I. To the Question

5. Damascene 58 [3.14] solves this question by saying that just as one must firmly hold by faith that in Christ there are two natures and a single hypostasis, so one must concede (as a consequent from it) that there are in him the natural properties and powers of each nature; but the most perfect powers of rational nature are intellect and will; so there are in him a created intellect and a created will.

6. In d.13 nn.53-54, 87 above it is maintained that there was supreme created grace in Christ and supreme created enjoyment, and in d.14 nn.58, 67-70 it is maintained that in him was all knowledge and supreme vision, by reason of the assumed nature.

7. The Church maintains the same in its Sixth Synod, when it determines that in Christ there are two wills and two operations [Canon ch.9, Gratian Decretum p.1 d.16 ch.16].

8. Since, therefore, knowledge [n.6] presupposes intellect and will, one must posit both powers in Christ in their best disposition; and so there is a created will in him.

9. But is the created will in Christ one only?

I reply that the will can be taken in its proper idea, or in its general idea and name, namely as appetite. If it is taken generally then there were at least three appetites in Christ, namely uncreated intellectual appetite, created rational appetite, and created irrational appetite (that is, sense appetite); but will properly speaking adds something to appetite, because it is “free appetite with reason” [Rhetoric 1.101369a24]. And so, strictly speaking, there were only two appetites in Christ.

10. But commonly speaking, and taking will in the sense of appetite, I think that in this way there were in Christ, as in us, as many appetites as there are in us distinct apprehending powers; and thus, just as there is a different apprehending of taste and sight and another of taste and smell, so there is a different appetite proper to this one and to that, and a different proper appetite consequent to this apprehending and to that.

11. However we commonly speak of the sense appetite as single, and it is the appetite that follows the imagining power, because just as the imagining power imagines the objects of each of the senses (in the presence and in the absence of those senses), so its appetite delights in them if they are agreeable, or is pained by them if they are disagreeable. But just as, notwithstanding the fact that the imagining power can thus imagine the objects of each of the senses (both in their presence and in their absence), we nevertheless posit certain particular senses that apprehend distinct particular objects - so, notwithstanding the fact that the appetite consequent to the imagining power can desire and rejoice in the agreeableness of every sensible particular and not desire or be pained by their disagreeableness, so by parity of reasoning one must posit distinct particular appetites that are consequent to particular apprehendings or to distinct apprehending powers; and there is the same necessity to power distinct appetites as there is to posit distinct apprehending powers.

12. But what of natural will and free will - are they two powers?

I say that natural appetite in any thing is taken as a general name for the natural inclination of a thing to its proper perfection - as a stone is inclined naturally to the center; and if in a stone that inclination is some absolute thing other than gravity (weight), then I believe as a result that in a like way the natural inclination of a man, as he is a man, to his proper perfection is something other than free will. But I believe the first point to be false, namely that the inclination of a stone to the center is some absolute thing other than gravity and is a different power, which different power has some operation toward the center, as some imagine; for then the operation would be miraculous, for there would be no possibility of giving a term to it since it would be a transient action passing outside to something other. And as the center is agreeable to it, it does not perform an action corruptive of it or preservative of it, since one cannot posit what that operation would be or what is the term of it, save perhaps that of the preserving of its proper ‘where’; for perhaps its ‘where’ in the center is continually coming to be (like light in the medium); but then the action is not to the center, for the ‘where’ is in the thing placed not in the thing that places it, and the center is what places a body in it; therefore the inclination does not state thing over and above gravity (weight) but the relation of the inclination of it to the center as to its proper perfection. Then I say that so also is it about the will, that natural will is not a will, nor is a natural willing a willing, but the term ‘natural’ diminishes both and is nothing but a relation consequent to the power in respect of its proper perfection; hence the same power can be called ‘natural will’ with a necessary respect to perfection consequent to it, and it is called ‘free’ according to its proper and intrinsic idea, which is will in the specific sense.

14. In another way will can be called natural as it is distinguished from supernatural power or will; and will as thus existing in its pure natural state is distinguished from itself as it is informed with the freely given gifts [of the spirit].

15. There is yet a third way in which ‘natural will’ is taken, namely as it elicits an act in conformity with natural inclination, which inclination is always toward the advantageous; and in this way the will is free in eliciting a conformed act as it is free in eliciting an opposite act, for in its power is the eliciting or not eliciting of a conformed act (the supernatural will elicits only conformed acts).