b. Rejection of the Opinion

30. Against these assertions.

First, it seems that the first root [n.27] is no root, because just as (according to him) “the first root of pain is an alteration in a fitting natural disposition that offends and corrupts it,” so the first root in pleasure is “an alteration in a fitting natural disposition that induces and preserves it.” But this alteration seems to be no alteration, for I ask what the term of the alteration is. Not the sensation itself because the alteration precedes the sensation as the first root precedes the second; nor much less can it be the sensation which follows the passion, because this sensation follows both roots; therefore the proper term is the disposition of both, which naturally precedes both every act of sense and every act of the delighting or sorrowing power. But nothing such seems necessary for pleasure, for nothing precedes the two of them save perhaps the species of the object; but if the species had thus pre-existed in the imaginative power, which conserves the species, there could no less be a new alteration, and every root necessary for pleasure should now be kept preserved. But if the sensation alone existed, there could no less be some pleasure, because there would no less be some perfect operation which, according to the Philosopher (Ethics 10.4.1174b18-23), is necessarily followed by pleasure.

31. Further, that the second root is sufficient without the first is proved by the fact that, although the organ of sense is a natural body (and so capable of undergoing a real passion), yet it is, as an organ of sense, so balanced that it is in proportion between the sense objects; in this way indeed is it of a nature to receive alterations in intention from the object as the object is a sense object; and in this way some object is agreeable to sense and another is disagreeable, and so is something that delights or pains. Therefore, even if every action prior to the intentional act were removed, still, provided the intentional act were of some thus disagreeable object in the organ (as it is a sense organ), or in the sense, pain would follow.

32. And this seems to be clear in the case of some of the senses, for although a disposition really preservative of an individual’s nature be induced by certain sense objects, yet these sense objects cause the feeling of pain if they are disagreeable to the senses as they are sense organs (as in the case of bitter medicine that pains the sense of taste, although it is healthy for the sick person [Ethics 10.2.1173b20-28]). For only the sense of touch is so bestowed by nature on animals that what disagrees with this sense as a sense accompanies what disagrees with it as a nature. And that is why the two alterations in the other senses go together even though one is of a different idea from the other, and even though the one that is sensed in the sense organ could be without the other (and conversely), and so the disagreeableness in the one could be without the disagreeableness in the other - and so pain without the first root.

33. As to the objection about the blessed [n.27], it will be touched on in Ord.4 d.44 p.2 q.2 nn.2-9, about how the bodies of the damned are made by corporeal fire to suffer.

34. As to the point about the difference between apprehension and perception [n.28], it seems that one power has only one perfect act at the same time; therefore the senses should not be posited as having two acts about their object at the same time, even though the same act qua ‘perfect’ could be called perception and qua ‘imperfect’ be called apprehension. So it is called apprehension when, namely, the operation of the senses is imperfect because the one sensing is distracted, being busied in his intention about the action of the other powers. Also, if apprehension and perception should be distinguished, perception seems more removed from pain than apprehension, because the operation that perception expresses seems to be more pleasant than the passion that apprehension expresses.

35. Also, what Henry seems to say of objects of sensitive perception as to their relations [sc. that they involve the idea of the agreeable and disagreeable, n.28] is not correct, because no sense can perceive the relations but perceives only certain non-relational or absolute things that are the principles which move the senses; but relations are not principles of moving any sense to any act.

36. Likewise, if the relations are posited to be objects of an act other than apprehension, it seems one should posit two acts of sight and two acts of hearing (and so on of each sense), one of which would apprehend color or sound and the other of which would perceive the intentions that circumstance them, because powers get their distinctions from distinct first objects.

37. What is cited from De Motu Animalium [n.28] does not serve to show that the intentions of agreeable and disagreeable cause the first bodily passions in the heart that the animal passions follow, nor even that they cause those very animal passions - rather it serves to show that the very sense objects, which are displayed in imagination (and which Aristotle is there talking about), or the imaginations themselves by virtue of the objects, cause such passions; and so the text serves to show that one must posit as causing pain ideas that are objective and are different from relational ones.