IV. To the Third Question

79. To the third question [n.19] I say that the phrase ‘the soul being able to enjoy supremely’ can be understood in two ways: either formally or elicitively, that is, either that supreme enjoyment informs Christ’s will (by whatever cause), or that his will elicits this enjoyment and is the active cause with respect to it.

80. In the first way, it is possible for the highest creatable enjoyment to be conferred on Christ’s soul, because his soul is receptive of any accident that befits him whatever and in the highest degree (if his soul does not determine for itself a definite degree), just as was proved in the first question about grace [nn.45-48]; and enjoyment is a certain absolute accident, capable of being created by the first cause immediately without the action of the created will.

81. In the second way, it seems probable that as the human will cannot have as much active force as another created will can have (as an angel’s), it cannot elicit enjoyment as perfectly as some other will can; for although it could have the highest grace, which, as partial cause with respect to enjoyment, would equally cause enjoyment in itself and in an angel (if the angel had enjoyment), yet the other partial cause, namely the will, will be unequal; but when one of two causes is deficient, the effect is deficient, if the remaining partial cause is equal. But now in fact Christ’s soul is elicitive to the greatest extent, because although his will is not as perfectly active as an angel’s will, yet along with supreme grace - as the other active partial cause - it has power for a greater enjoyment than the will of an angel with less grace has, because the excellence of grace in it surpasses the efficacy of the will of an angel.