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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 3. Distinctions 1 - 17.
Book 3. Distinctions 1 - 17
Eleventh Distinction.
Question One. Whether Christ is a Creature
I. To the Question
A. The Solution of Others

A. The Solution of Others

1. First Solution

11. One statement is [Bonaventure] that the proposition ‘Christ is a creature’ is to be denied because there is no sharing of attributes where the property of one nature is repugnant to the other nature [cf. III d.7 n.54], as is the case here, because ‘creature’ includes the idea of a beginning of existence and so it is repugnant to the eternity that is an attribute of the Son of God.

12. On the contrary:

It is no more repugnant to the person of the Son that he is or begins to be after not being than that he is not after being or that he ceases to be, for both are repugnant to eternity; but Christ is admitted to have died, even though ‘to be dead’ states a not-being after being because it states not being alive after being alive; for ‘to be alive is what it is for living things to be’ (Aristotle On the Soul 2.4.425b13); therefore etc.

13. Further, mortal and immortal are as opposed as created and uncreated, and yet both of the former are said of Christ; therefore etc.

14. Further, it is as formally repugnant to a created nature that it be creator or eternal as it is formally repugnant to something eternal that it begin to be; therefore Christ’s being Creator will be as much denied because of repugnance to one nature as his being a creature will be denied because of repugnance to the other nature.

2. Second Solution

15. Another solution [Aquinas] is to say that there is no sharing of attributes in the case of negations, or in the case of things that state the respect of one nature to the other.

The first point is plain, for otherwise contradictories would be said absolutely of Christ; for any negation belongs to one of the natures when the opposite affirmation naturally inheres in it by reason of the other nature, as with ‘the divine nature is eternal’ and ‘the human nature is non-eternal’. But if, for this reason, Christ were said to be non-eternal, then he would be said to be eternal and non-eternal. Negations, therefore, that inhere by reason of one of the natures (because they inhere in a certain respect, namely with a disjoining determination) do not denominate simply what they are said of.

Likewise the second point, about things stating the respect of one nature to the other, is clear: for it does not follow that if the human nature is assumed then the divine nature is assumed, because ‘creature’ not only includes negation, namely non-being before being, but also the respect of one nature to the other, namely to the one from which it receives being; therefore these will not be said of the whole.

16. On the contrary:

As ‘creature’ states the respect of one nature to the other, as of the human nature to the divine nature, so it seems that ‘Creator’ does so conversely, namely that it states a respect of the divine nature to the human; therefore if things that state a respect are not said of the whole, Christ will not be Creator. A negation too can be found that would be introduced by the name ‘Creator’, as ‘not to receive from another’, just as in the name ‘creature’ is introduced ‘receiving from another’ or ‘not existing of itself’; therefore, just as Christ is not called ‘creature’ because of the negation included, so he will, for the same reason, not be called ‘Creator’.

17. Further, ‘Christ is less than the Father’ is conceded absolutely and is stated in John 14.28 - yet it states a respect of one nature to the other, because Christ is not less than the Father save in his human nature.

2. Third Solution

18. Another solution [William de la Mare] is that the proposition is simply to be conceded provided it is properly understood; it was, however, commonly denied by the saints because of the heresies of those heretics who said that Christ was a pure creature, and the saints did not want to share with them in their words.

19. And that it can be conceded by virtue of the words is proved from Damascene [ch.48], who says that “Christ is created and uncreated, passible and impassible,” and again the same Damascene concedes [ch.91] that he can be called ‘creature’. There is proof also from Augustine On the Sermon on the Mount [Sermon 186], “he who was Creator wanted to be a creature;” and from Jerome On Ephesians 2.10, ‘We are his handiwork’, who says, “Many are fearful lest they be compelled to say Christ is a creature; we proclaim that there is no danger in saying Christ is a creature.”