heresy would stand together with each other; and then too it is not a disposition for acquired faith. Therefore, the faith that he still has about the articles where he does not err is not infused faith, because the whole of infused faith has been corrupted. So it follows that it is acquired faith, which he first acquired for himself by hearing. This too is plain that, if a Jewish child was brought up among Christians and was not baptized, he would as firmly believe everything when adult as a Christian does. The same is plain from the Apostle in Romans 10, ‘How will they believe him who they have not heard? How will they hear without a preacher?’ Hence according to Paul faith is from hearing and hearing is from preaching. But it is plain that the argument holds only of acquired faith. Now, the fact that some things not necessary for salvation are firmly believed only by faith acquired through hearing is plain. For I most certainly believe that England exists which, however, I have never seen; but I believe those who have seen it, and so on in other cases.

7. From the things just said a corollary follows, namely that, in order for the articles of faith to be firmly believed, the other things too that are necessary for salvation are to be believed, and so firmly as not precisely to be altogether believed without fear of the other side of the contradiction. For this reason, infused faith is necessary, because faith acquired from hearing alone would suffice, as is plain from what was said. For sometimes a heretic exposes himself to death, just like one of the faithful, for the sake of what he has believed.

8. About the second point [n.5] I say that infused faith is similar to acquired faith in someone, because just as acquired faith rests on the truth of the one who asserts what I believe (so that because of him I believe it, because I believe that he who asserts it is truthful), so does infused faith rest on the truth of God revealing, so that I believe it to the extent I believe that God who reveals it is truthful. It is because God reveals such things supernaturally that therefore infused faith is a supernatural habit; and this is plain because it is obscure, without getting evidence from the object believed but resting on the truth of the revealer. And accordingly it can be said that there is one faith for all matters of belief, for it does not bear per se and ultimately on believed things under their proper ideas, but on the truth of the revealer, so that by the same habit by which one believes that God revealing is truthful, one believes that everything he reveals is also true.

9. But there is here considerable doubt. For I will say to you, ‘Why do you believe that God is truly three and one?’ You will say, ‘Because God who is truthful has revealed it. And God is truthful because God is God’, and there a stand is made. But I will say to you, ‘Why do you believe that God has revealed it, because he did not reveal it to you.’ If you say, ‘I believe because he has revealed that he is three and one, because he has revealed that he has revealed it,’ and so there is a regress to infinity, as is plain. If you were to say that you believe this by acquired faith, because the Church tells you that God has revealed himself to be three and one, then it follows that infused faith depends essentially on acquired faith, which is unacceptable. If you were to say, ‘I believe it for the reason that I find it thus written in the Gospel’, you do not escape, because I will then ask, ‘Why do you believe the Gospel?’ and so we will return to the same place.

10. And therefore one can speak differently about infused faith. I will say then as follows: The terms of the articles of faith in their proper essence are naturally unknown to us, and the combination of them in propositions is now naturally unknown to us. But because the terms, which are unknown to us in their proper essence, are naturally known to us under general and common concepts, so their combination, which is naturally unknown to us, is naturally neutral for us; and the denial of the combination is not naturally known to us, because then their falsity would be a known falsity for us.

11. I therefore next say that infused faith causes me to adhere firmly to the combination of the terms, which combination was however nothing naturally unknown. And so the above doubt will cease, because I do not say that infused faith makes me believe the articles that are revealed by God, whom I know or believe to be truthful; but I say that infused faith inclines me immediately to believe the combination of the terms which was naturally neutral for me. But as to the genus of cause that faith with respect to this act of believing is related to, I say that it is in the genus of partial efficient cause, and in this way the difference between acquired faith and infused faith is plain. If someone prefers the first way [n.10] let him solve the above stated doubt.

12. About the third point [n.5] I say that one must posit infused faith because of the authorities of the saints and of Scripture, but this cannot be demonstrated to one who refuses to believe but it is to be held by faith, so that just as I believe that God is three and one, so I believe that I have the infused habit of faith whereby I believe. But one can be led to this result as follows: for God is the most perfect physician so that whom he cures he cures perfectly. Thus he has repaired the whole idea of the image in us that was deformed by sin. So just as he has repaired the will through the infused habit of charity, so he has repaired the intellect through faith.

To the Arguments

13. To the first [n2] the response is plain from what was said. For even if we can have the whole act of belief through acquired faith, yet not as we can through infused and perfect faith. Hence I say that just as God can be loved by the will without infused charity, and just as a habit of understanding can be generated whereby the will is capable of every act of delight that it is capable of by charity, yet it is not capable of so intense and perfect an act. It is the same too on the part of the intellect and the habit of faith, for since a habit is a partial cause with respect to act, it contributes to the substance and intensity of the act; therefore if the habit is more perfect, the act too will be more perfect.

14. It follows too that just as delight without charity is not meritorious, so neither is the act of believing without infused faith.

15. To the second [n.3] I say that an act can be considered in two ways. In one way in itself according to its substance, and I concede that in this way an act elicited by a supernatural and more perfect habit is itself more perfect. In another way in comparison with its object, and then an act is said to be more perfect in two ways.

16. First because it is about a more perfect object, and in this way too the act of believing is more perfect than our act of knowing or of understanding principles, for the object is God. Second because it understands more perfectly the whole attainability of the object, and in this way the act of understanding the principle of knowing a conclusion is more perfect than an act of believing. But this does not happen because of imperfection in the habit of faith; it happens because of the excellence of the object.

17. An example: the eye of the eagle sees the sun and I see the single flame of a candle. I say that in itself and simply the sight of the eagle is a more perfect sight than mine, because elicited by a more perfect organ and about a more perfect object. However according to and in the second way stated [n.16], one sight is more perfect than another because it attains more the whole visibility of the object. In this respect too is valid what the Philosopher says in his book on Animals, that it is better to attain less of a noble object than more of another object.